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Constitutional Tales of Violence: Populists,
Outgroups, and the Multicultural Landscape
of the Second Amendment
David C. Williams*
Traditionally, populists have claimed the Second Amendment as their particular cultural
property; by contrast, outgroups and elites have found the Amendment somewhat culturally
alien. Recently, some outgroup members have argued that their groups ought to embrace the
Amendment because the right to keep and bear arms can be a valuable way of resistingpopulist
oppression. This Article explores this changing multicultural landscape of the Second
Amendment It recognizes that in particular instances and in the short term, outgroups might
need to arm themselves against hate violence. It argues, however, that only a consensus culture
on the use of violence will provide any real protection to outgroups in the long run. The new
outgroup theories oftheAmendmentfrustrate the creation of such a culture because they rest on
a constitutional vision of decentralized violence, premised on the inevitability of mutual
suspicion and thefndamentality ofrelating through arms. Such a regime will ultimately benefit
populists more than outgroups. In other words, in the long run, these constitutional tales of
violence will actually be counterproductive to the goal of outgroup safety that they seek to
secure.
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For some time, the Second Amendment has led a dual life. On
one hand, commentators have approached it as a formal rule of law. In
this guise, some have interpreted it as protecting arms bearing only
within a state militia; others have interpreted it as protecting an
individual right to keep and bear arms, for self-defense, hunting, or
even resistance to government. Both schools of thought, however,
share one conviction: the right to arms does not peculiarly belong to
any subculture, any identity group, any race, religion, or gender. On
the other hand, commentators have also approached the Amendment
as a cultural document. In this guise, the Amendment does have a
particular constituency. The "gun culture" has embraced the provision
as its special property, interpreting it as a personal right to arms, while
other groups have been notably cooler toward the provision.
The gun culture is generally described as masculine, rural,
conservative, and nativist-in other words, the general population out
of which American populist movements have traditionally grown.
Like other populisms, the gun culture has defined itself in opposition
to two enemies. First, the culture has overtly opposed liberal, urban,
educated, and cosmopolitan elites who would take away its guns;
second, the culture has also opposed-overtly in the past, less overtly
in the present-various outgroups, including Jews, feminists, and
African-Americans. For their part, these various outgroups have
generally agreed that they find the Second Amendment, with its
implicit threat of private violence, alien to their cultures. Indeed, the
Second Amendment has been the site of a conflict that approaches a
culture war.
In recent years, however, the cultural landscape of the Second
Amendment has become more complicated. Certain Jews, feminists,
and African-Americans have begun to argue that outgroups should
embrace the Second Amendment, and that the experience of outgroups
as oppressed minorities provides a reason to interpret the Amendment
as a personal right to arms. In brief, these theorists argue that "if you
can't join 'em, then fight 'em." Because part of America will always
be armed and hostile toward outgroups, outgroups should become
armed and hostile themselves, using the masters' tools to dismantle the
389
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masters' houses. In short, the Second Amendment has become
multicultural: populists claim it for themselves, but so do some
outgroup members.
Although relatively few in number, these new outgroup theorists
of the Second Amendment pose a question that is of enormous,
perhaps ultimate, significance to a constitutional republic. In theory,
the Constitution promises a scheme of law that is tolerant toward
outgroups, protective of individual rights, and resting on the consent of
the governed. In practice, however, whether America delivers on
those promises depends on the constitutional organization of force. If
the means of violence resides in the wrong hands, then the promises
will amount to nothing. These outgroup theories of the Second
Amendment maintain that America will most likely fulfill its
constitutional promises if the means of violence is broadly diffused
through the population-and so we should read the Amendment to
protect an individual right to keep and bear arms.
This Article considers how we might best interpret the
constitutional organization of violence so as to protect outgroups. To
do this, the Article analyzes the relationship between outgroups and
populists in the new multicultural landscape of the Second
Amendment. After surveying the terrain, it argues that culturally, the
Second Amendment lends itself most effectively to populist
interpretations, because conditions of decentralized violence generally
favor armed, violent, and exclusionary populist movements. Outgroup
self-arming may in the short term- provide a measure of safety, but in
the long run, interpreting the Constitution to require decentralized
violence will impede the formation of a consensus culture that extends
protection to all.
Part I describes the traditional landscape of the Second
Amendment. Some commentators have approached the Amendment
as an acultural formal rule, as a protection either for state militias or for
abstract individuals connected to no particular identity group. In
practice, however, the Second Amendment has worn very distinctive
cultural clothing. Claiming to be the legatees of the Founders and
therefore the true American people, members of the gun culture have
adopted the Amendment as the central icon of their vision of America.
By contrast, both urban elites and outgroups have rejected the
Amendment as alien to their respective cultures.
Part II describes the recent adoption of the Amendment by
members of three outgroups-Jews, feminists, and African-
[Vol. 74:387390
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Americans.! These outgroup theories share two features. First, they
argue that, from the perspective of their respective groups with their
history of victimization, the Second Amendment should best be
interpreted as protecting a personal right to arms, so that group
members can arm themselves against private and public hate violence.
Second, they argue that the Second Amendment projects a social
world that is fragmented into hostile identity groups; for that reason,
outgroup members need a personal right to arms. As a result, although
these theories seek to guarantee an individual right to arms, they
contemplate that individuals will use their arms in highly political
ways. As members of identity groups, they will-severally and
collectively-resist attacks by members of other identity groups. In
the long run, such self-defense efforts will not only protect individuals;
they will also help break the power of anti-Semitism, misogyny, and
racism.
Part Ill analyzes these outgroup theories on their own terms. By
way of internal critique, it considers whether interpreting the Second
Amendment as an individual right will help to protect outgroups. All
of the outgroup theories argue for a scheme of decentralized
violence-because the state is incompetent or oppressive, outgroups
will flourish best when everyone is armed, allowing outgroups to
defend themselves. In fact, however, under conditions of
decentralized violence, outgroups typically suffer because such
conditions generally encourage and benefit angry populist movements.
Outgroup theorists may respond that although decentralized violence
may be bad for outgroups, centralized control of violence would be
even worse, because the state would fail to protect, or would actively
oppress, them. And indeed, these theorists make a persuasive case that
outgroups would be unwise to repose perfect trust in the state. For that
reason, it might be prudent for outgroup members to arm themselves
against the present threat of hate violence, and it might be good policy
for the state to permit them to arm themselves.
Because much of this Article is a critique of these outgroup
theories, let me reemphasize this point: I am not arguing that as a
matter of prudence and policy, outgroup members should go without
1. At least one gay organization in New York City has also embraced the right to
arms as a response to gay bashing. See Alisa Solomon, Fired Up: Should Gays Cany
Guns?, VILLAGE VoicE, Nov. 27, 1990, at 43, 43-44. Regrettably, I have been unable to
obtain material explaining their interpretation of the Amendment in detail. I also have
personal knowledge that some militant Native Americans are also great believers in the
Amendment as a personal right to arms. Again, however, I have not been able to find
adequate documentary evidence of their view.
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guns. Instead, I offer a critique of these outgroup theories, not as
counsels of prudence, but as constitutional prescriptions-as
constitutional tales of violence. The outgroup theorists ultimately
leave outgroups in a hopeless situation-they must choose between
decentralized violence, with its threat of private oppression, or
centralized violence, with its threat of public neglect or oppression.
Outgroups need to strive for a more hopeful third option-a consensus
culture that is not filled with hatred. In the absence of such a culture,
outgroups will inevitably suffer, no matter who controls the means of
violence. These outgroup theories of the Second Amendment,
however, frustrate the development of such a culture. The theories do
not merely urge outgroups to take up arms against a world presently
filled with hatred; they also argue that the Constitution itself assumes
that the world will always be filled with hatred. For that reason,
according to outgroup theorists, the Second Amendment guarantees to
outgroups a permanent right to arms-their ultimate hope for safety in
an unsafe world.
We define our hopes and dreams, in part, through the
constitutional tales that we tell. The constitutional tales of violence
told by these outgroups offer no possibility of redemption; they tell us
that we can realistically hope for no more than the present. In so
doing, they deny to the Constitution one of its most important roles-
that of an ideal of social justice which we may never realize but
toward which we are commanded to aspire. Outgroups have always
needed the Constitution to fill that role, and they still do, precisely
because of the rising tide of hate violence. Angry and exclusive
populists may rest content with a fragmented and violent social world
because such conditions favor their dominance. Outgroups, by
contrast, may prudentially arm themselves in recognition of the
present threat, but if they wish for safety, they can never stop dreaming
of a better day.
i. THE TRADITIONAL LANDSCAPE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
A. The Formal Second Amendment
Traditionally, theorists of the Second Amendment have held two
different positions on the provision's formal meaning.2 First, the
states'-rights view3 places primary emphasis on the introductory clause
of the Amendment, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
2. See David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The
Temrifing Second Amendment, 101 YALEL.J. 551,556-59 (1991).
3. See id. at 558.
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security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed."4 In this view, that introductory clause explains
the purpose of the Amendment-to protect state militias so that they
may resist federal tyranny.5 Importantly, for those of this position, the
Amendment does not convey an individual right to arms for self-
defense, hunting, or any other purpose.6
By contrast, the individual rights position places primary
emphasis on the latter part of the Amendment. They point out that the
provision protects a right of "the people," not the state governments,
and they further maintain that in the late eighteenth century, the
unorganized militia included every male of arms-bearing age.7
Proponents of this view acknowledge that the Amendment specifies a
"well regulated Militia," but they argue that "well regulated" means
"well trained," rather than "government-controlled." 8 The Framers of
the Amendment believed in the right to arms both because an
unorganized militia might need to resist tyrannical government and
because individuals possess a right to personal self-defense.9 Thus, the
Amendment conveys the right to bear arms upon all individuals, not a
state body like the militia.'
Elsewhere, I have offered a third interpretation that combines
elements of both positions." In my view, the purpose of the
Amendment was to allow the body of the people to make a revolution
against tyrannical government.' In the Framers' minds, any such
revolution would have to be made by the people as a whole, rather
than a faction, so that the revolution would be dedicated to the
common good, rather than the partial good of a few.'3 For that reason,
4. U.S. CoNsT. amend. II (emphasis added).
5. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AD DISTRusT: A THEORY OF JuDIcIAL
REvIw 94-95, 227 n.76 (1980).
6. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrIoNAL LAW 299 n.6 (2d ed.
1988); Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth.
Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTONL. REV. 5,33-35 (1989).
7. See Williams, supra note 2, at 558.
8. See Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to
Self-Preservation, 39 U. ALA. L. REv. 103, 106 (1987).
9. See Williams, supra note 2, at 558-59.
10. See, e.g., Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of
the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204, 211-18 (1983); Sanford Levinson, The
Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 637-57 (1989); Lund, supra note 8;
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REv. 461,
466-71 (1995).
11. See Williams, supra note 2; David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and
Second Amendment Revolution: Conjuring with the People, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 879
(1996).
12. See Williams, supra note 11, at 892.
13. See id. at 904-05.
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the Amendment contemplated that the right to arms would belong to
the whole of the citizenry-just as the individual rights view
maintains. 4 For the Framers, however, the citizenry must be civic
republican in nature; it must exhibit a high degree of consensus and
civic virtue.15 Importantly, it must not be a collection of atomistic
individuals with radically different ends, desires, and values.16
Otherwise, any revolution will turn into vicious civil war, rather than a
united campaign against erring government. For that reason, for the
Amendment to make sense on its own tenns, the right to arms may be
possessed only by a civic republican citizenry. 7 In other words, the
right to arms does belong to every individual citizen, but only if they
are united into a coherent revolutionary people. As I do not believe
that Americans presently comprise such a citizenry, I do not believe
that the Amendment applies to modem conditions, by its own frame of
reference.'
8
These formal views thus all disagree on important substantive
matters, and the disagreement is often quite rancorous. 9 All of these
views, however, share important features. They rest on purportedly
universal and objective natural rights of self-defense and revolution,
and they assign those rights to abstract individuals, not to groups or
individuals defined by their religion, gender, or race. For example, the
individual rights view offers a basically liberal/Lockean analysis. All
individuals possess a natural right to self-defense, against private
parties and tyrannical governments. That right is not a matter of
conventional values, particular discourses, or cultural traditions; rather,
it is objectively true. In this sense, the Second Amendment did not
create a right to anms; it merely recognized a preexisting natural right.
For the same reason, the right belongs to all individuals qua
individuals, regardless of their backgrounds." In discussing the right
to revolution in particular, the individual rights view assumes that
Americans constitute a homogeneous, united people capable of
making a unified revolution, rather than a severely divided
14. See id. at 904-22.
15. See id. at906-09.
16. See id. at904.
17. See id. at 904-09.
18. See Williams, supra note 2, at 554; Williams, supra note 11, at 952.
19. See Andrew Jay McClurg, The Rhetoric of Gun Control, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 53,
57-59 (1992).
20. See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
CONSTrrTUmONAL RIGHT 24-32 (1984); Kates, supra note 10, at 232-35; Lund, supra note 8,
at 117-21; Reynolds, supra note 10, at 466-71.
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population.21 The states' rights view is somewhat less universal in that
the right to arms belongs only to members of state militias, not to all
individuals.22 It assigns the right to militia members, however, in their
status as abstract citizens, not as concrete human beings with specific
religious, gender, and racial identities.23 It traces the Amendment,
moreover, to a general right to resist tyranny, rather than to anything
less universal.24 My own view is similar in that it bases the right to
bear arms on a natural right to resist revolution, and it assigns the right
to a united, homogeneous citizenry, not to one riven by religious,
gender, and racial wars.25
Considered thus as a set of formal propositions, the Second
Amendment should be seen not only for what it is, but also for what it
is not. First, it is not the cultural property of a particular group in
American society. Second, it envisions the social world as composed
of deracialized, degendered citizens or individuals, not as a highly
fractured collection of particular cultural identities.
B. The Cultural Landscape of the Second Amendment
1. The Gun Culture
If the formal Second Amendment exhibits all of these
characteristics, there is nonetheless a very different way to approach
the Second Amendment-as a primary cultural text in an ongoing
Kulturkampf So considered, the Amendment is not a culturally
neutral rule but the central constitutional provision for a special
constituency-the so-called gun culture.26 Thus, arguments about gun
control and the Second Amendment are not just arguments about guns;
rather, they are arguments about a whole collection of values, for
which guns serve as a symbol. The national discussion on the
Amendment and gun control is hence marked by uncommon rancor,
because the participants are arguing about the value of different ways
of life.
21. See Williams, supra note 11, at 911-15.
22. See, e.g., Ehnman & Henigan, supra note 6, at 33-35.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See Williams, supra note 2, at 577-79; Williams, supra note 11, at 904-11.
26. As autobiographical revelation seems to have become the norm in the field of
Second Amendment studies, to reveal possible authorial bias, let me offer the following
information. I grew up with guns and the gun culture. I have owned guns all my life, and I
will probably continue owning them as long as the law allows. I do not believe that guns are
inherently evil. I am, however, profoundly weary and suspicious of the culture's claim to
superior virtue.
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Some years ago, B. Bruce-Briggs offered what has become the
classic exposition of this cultural battlefield.27 Because of its influence
and accuracy, it is worth quoting at some length:
[U]nderlying the gun control struggle is a fundamental division in our
nation. The intensity of passion on this issue suggests to me that we are
experiencing a sort of low-grade war going on between two alternative
views of what America is and ought to be. On the one side are those
who take bourgeois Europe as a model of a civilized society: a society
just, equitable, and democratic; but well ordered, with the lines of
responsibility and authority clearly drawn, and with decisions made
rationally and correctly by intelligent men for the entire nation. To such
people, hunting is atavistic, personal violence is shameful, and
uncontrolled gun ownership is a blot upon civilization.
On the other side is a group of people who do not tend to be
especially articulate or literate, and whose worldview is rarely
expressed in print. Their model is that of the independent frontiersman
who takes care of himself and his family with no interference from the
state. They are "conservative" in the sense that they cling to America's
unique pre-modem tradition-a nonfeudal society with a sort of
medieval liberty writ large for every man. To these people,
"sociological" is an epithet. Life is tough and competitive. Manhood
means responsibility and caring for your own.
This hard-core group is probably very small, not more than a few
million people, but it is a dangerous group to cross. From the point of
view of a right-wing threat to internal security, these are perhaps the
people who should be disarmed first, but in practice they will be the
last .... They consider themselves no threat to anyone; they are not
criminals, not revolutionaries. But, slowly, as they become politicized,
they find an analysis that fits the phenomenon they experience:
Someone fears their having guns, someone is afraid of their defending
their families, property, and liberty. Nasty things may happen if these
people begin to feel that they are cornered.8
Historians Lee Kennett and James LaVeme Anderson offered a
similar analysis:
The gun, then, is part of a whole series of traditional attitudes about
government, society, and the individual. They run, like so many
threads, through the whole tapestry of the national past. In its essence,
the gun controversy is a struggle between these attitudes and new ones.
The city has spawned the new and negative view of the gun; rural and
27. See B. Bruce-Briggs, The Great American Gun War, reprinted in THE GUN
CONTROL DEBATE: You DEciDE 63 (Lee Nisbet ed., 1990) [hereinafter TuE GuN CoNTROL
DEBATE].
28. Id. at 84.
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small town America tends to hold to the older, more positive view.
There is also evidence of cleavage along class lines....
... [T]he gun controversy [is] a skirmish in the larger battle over the
nation's cultural values, a battle in which "cosmopolitan America" is
pitted against "bedrock America."... Cosmopolitan America foresees
a new age when guns and the need for them will disappear; bedrock
America conceives of it as 1984. Cosmopolitan America has always
been concemed about its intemational image; bedrock America has
always been nativist.29
After examining the writings of the gun press at length, another
analyst summarizes the themes of the gun culture thusly: (1) "The gun
owner is a patriot"; (2) "The gun owner is social"; (3) "The gun owner
appreciates nature"; (4) "The gun owner is able to survive through his
weapons"; and (5) "The gun owner respects tradition and the teachings
of his elders."'3
Finally, sociologists James D. Wright, Peter H. Rossi, and
Kathleen Daly offer a similar characterization:
The values of this [gun] culture are best typified as rural rather than
urban: they emphasize independence, self-sufficiency, mastery over
nature, closeness to the land, and so on. Within this culture, the
ownership and use of firearms are both normal and normatively
prescribed, and training in the operation and use of small arms is very
much a part of what fathers are expected to provide to their sons-in
short, this training is part and parcel of coming of age.31
2. The Gun Culture's Enemies: The Liberal Elite
Both partisans32 and enemies33 of the gun culture in America thus
agree on one point: a distinctive gun culture does exist, and it is at the
center of intense cultural division. There are, however, multiple ways
to describe the enemies of the gun culture. One way characterizes the
enemy as the liberal power-elite that would take away the gun
29. LEE KENNET & JAMES LAVERNE ANDERSON, THE GUN IN AMERICA: THE
ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL DILEMMA 254-55 (1975).
30. Eugene H. Balof, Popular and Media Images of Firearms in American Culture,
in THE GUN CULTURE AND ITS ENEMIES 153, 158-60 (William R. Tonso ed., 1990)
[hereinafter THE GUN CuLTuR E] (emphasis omitted).
31. JAMES D. WRIGHT Er AL., UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA 113 (1983).
32. Perhaps the most prominent academic partisan is William R. Tonso, a sociologist
at the University of Evansville. See, e.g., William R. Tonso, A 'iewfrom Inside the Gun
Culture, in THE GUN CULTURE, supra note 30, at 7.
33. Perhaps the most prominent opponent was the late historian Richard Hofstadter.
See, e.g., Richard Hofstadter, America as a Gun Culture, in THE GUN CONTROL DEBATE,
supra note 27, at 25.
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culture's guns. This characterization emphasizes several fault lines.
The first is geographic. The gun culture is predominantly rural and
small-town, and its enemies are predominantly urban.34 Moreover, the
South would appear to be a special center of the gun culture.35 The
second fault line is ideological. Cosmopolitan America believes in
bureaucratic rationality and state authority, and bedrock America
believes in armed self-reliance.36 The third fault line is class. The gun
culture is predominantly working class, its enemies predominantly
professional and upper-middle class.37 The fourth fault line involves
internationalization. The gun culture tends toward nativism,
suspecting foreign ideas, while its enemies welcome them.' The fifth
fault line involves control of the production of knowledge. The gun
culture believes that its enemies in the media and the academy have
created a stereotyped image of gun owners.39 The sixth fault line is
chronological. The gun culture sees itself as the preserver of
traditional American values, its enemies as the proponents of liberal
new ideas, especially collectivism.4"
In short, in this description, the cultural landscape of the Second
Amendment is divided between bedrock and cosmopolitan America.
34. Statistics bear out this observation: many more people per capita own arms in
rural areas than in cities. See WRGHT ET AL., supra note 31, at 104-05; James D. Wright &
Linda L. Marston, The Ownership of the Means of Destruction: Weapons in the United
States, 23 Soc. PROBS. 93, 95 (1975).
35. Some sociologists have argued that the South exhibits a distinctive subculture of
violence-a set of family-transmitted values that glorifies violence. See Raymond D. Gastil,
Homicide and a Regional Culture of iolence, 36 AM. Soc. REv. 412 (1971); Sheldon
Hackney, Southern Violence, in THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND
COMPARATIVE PERs1EcnvoS 505 (Hugh Davis Graham & Ted Robert Gurr eds., 1969).
Others have contested this claim, arguing that the South's rural geography, rather than any
distinctive culture, accounts for its gun-loving ways. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 31, at
109-12. In either event, the South is plainly a particular center of the gun culture. Per capita,
Southerners own more arms, see id. at 106-07; BUREAu OF JUSTICE STATISnrCS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SoURCEBOOK OF CRIaNAL JUSTICE STATISTCS-1987, at 169 tbl.2.50 (Timothy J.
Flanagan & Katherine M. Jamieson eds., 1988) [hereinafter SOURcEBOOK]; Wright &
Marston, supra note 34, at 95, and commit more violent crimes than other Americans, see
DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, TmE MOUNTIE, AND THE CowBoy: SHOULD AMERICA ADoPT
THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMocRACES? 159 (1992); Bruce-Briggs, supra note 27, at
80, and Southern politicians vote against gun control in greater percentages, see Balof, supra
note 30, at 153-54; Hofstadter, supra note 33, at 33.
36. See supra text accompanying note 29.
37. See Wright & Marston, supra note 34, at 95-99. In fact, while the gun culture
may be concentrated in the working class, gun ownership is concentrated in the middle and
upper middle classes, no doubt because those classes have the means to purchase guns. See
SOURCE3OOK, supra note 35, at 169 tbl.2.50; WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 31, at 107-08;
Wright & Marston, supra note 34, at 95-97.
38. See supra text accompanying note 29.
39. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
40. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
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In describing the landscape this way, many commentators emphasize
the relative powerlessness of the gun culture.41 Today, the culture feels
embattled, distant from the centers of power, and disdained by an
urban elite.42 Thus, Sanford Levinson writes:
For too long, most members of the legal academy have treated the
Second Amendment as the equivalent of an embarrassing relative ....
Those of us who agree with [an] emphasis on the desirability of
encouraging different "voices" in the legal conversation should be
especially aware of the importance of recognizing the attempts of [gun
culture members] to join the conversation.... [S]urely the call for
sensitivity to different or excluded voices cannot extend only to those
groups "we" already, perhaps "complacent[ly]," believe have a lot to
tell "us.""
3
Wright, Rossi, and Daly hit the same note:
To members of the gun subculture ... , the indictments of gun
control advocates must appear to be incomprehensible, if not simply
demeaning. We should not be surprised to learn that they may resent
being depicted as irresponsible, nervous, [and] potentially dangerous
.... Indeed, one can only begin to understand the virulence with which
gun control initiative[s] are opposed in these quarters when one realizes
that what may be at stake is a way of life.
A critical issue in modem America is whether the doctrine of
cultural pluralism should or should not be extended to cover the
members of the gun subculture. 4
3. The Gun Culture's Enemies: Outgroups
In this map of the Second Amendment's cultural landscape,
outgroups as such do not overtly make an appearance. The gun
culture's enemy is an urban elite that, on its face, is not associated with
41. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 10, at 658-59.
42. See id.
43. Id. (footnote omitted) (alteration in original).
44. WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 31, at 323-24. Other writers, more clearly partisans of
the gun culture, argue even more emphatically that gun owners are an embattled, even
victimized, class, and that the urban elite, especially the media elite, view them with disdain,
ignorance, and bigotry. See, e.g., Brendan .J. Fumish, The New Class and the California
Handgun Initiative: Elitist Developed Law as Gun Control, in THE GuN CULTURE, supra
note 30, at 127, 127-39; Richard Hummel, Firearms' Stereotypes in American TV and
Films: "Truth?" and Consequences, in THE GUN CULTURE, supra note 30, at 143, 143-52;
William R. Tonso, Social Problems and Sagecraft: Gun Control as a Case in Point, in THE
GuN CONTROL DEBATE, supra note 27, at 35, 4041; William R. Tonso, The Media and Gun
Control: A Case Study in World-View Pushing, in THE GUN CULTURE, supra note 30, at 185,
185-87.
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a particular religion, gender, or race. Indeed, to the extent that any
bloc appears as an outgroup, it is the gun culture itself, powerless and
reviled by those in power.
It is possible, however, to observe a different division in the
cultural landscape. The gun culture-as part of bedrock America-
has always proudly proclaimed itself to be the voice of the true
American people. In this self-image, the culture is not an embattled
outgroup, but rather the very definition of 100% Americanism.
Correlatively, the enemies of the gun culture include not merely urban
elites, but everyone who would contest that self-image. This definition
embraces outgroups like Jews, feminists; and African-Americans, who
would challenge or complicate traditional notions of American
identity.
If members of the gun culture today feel embattled, they have not
always felt so. Indeed, traditionally, these Americans have seen
themselves as the populist defenders of the establishment, the forces of
law, order, and authority.45 As such, members of the gun culture were
responsible for policing "deviant" elements within American society.46
Tracing the origin of the modem gun culture, Kennett and Anderson
explain:
[l]n the development of American society the enemy became internal.
Society felt threatened by criminals, ethnic groups, racial groups,
rioters, and malcontents .... Violence became more closely associated
with the use of firearms .... [T]he Americans of the nineteenth century
became armed individuals as a reaction to the increasing diversity and
complexity of their society.47
In that environment,
pervasive was the idea that the gun helped preserve the social fabric of
the nation, "the establishment." Those who were not in that
establishment, notably slaves and Indians were the only people who
had no business being armed. Even if they were, their cause was
hopeless, for they would be outgunned.... Perhaps this was not the
best solution, but it was a distinctly American one, incorporating the
idea that the gun is its own antidote.... Elsewhere the armed masses
remained a vision of revolutionaries. In America, by a curious
48inversion, they became a symbol of order and a conservative totem.
45. See KENN= & ANDERSON, supra note 29, at 163-64.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at251-52.
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Richard Hofstadter similarly writes, "[]n the historic system of the
South, having a gun was a white prerogative .... [and] an important
symbol of white male status."'
In his massive three-volume study of the myth of the frontier,
Richard Slotkin exhaustively examines the way that myths of violence
have supported dominant groups and subordinated outgroups ° In
particular, he argues that the myth of the frontier-that America takes
its special character from its frontier origins-has been one of the
central organizing stories of American popular culture."1 Primary
components of the myth of the frontier are "regeneration through
violence" and "savage war.'5 2  According to this mythology
Americans have achieved progress by separation from civilization on
the frontier, regression to a more primitive state, and then redemption
by means of violence.5 3 The most common form of such regeneration
is the "savage war": "[-]neluctable political and social differences-
rooted in some combination of 'blood' and culture-make coexistence
between primitive natives and civilized Europeans impossible on any
basis other than that of subjugation.... [B]ecause of the 'savage' and
bloodthirsty propensity of the natives, such struggles inevitably
become 'wars of extermination."' 4 These myths thus originated in the
European experience with Indians," but later Americans used them as
a favorite framework to explain the need to deal violently with
resistance of any kind-labor unrest, class warfare,56 African-
American unrest, 7 the Vietnam War,"8 and the drug war.59 In every
case, this national mythology provided a rationale for white male
49. Hofstadter, supra note 33, at 33. Many right-to-arms proponents do not deny
these attempts by the dominant elements in society to disarm outgroups and to arm
themselves; indeed, they emphasize them, arguing that the Second Amendment right to arms
is important precisely because gun control has so often been a means to disarm "deviant"
elements. See discussion infra text accompanying note 142. They generally fail to note,
however, that such attempts to disarm outgroups are as often a product of the gun culture
itself as they are of the urban elite.
50. See RICHARD SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION: THE MYTH OF THE FRONTIER IN
TwENTIETH-CENTuRY AMERICA (1992) [hereinafter SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION];
RICHARD SLOTKIN, REGENERATION THROUGH VIOLENCE: THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE
AMERICAN FRONTIER, 1600-1860 (1973); RICHARD SLOTION, THE FATAL ENViRONME : THE
MYTH OF THE FRONTIER IN THE AGE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1800-1890 (1985).
51. See SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION, supra note 50, at 10.
52. Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 14.
56. See id. at 18-19, 42-49.
57. See id. at 19, 549-52.
58. See id. at 544-47.
59. See id. at 649-52.
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supremacy: "Even in its liberal form, the traditional Myth of the
Frontier was exclusionist in its premises, idealizing the White male
adventurer as the hero of national history."'
To this day, the gun culture often portrays itself not as one culture
among many but as the true, authentic, and exclusive American culture.
This self-portrait is most vicious among members of the militia
movement. As I have argued elsewhere, militia writers interpret the
Second Amendment as conferring a right to revolution on a unified
American people composed of people like themselves and excluding a
variety of others-blacks, Jews, secularists, internationalists, non-
libertarians, etc.61 That self-portrait, moreover, is not limited to the
militia fringe; even moderates in the gun culture describe it as the
quintessence of the American experience. Thus, Eugene Balof writes:
"Bearing arms is thus seen as not only a defense of the nation, but
more importantly, the possession, use, and interest in arms is seen as a
uniquely American... trait. The gun owner is an American just as the
American is a gun owner."62
Even law review writers identify the gun culture with a truer or
more fundamental American culture. Most often, these writers argue
that the gun culture is the legitimate descendant of the Framers'
worldview, and gun culture opponents are therefore cultural
aulanders. 63 In aijguing that the right to arms should be protected
through the Ninth Amendment, Nicholas Johnson states: 'By many
accounts the framers envisioned a rural agrarian based America....
[W]e can usefully ask whether disarmament advocacy is driven by an
urban vision that exalts luxury at the expense of individual liberty. To
the degree it is, it may be in conflict with our core constitutional
values."' Then, after quoting Bruce-Briggs' description of the culture
war reproduced above, Johnson opines:
An individual right to arms fits very comfortably within the vision of
rural Americans. Because rural life is not glorified in our society, the
rural vision may not be popular. Nonetheless, it remains reasonable to
believe that vision of America is more in accordance with that of the
Framers than is the urban based view that may be the predominant
influence on our popular culture.65
60. Id. at 655.
61. See Williams, supra note 11, at 924-46.
62. See Balof, supra note 30, at 158.
63. See Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to
Arms N'ewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 24-27 (1992).
64. Id. at24.
65. Id. at 25-26 (footnote omitted).
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Similarly, Don Kates quotes the Bruce-Briggs passage and then
observes:
If we assume that most modem scholars fall into the first of the
modem value categories described, it becomes understandable why
they might find the views of the Founders so foreign, indeed repugnant
.... For the second of the value categories described accords perfectly
with the views of the Founders, except that, as intellectuals themselves,
its aura of anti-intellectualism would have struck no responsive chord in
them. 66
Even as sophisticated, careful, and culturally sensitive an analyst
as David Kopel portrays the gun culture in the same general way. In
his prize-winning work The Samurai, the Mountie, and the Cowboy:
Should America Adopt the Gun Controls of Other Democracies?,
Kopel argues that different gun control schemes are appropriate for
different countries because they have different cultures.67  Thus,
countries like Japan68 and Great Britain69 can tolerate a fairly invasive
gun control scheme because their citizens trust the government,
especially the police, and they may have good reasons for that trust.
By contrast, such a scheme would not work in this country, because
guns and distrust of government are too central to the American
cultural experience.7' Thus, Kopel emphasizes the importance of
careful attention to cultural differences when considering the role of
guns and gun control in different countries.7"
Unfortunately, Kopel's nuanced appreciation of cultural
difference falters when he considers America's gun culture, because he
tends to portray it as the fundamental, enduring American culture,
rather than merely one among many:72
Whether the framers chose wisely or not, their choice cannot be
undone. Indeed, the Second Amendment simply reflected the social
reality that Americans were already extremely well armed. Gun culture
is too deeply embedded in the American soul to change now ...
Foreign gun control ... postulates an authoritarian philosophy of
government and society fundamentally at odds with the individualist
and egalitarian American ethos.... Even if some Americans want their
nation to be more like other countries, America cannot be more like
66. See Kates, supra note 10, at 227.
67. KOPEL, supra note 35, at 43 1.
68. See id. at 45-46.
69. See id. at 96-97.
70. See id. at 392-93,422,431-32.
71. Seeid. at431-32.
72. See id. at 419-32.
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them. There are too many guns in America, and too much of an
individualist gun culture in the American psyche .... Instead of
transplanting foreign gun control and culture to America, a realistic
American gun policy must accept the permanence of guns in American
life.7
3
In other words, for Kopel, guns reflect a permanent, central, and
ineradicable part of American culture; gun control, by contrast,
represents a recent and hopeless attempt to graft elements of foreign
culture onto America. For that reason, guns cannot be abandoned, but
gun control can. Gun culture is the root of America, gun control
culture a feeble and alien transplant.
In short, many in the gun culture see no genuine cultural division
among real Americans on the subject of guns; instead, they see
America (represented by the gun culture) arrayed in battle against its
enemies. In this map of the cultural landscape, the essential fault line
lies not between bedrock and cosmopolitan America but between a
"true" America and everyone else. In this alternative vision, gun
owners are not an outgroup despised by an elite but the ultimate
ingroup, responsible for controlling cultural outgroups. And they have
a story to tell about themselves. Once upon a time, they were
America, justly glorified and dominant. In recent decades, their
position has changed, as urban elites have come to control America,
but the gun culture is still the true American way. Everyone else-not
only the urban elite but everyone, including outgroups-should rightly
be seen as less central to the American experience.
In this vision, Jews, feminists, and blacks fall outside the gun
culture. Individual Jews, feminists, and blacks may own guns; some
may even view themselves as part of the gun culture. As a group,
however, they fall outside the traditional gun-owning heartland; their
status as members of outgroups makes their membership in the gun
culture problematical, a hurdle to be overcome. As observed above,
the gun culture is heavily masculine, and is centered on the father-son
relationship and the male responsibility of protection.74 Feminists who
would complicate gender roles would not be welcome in this highly
patriarchal milieu. Similarly, per capita, Protestants are much more
likely than other groups to own arms.75 Revealing his own non-
Protestant frame of reference, Bruce-Briggs explains, "The first gun at
73. Id. at419,432.
74. See supra text accompanying note 31. Again, statistics bear out this observation.
Many more men than women own guns. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 35, at 169 tbl.2.50;
WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 31, at 109, 114.
75. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 31, at 108.
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puberty is the bar mitzvah of the rural WASP."76 Given the soil in
which the gun culture has grown, this religious identification is not
surprising. Rural, conservative, nativist Americans have always been
overwhelmingly Protestant, and they have identified Protestantism
with the national character.77 Indeed, when the gun culture describes
its enemies as the urban, educated, professional, media-oriented liberal
elite, it is difficult not to catch at least a whiff of anti-Semitism.
Although I cannot document the assertion, I am quite confident, based
on considerable exposure to the gun culture, that when many gun-
owners imagine the hated "gun-grabbers," they have Jews in mind.
7
Similarly, the gun culture originated in the concerns of white
citizens to control those of other races, especially blacks and Native
Americans.7 ' Today, the composition of the culture reveals its racial
identification. Rural, conservative, nativist Americans have always
been white. 0 Although blacks own guns in roughly the same
percentages as whites8" and arms bearing has been symbolically
important to many blacks," still African-Americans are not part of the
gun culture's "bedrock" America. As I elaborate below, the gun
culture has typically posed a threat, not a promise, to black America. 3
Racial hierarchy and violence formed an important part of the gun
culture in the South in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries8 4
Even today, Southerners own guns in much larger percentages than
non-Southerners, and white Southern gun owners display greater racial
animus than white Southern non-gun-owners. 5 Moreover, racism has
always blemished the tradition of rural radicalism that marks one
extreme of the gun culture. 6
Because stereotyping of opponents is so common in this culture
war, I wish to be very clear about this claim. I am not arguing that all
or most gun owners are hostile to outgroups. I am not arguing that all
76. See Bruce-Briggs, supra note 27, at 66.
77. See, e.g., DAvID H. BENNET, TnE PARTY OF FEAR: FROM NATViST MovENTs
TO THE NEw RIGHT IN AME~icAN HisrORY 9-10 (1988).
78. Certainly, Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership-presumably a
sensitive barometer-thinks so. See infra notes 197-203 and accompanying text.
79. See discussion infra Part ILI.A.4.
80. See generally, e.g., BENNETT, supra note 77.
81. See WRIGHTETAL., supranote31, at 108-09.
82. See, e.g., NATHAN MCCALL, MAKEs ME WANNA HOLLER: A YOUNG BLACK
MAN IN AMERICA 60-61 (1994).
83. See discussion infra Part llI.A.
84. See TED OwNBY, SUBDUING SATAN: RELIGION, RECREATION, AND MANHOOD IN
THE RURAL SoUH, 1865-1920, at 16-17,26 (1990).
85. See Wright & Marston, supra note 34, at 98 & n.8.
86. See infra note 488 and accompanying text.
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members of the gun culture are hostile to outgroups. And I am not
arguing that proponents of the right to arms are hostile to outgroups;
indeed, in my experience, most such proponents are libertarians
implacably hostile to bigotry as a restriction on liberty. I am arguing
that the gun culture, by and large, has imagined itself as the true
American people, has excluded outgroups, and has thereby regarded
outgroups as less central to the American citizenry.
I am certain that some members of the gun culture would resist
this characterization. They would claim that perhaps once the culture
excluded outgroups, but no longer. Such a claim, however, bears a
heavy burden of persuasion. Populist movements of the common man
have always grown from the rich soil of "bedrock America." As
detailed in Part II, those movements have always imagined not one
but two enemies-urban elites and outgroups. Moreover, populist
violence has typically been directed not at elites but at despised
outgroups." Even today, the paradigmatic member of the gun culture
is a white, Protestant, rural, conservative, nativist male.88 Perhaps that
man has undergone a conversion experience, welcoming Jews, blacks,
and feminists as equal members in his culture, but it seems unlikely.
4. Outgroup Attitudes Toward the Gun Culture
If the gun culture has exiled outgroups from its embrace,
outgroups have typically been voluntary exiles; the suspicion has
always been mutual. Generally, outgroup members have maintained
that to be a Jew, feminist, or African-American entails opposition to
the gun culture. Sometimes these arguments verge on the essentialist
claim that outgroups are inherently antigun, but more often they
simply claim that outgroups have historically found the gun culture
alien and perhaps threatening.
Thus, traditionally, guns have been culturally coded as male and
anti-female. The status of guns as phallic symbols is virtually a cich6
in these post-Freudian days.89 Many women first learning to shoot
guns find it difficult to overcome their socialization as women-their
fear of guns, their aversion to violence, and their sense that guns are a
87. See discussion infra Part II.A.4.
88. See supra notes 27-31, 84-88 and accompanying text.
89. See KEmNNr & ANDERSON, supra note 29, at 250. I am here suggesting only that
men and women associate guns with penises and therefore with masculinity. I am not
arguing for the much broader "priapic" theory of gun ownership-that male gunowners are
sexually insecure and buy guns in order to assuage that insecurity. See Don B. Kates Jr. &
Nicole Varzos, Aspects of the Priapic Theory of Gun Ownership, in THE GUN CutTuRE,
supra note 30, at 93, 93-95.
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part of male culture off-limits to them. Many feminists, especially
cultural and radical feminists, agree that women are either inherently
or culturally nurturant and pacifistic, not militarist and violent. Thus,
Ann Scales argues that the force inherent in militarism90 provides the
grounding for the silencing of women:
[M]ilitarism normalizes the oppression of women. It supplies the moral
authority for relations of dominance and submission.... [T]he
militaristic individual has been drilled in the necessity and legitimacy of
the use of force.... This kind of force, hanging over our heads at every
moment, has "the ability to turn a human being into a thing while he is
still alive."... And that is a definition of woman's othemess. Women
have been imitating nothingness for a long time.91
Sara Ruddick further argues that '"maternal thinking" lends itself to a
politics of peace.92 Ruddick notes the typical, cultural belief that men
make wars and women make peace,93 but she rejects this absolutist
distinction, observing that mothers have warlike impulses to support
soldiers and to fight for parochial interests.94 Instead, she offers a
more limited and culturally contingent argument. Maternal thinking
can, under the right circumstances, act as a basis for a peace politics,
because it is rooted in caring labor, especially the care of bodies.9' By
contrast, she argues, militarist thinking abstracts away real human
physicality and suffering and so makes violence and cruelty easy.96
Wendy Brown offers a feminist analysis of the Second
Amendment that rests on this perceived antinomy between women and
guns. 97 First she attacks the formal Second Amendment, particularly
"[Sanford] Levinson's vision of an armed citizenry, collectively
resisting the excesses of state power on behalf of itself as a
community."'98 Brown argues that this superficially universalist vision
90. Militarism is not the same thing as the gun culture. As I explain in the text,
however, in objecting to militarism, these feminists are centrally objecting to force as the
basis for social relations. See infra text accompanying notes 91-96. Their objection therefore
runs to any culture organized around the use of force.
9 1. Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as
Oxymoron?, 12 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 25, 42-43 (1989).
92. See SARA RuDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A PoLrncs OF PEAcE, 219-
51(1990).
93. See id. at 141-45.
94. See id. at 151-56, 221.
95. See id. at 130-34, 156-84, 205-21.
96. See id. at 185-205.
97. See Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic
Republicanism: On Sanford Levinson r The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE
L.L 661 (1989).
98. Id. at 665. The reference is to Levinson, supra note 10.
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in fact ignores the lived experience of outgroups.99 She contends that
Americans do not presently constitute a unified community and
instead live in "an era of thoroughly disintegrated public life and
disintegrating social order, and an era of rampant violence within and
against the urban poor and against women of all socio-economic
classes."' ' Under those conditions, a right to arms will generally hurt
the "most routine victims of this 'right': "[U]rban Black men
between the ages of sixteen and thirty-four, for whom homicide is the
leading cause of death, and women, one of whom is raped every six
minutes, one out of three times at gunpoint or knifepoint."'O' She asks
rhetorically, seeking to expose the bias of a purportedly universalist
interpretation of the Amendment: "Might there be something a bit
'gendered' about a formulation of freedom that depicts man,
collectively or individually, securing his autonomy, his woman, and his
territory with a gtm[?]''1°2
Having exposed the Amendment as culturally specific, rather
than universal, Brown then argues that women, feminists in particular,
fall outside of this culture. 3 She makes this argument by means of a
personal story. Returning from a long trek in the wilderness, she and
some friends discovered that her car would not start.1°4 Luckily, two
men from a nearby Winnebago were able to help them start the car.'
Despite this cooperation, however, Brown found herself reflecting that
she and the men were at "opposite ends of the political and cultural
universe" and did not "share[] much of anything."'06 When she first
met the chief rescuer, he was "making his way through a case of beer,
flipping through the pages of a por magazine, and preparing to survey
the area for his hunting club." 107  Their reasons for being in the
wilderness were thus utterly different---"he preparing to shoot the
wildlife that I came to revere, he living out of his satellite-dished
Winnebago and me out of my dusty backpack, he sustained by his
guns and beer, me by my Nietzche and trail mix." O8 If she had met
him alone, she would have feared rape; "his gun could well have made
the difference between an assault that my hard-won skills in self-
99. See id. at 665-66.
100. Id. at 665.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 663-64.
103. See id. at 665-66.
104. See id. at 666.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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defense could have fended off and one against which they were
useless."'0 9 In other words, because of the "social positioning and
experiences of men and women in our culture," the right to arms
primarily benefits men, as Brown observes by closing with rhetorical
questions:
Who is the gun-carrying citizen-warrior whose power is tempered by a
limit on the right to bear arms? Is he most importantly a republican
citizen, or more significantly, a socially male one? Is his right my
violation, and might his be precisely the illegitimate authority I am out
to resist?""o
Similarly, many Jews have traditionally defined themselves as
fundamentally nonviolent-gentle, powerless, and rational."' In the
face of long-tern and implacable persecution, these Jews resolved to
oppose violence only with reason; some have argued that "speaking
truth to power" is a central Jewish activity.112 Rationality and
nonviolence thus became central pillars of Jewish ethics. Perhaps the
foremost scholarly exponent of this view is the anti-Zionist writer
Michael Seizer, who maintains: "Jewish ethics and purpose derive
from the rejection of power, from the actual contempt of power, which
pervades the Jewish ethos.""' 3 Some attribute theological significance
to this ethical norm. God has commanded the Jews to adhere to the
covenant, even in the face of persecution, by "representing God's ways
in the world and by serving as God's spiritual agents in society." 14
The identification of Judaism with nonviolence has also
permeated popular Jewish culture. In their classic study of shtetl
culture, Mark Zborowski and Elizabeth Herzog explain that the culture
was "at one in regarding physical violence as 'un-Jewish.""' 5 In this
view of the world, Jews emphasized "intellect, a sense of moderation,
[and the] cherishing of... rational, goal-directed activities," and they
109. Id. at 666-67.
110. Id. at 667.
111. See DAVID BIALE, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS IN JEWISH HISTORY 4-5 (1986);
PAUL BREINES, TOUGH JEWS: POLITICAL FANTASIES AND THE MORAL DILEMMA OF AMERiCAN
JEWRY 3,26-27,29 (1990).
112. See BIALE, supra note 111, at 198; ROBERT COVER, The Folktales of Justice:
Tales of Jurisdiction, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT
COVER 173, 179-86 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter COVER EssAys]; CHARLES
E. SILBERMAN, A CERTAIN PEOPLE: AMERICAN JEWS AND THEIR LIVES TODAY 360 (1985)
(internal quotations omitted).
113. MICHAEL SELZER, ZIONISM RECONSIDERED: THE REECrION OF JEWISH NORMALCY
at xv (1970).
114. DAVID S. ARIEL, WHAT Do JEWS BELIEVE?: THE SPIRITUAL FOUNDATiONS OF
JUDAISM 126 (1995).
115. MARK ZBOROWSKI & ELIZABETH HERZOG, LIFE Is WrrH PEOPLE: THE CULTURE
OF THE SHTEIL 149 (1952), quoted in BREINES, supra note 111, at 108.
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rejected an un-Jewish "emphasis on the body, excess, blind instinct,
sexual instinct and ruthless force." '116 In the 1940s, Jean-Paul Sartre
famously celebrated this view of Judaism:
The Jews are the mildest of men, passionately hostile to violence. That
obstinate sweetness which they conserve in the midst of the most
atrocious persecution, that sense ofjustice and of reason which they put
up as their sole defense against a hostile, brutal, and unjust society, is
perhaps the best part of the message they bring to us and the true mark
of their greatness."'1
17
Finally, Paul Breines describes the continuation of this stereotype in
the '"Woody Allen figure, that is, the schlemiel: the pale, bespectacled,
diminutive vessel of Jewish anxieties who cannot, indeed, must not,
hurt a flea and whose European forebears fell by the millions to Jew-
hating savagery."118
Given this tradition, it is not surprising that Jews as Jews have
generally located themselves outside the gun culture. Jews own guns
in very low percentages compared to other groups.119 All of the
leading mainstream Jewish organizations have taken strong positions
in favor of gun control,12 and it may not be a coincidence that the
leading advocate of gun control on Capitol Hill, Charles Schumer, is
himself Jewish.' Indeed, the central elements of the gun culture-
violent self-reliance, toughness, a willingness to meet blow with
blow-comprise a virtual definition of "un-Jewish" behavior in this
view of Jewishness.
Similarly, African-Americans have traditionally fallen outside the
parameters of the gun culture. In fact, the relationship of blacks to
guns themselves has been complicated and sometimes conflicted. On
one hand, there is no tradition of viewing guns as "un-black" in the
way that there is for viewing guns as "un-Jewish" or "un-female."
Many Southern blacks participated in the outdoors culture from which
the gun culture grew.122 In addition, as a result of the long tradition of
116. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
117. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, ANnr-SITEr AND Jaw 117-18 (George J. Becker trans.,
Schocken Books 1965). Similarly, Philip Roth recalls: "[O]ur worth as human beings, even
perhaps our distinction as a people, was embodied in the incapacity to perpetuate the sort of
bloodletting visited upon our ancestors." PHmip ROTH, THE FActS: A NovEUsT's
AuToBIoGRAPHY 28 (1988).
118. BREnEs, supra note 111, at 3.
119. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 31, at 108 n.5.
120. See infra text accompanying note 199.
121. Certainly, Jews for the Preservation of Handgun Ownership does not believe it a
coincidence that Schumer is Jewish; they denounce him and the whole Jewish culture of
nonviolence from which they believe he springs. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
122. See OwNBY, supra note 84, at 179.
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disarming blacks, many African-Americans have seen self-arming as
an important form of empowerment.' Today, blacks own guns in
roughly the same percentages as others, 12 4 and owning a handgun is a
badge of manhood for many inner-city youths. 2' Indeed, many young
urban black men romanticize revolutionary violence, especially as
they perceive it in the figure of Malcolm X.126 On the other hand,
pacifism also has been a significant part of black culture as well,
perhaps most significantly in the work of Martin Luther King and the
Southern Christian Leadership Council.'27 Moreover, most blacks are
neither revolutionaries nor gang members; rather, most blacks view the
presence of guns in the hands of inner-city youth as a pestilence that is
destroying their community. 8 Not surprisingly, prominent African-
American intellectuals have generally condemned widespread gun
ownership among blacks and have called for tighter gun control.'29
Furthermore, as a group, African-Americans are more in favor of gun
control, especially handgun prohibition, than whites.
30
However complicated the relationship of African-Americans to
guns, their relationship to the gun culture is much simpler. As
suggested above, they have experienced its hostility. Even some of the
African-Americans fondest of the gun do not love the gun culture.
Black revolutionaries have generally sought to break the white power
structure.' The first objects of a black revolution would probably be
urban, such as the police,' but rural, conservative, bedrock America
would surely not be far behind.'33 Indeed, Carl Rowan predicts that
the next race war will come-and come soon-when blacks take up
arms to defend themselves from attack by the white racist members of
the militia movement.3 4 In fine, black revolutionaries typically have
shown no inclination to make common cause with the gun culture, to
123. See discussion infra Part II.C.
124. See WRIGHTETAL., supra note 31, at 108-09.
125. See McCALL, supra note 82, at 60-69, 72-73; Hofstadter, supra note 33, at 33.
126. See MICHAEL ERIC DYsoN, MAKING MALCOLM: THE MYTH AND MEANING OF
MALCOLM X at xi-xiii (1995).
127. See, e.g., HUGH PEARSON, THE SHADOW OF THE PANTHER: HuEY NEWTON AND
THE PRICE OF BLACK POWER IN AMERICA 20-21, 28-31 (1994).
128. See, e.g., CARL T. ROWAN, THE COMING RACE WAR IN AMERICA: A WAKE-UP
CALL 186-90, 283 (1996).
129. See, e.g., id. at 189; Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REv.
1365, 1383-87 (1993).
130. See Bogus, supra note 129, at 1387.
131. See PEARSON, supra note 127, at96, 101, 109-11, 131-32.
132. Seeid. at 110-11,132.
133. See, e.g., ROWAN, supra note 128, at viii, 282-83.
134. Seeid.
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join with them in celebration of their shared devotion to self-arming;
instead, they have seen them as likely opponents.
Recently, Carl Bogus has argued that not only the gun culture in
general but the Second Amendment in particular has not benefited
African-Americans. 135  He joins the collective rights theory in
maintaining that the point of the Amendment was to ensure that the
federal government would have no power to disarm state militias.
3 6
The concern to safeguard the militia system, however, may have
derived from a desire to protect its traditional function as slave patrol:
[T]he Second Amendment may have been inspired as much by a desire
to maintain a form of tyranny as to provide a means of resisting
tyranny....
Why the fear about Congress disarming the militia? ... Northern
states would control Congress, and the North was finding slavery
increasingly obnoxious. Intentionally or unintentionally, Congress
might subvert the slave system by allowing the militia to decay.
... [S]trong evidence suggests that the Southern states' concerns
about maintaining the militia for slave control, and the Northern states'
desires to relieve the Southern states' anxiety on the matter, were
significant forces behind the Second Amendment.
137
In summary, then, until relatively recently, the cultural landscape
of the Second Amendment seemed fairly simple. The gun culture on
one side, and urban elites and outgroups on the other. In recent
decades, however, a loud and dissenting chorus has arisen among
outgroups to complicate this simple division. Eloquent and emphatic
Jews, feminists, and African-Americans have come to embrace the
Amendment. In their view, just as the gun culture has used firearms in
the past to control outgroups, those same outgroups can now use
firearms to seek and find liberation.
H. THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
The essence of the outgroups' case is fairly straightforward.
Because outgroups cannot rely on the anti-Semitic/patriarchal/racist
state to protect them, they have no choice but to rely on themselves, by
self-arming against anti-Semitic/patriarchal/racist oppression by public
or private parties. The following subparts present an overview of these
arguments. Subpart A examines the analysis of Jews for the
Preservation of Handgun Ownership, subpart B examines the Women
135. See Bogus, supra note 129, at 1367.
136. See id. at 1372-74.
137. Id. at 1373-74 (footnote omitted).
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and Guns movement, and subpart C examines the writing of
Professors Robert Cottrol and Raymond Diamond, prominent African-
American exponents of the right to arms.
In presenting these arguments, I will emphasize two points. First,
the outgroups make two kinds of arguments. One argument is a
prudential and political claim: individual members of outgroups
should exercise the right to arms, and legislatures should respect it,
because of the present reality of religious, gender, and racial
oppression. The other argument is a constitutional claim: we should
interpret the Second Amendment to protect a personal right to arms
because, in light of the permanence of government untrustworthiness
and private oppression, outgroups badly need such a right. Indeed, for
representatives of these outgroups, if the Second Amendment has a
special constituency, it is their respective groups, not the gun culture.
In short, then, these theorists use a perspective-based mode of
constitutional interpretation. They approach the Amendment from the
perspective of their membership in outgroups, and they offer reasons
for interpreting the Amendment in a particular way drawn from their
experience in those groups.
Second, the social world of the Second Amendment, as construed
by these theorists, is permanently fragmented into hostile identity
groups. The permanence of hate violence is precisely the reason that
these theorists believe that a right to arms is so important. As a result,
these theories seek to recognize an individual right to arms, but these
individuals exist in a world of dissentient collectivities. The very
rationale for the right to arms considers individuals as members of
collectivities. We should recognize a right to arms precisely because
people are not abstract individuals; rather, they have religious, gender,
and racial identities and act on malign motives rooted in those
identities. Moreover, the individual arms bearer acts for reasons
rooted in his or her membership in a collectivity and to effectuate
change that will make the world safer for other members of that
collectivity. The Jew who resists a genocidal government helps to stop
another Holocaust, the woman who foils a would-be rapist helps to
break the power of the patriarchy, and the African-American who
shoots back at the Klan helps to rid the world of racism.
A. Jews for the Preservation ofFirearms Ownership
The tradition of Jewish meekness is only one strand in a rich
historical experience. Collectively and individually, Jews have always
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exercised power, from Biblical days to the present. 3  There have been
Jewish soldiers,139 gangsters,14' and even shteti thugs, the ba'al-guf,14 1
though Jewish elites have sometimes tried to suppress the memory of
these "deviant" Jews.14' Through the ages of persecution, many Jews
armed themselves to resist, in defiance of the stereotype of Jewish
resignation. 14
3
During the nineteenth century, Zionism arose as an alternative
ideology to assimilation; it sought to replace gentle accommodation
with militant nationalism.14 After World War II and the Holocaust,
many Jewish emigrants began to celebrate the martial virtues as they
struggled for a homeland in Palestine; Jews, in their view, should fight
rather than suffer.'45 Some of these even became terrorists, adopting a
vision of warlike unity that had parallels with the fascism from which
they had fled.14
6
With Zionism's efflorescence in the State of Israel, then, armed
strength again became a culturally respectable Jewish option. 47 In
America, however, most Jews did not come quickly to that point of
view. Indeed, American Jews may have first come to feel great pride
in a powerful Israel only with the Six Days War, and with this pride
came a new appreciation for the uses of violence. 48  For many, the
image of the enfeebled shtetl Jew rapidly took a back seat to the image
of the bronzed, virile sabra warrior or the merciless Mossad agent. 49
Indeed, some have argued that American Jews have a special
attachment to images of Jewish might. Enjoying a safe life in
America, endangered only by assimilation, they feel guilty that they
are not in Israel, facing hardship and the Arab threat. 50  To
compensate, some argue, they become highly devoted to the cause of
Israeli security, resenting all criticism of Israeli imperialism.,5 For
such Jews, the Holocaust has become a testament to the folly of
138. See generally BALE, supra note 111; BREmS, supra note 111.
139. See BREwNS, supra note 111, at 97-101.
140. See id. at 105-20.
141. See id. at 132-35.
142. Seeid. at77, 90, 113.
143. See BIALE, supra note I 11, at 72-77; BREINES, supra note 111, at 81-83, 88-90.
144. See BREINS, supra note 111, at 139-49.
145. See id. at 149-67.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 48-49.
148. See id. at 56-73.
149. See id. at 3-4.
150. Seeid. at 52-53.
151. See id. at 22,71-73.
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Jewish passivity,' 2 the Warsaw uprising5 ' and Masada' have
become central stories, and the fundamental pledge has become
"Never again."
Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership (JPFO) appears
to be a fringe by-product of this large-scale cultural movement. JPFO
is a Milwaukee-based organization, headed by Aaron Zelman, Jay
Sinkin, and Alan Rice, and claims 4000 members. 55 Its mission is to
alert the public to what it believes are the dangers of gun control. 6 Its
major works are Lethal Laws'57 and "Gun Control": Gateway to
Tyranny.'58 These works have received generally favorable reviews by
mainstream Second Amendment theorists of the individual right
school. 59 Moreover, despite its relatively small numbers, JPFO has
received a great deal of media attention, 60 presumably because of the
virulence of its views and its incendiary way of expressing them.
1. Gun Control and Genocide
According to JPFO, gun control "has a down-side. A very nasty
one.... The down-side of 'gun control' is genocide. There have been
at least seven major genocides in this century, involving 50-60 million
152. Seeid. at 17-18,70,79.
153. Seeid. at70.
154. See id. at 61, 83-84.
155. See Leslie Camhi, Imaginary Jews: America Develops a Masada Complex,
VILAGE VoICE, July 11, 1995, at 29,29.
156. See id.
157. This book's copyright notice requires the following citation: LETHAL LAWS, JAY
SIMKIN, AARON ZELMAN, & ALAN M. RICE, JEWS FOR THE PRESERVATION OF FIREARMS
OwNERSHIm, INC., 2872 South Wentworth Avenue, Milwaukee, WI 53207, (414) 769-0760
[hereinafter SIaN ET AL., LETHAL LAws].
158. JAY SIMKIN & AARON ZELMAN, "GUN CoNTRoL": GATEWAY TO TYRANNY
(1993).
159. See Don B. Kates, Jr. & Daniel D. Polsby, Of Genocide and Disarmament, 86 J.
CRIm. L. & CRIMNoLOGY 247 (1995) (reviewing SIMfaN Er AL., LETHAL LAws, supra note
157); David B. Kopel, Book Review, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 355 (1995) (same).
160. See, e.g., Camhi, supra note 155, at 29; Erik Eckhohn, Owners Say Mild Limits
WouldLead to Handgun Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1992, at D21; Keith Epstein, Militias Aim
for Better Image, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), June 19, 1995, at IA; Charles Holmes, Pro-
Gun Ad Targeting Jews Is Denounced, ATLANTA CONsT., Apr. 30, 1991, at A2; Jody
McPhillips, No-More-Hate Message Replaces Hitler Billboard That Caused Fury,
PROVIDENCE J.-BuLL., Nov. 5, 1994, at 3A; New York- Schumer Shot Down by Jewish Gun
Group, HouNE, Apr. 25, 1991, available in LEXIS, Cmpgn Library, Hotlne File
[hereinafter Schumer Shot Down]; Charley Reese, The Best Protection Against Tyranny Is the
Right to Bear Arms, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 12, 1993, at A8; Frank Smyth, Crossfire:
Wounded by Congress, the NRA s Regime Bullies Its Own Boad and Launches a New
Offensive on America, VILLAGE VOICE, June 21, 1994, at 26; Jim Strang, Hitlers Influence on
U.S. Gun Law, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Apr. 18, 1993, at 1B; Ed Vulliamy, Cults 2,
OBSERVER (London), May 21, 1995, at 20, available in LEXIS, News Library, Obsrvr File.
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victims .... In every case, a 'gun control' law was in force before the
genocide began."16' Gun control and genocide thus have a close
relationship, although JPFO equivocates on just how close. At a
minimum, gun control is a necessity for genocide: "In the [twentieth
century] 'gun control' is an essential pre-condition for genocide. Until
and unless a hate-driven group gets control of the government
mechanism and disarms its intended targets, genocide simply cannot
and does not occur." 62  Even this minimum claim is quite
extraordinary: no gun control, no genocide. If armed, the potential
victims will always be able successfully to resist.163 JPFO, however,
sometimes goes even further. It argues that gun control actually tends
to precipitate genocide."6 Exhibiting the bad manners for which they
have become notorious, Simkin, Zelman, and Rice assert: "[T]hose
seeking more 'gun control'--or who accept existing 'gun control'
laws-need to consider whether or not they still can support a policy
that promotes genocide; ... those who back 'gun control'-after
reading the lethal laws presented within-must be recognized as
supporting genocide."1 65
This claim that gun control leads to genocide grows directly out
of JPFO's basic political philosophy. In its view, the "formula for
genocide has three parts: Hatred; Government ... ; [and] Gun
control."'66  Without all three, "genocide does not occur," because
genocide occurs only when a hate-driven group seizes control of the
government and disarms the people. 167 Unfortunately, because it is a
"basic human emotion," hatred "cannot be banned.' 68  Similarly,
although government has an "inherent capacity to do great evil," it "in
some form, is a necessity for civilization."' 69 Therefore, "[g]un control
is the only part of this formula that need not be present.' 170 Given
161. SIMINEr AL., LETHAL LAWS, supra note 157, at 1.
162. Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted).
163. Less often, JPFO hedges this bold claim: "So long as a target group is armed, it
has a chance to avoid extermination." Id. (emphasis omitted).
164. See id. at 4.
165. Id. (emphasis added). In a letter to the Atlantic Monthly, Jay Simkin denies that
JPFO has argued that gun control causes genocide; rather, "murderous politicians and
government bureaucrats plan and carry out genocides." Jay Edward Simkin, Letter to the
Editor, ATLANTic MONTHLY, June 1996, at 12, 12. This denial, however, is either
disingenuous or a quibble: certainly, some set of human beings must carry out genocide, but
Lethal Laws claims that the existence of gun control, all by itself, "promotes genocide" by
such people.
166. Snvm ET At., LETHAL LAWS, supra note 157, at 9 (internal quotations omitted).
167. Seeid.at9-10.
168. Id. at 9 (intemal quotations omitted).
169. Id.
170. Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
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these premises, JPFO's conclusions are ineluctable. Because hatred is
always lurking and government is always a threat, the only way to
prevent genocide is to ensure that the "people are on guard and
armed;" if gun control laws disarm the people, it is only a matter of
time before genocide occurs. 171
JPFO offers many examples of modem genocides made possible
by gun control, but the central example-indeed, the experience that
drives the analysis-is the Holocaust in Germany.72 Not surprisingly,
gun control turns out to be the key to understanding how the Nazi
atrocities could have happened. In 1928, the Weimar Republic
enacted a permit and registration system, 73 and then in 1931
prohibited the public carrying of arms as a hedge against political
violence.74 With the passage of these laws, "the fate of Jews in
Europe was sealed."' 75 In 1933, Hitler came to power and "loosed his
militia!' to terrorize the population. 76 The Nazis inherited the Weimar
gun control scheme, and it allowed them to achieve "an iron grip on
Germany.' '177 By 1933, the law had discouraged arms ownership, and
the registration lists gave the Nazis necessary information to revoke
the permits of "anyone they deemed unreliable," especially Jews. 7 In
1938, the Nazis authored their own gun control law that forbade Jews
to own any weapons and exempted the Nazis themselves from the gun
control laws. 79  Shortly thereafter followed the stages of the
Holocaust: the Kristallnacht pogrom, 'Mass Murder by Shooting" in
Russia, and ultimately "Mass Murder by Gassing."' 8
0
This slaughter was possible only because the Jews had already
been disarmed. In Russia,
[t]hat so few could murder so many, so quickly can only be explained
in one way: the victims were unarmed. The same "gun control" laws
that made it possible for Stalin to murder millions of his real or
171. Id.
172. These examples include the persecutions of Armenians in Turkey (1911-1917),
political dissidents in China (1949-1952), Mayans in Guatemala (1960-1981), Christians in
Uganda (1971-1979), and opponents of Pol Pot in Cambodia (1975-1979). See id. at 14.
JPFO's definition of genocide includes the extermination of a group defined by its political
beliefs, hence the inclusion of Chinese and Cambodian dissidents. See id. at 9.
173. Seeid. at 151.
174. See id. at 152.
175. Id. at 11.
176. See id. at 153.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 153-54.
179. Seeid. at 11, 156.
180. Id. at 156-58.
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imagined opponents, also made it possible for the Nazis to murder
millions of Soviet Jews. 1'
Only the Warsaw ghetto resisted by force of arms, and it ultimately
lost because it was "woefully under-equipped."'
82
According to JPFO, the risk that gun control will lead to
genocide exists everywhere, even in America. The federal
government came close to genocide when it interned hundreds of
thousands of Japanese-Americans during World War HI." If Japan
had been more successful in the war in the Pacific, "Japanese-
American internees might then have met with the same fate as Jews in
Hitler's Europe: extermination."' 18 4 Today, the infrastructure exists for
a massive genocide. That infrastructure has three elements: gun
control, especially the Gun Control Act of 1968; databases of
information about Americans, which "greatly enhance[] the potential
for 'genocide' because centralization of information promotes the
speedy identification of potential victims"; and a mass media that
might "fan the flames of hatred."' 85
Indeed, much of JPFO's language suggests that it believes a
Nazi-like genocidal conspiracy is already afoot in America. It argues
quite seriously that the 1968 Gun Control Act was "likely based on the
Nazi Weapons Law of 18 March 1938. ' 186 Sometimes, JPFO makes
the claim even stronger: "[The 1968 Gun Control Act] is identical,
word for word, in tone and in content, as that passed by Adolf Hitler in
1938.' ' 7 The Library of Congress allegedly translated the Nazi law
for Senator Christopher Dodd four months before the American law
was passed. 8 Thus, for JPFO, gun control is a "Nazi cancer"
"implanted" in America8 9 in order to "soften the underbelly of the
USA for the slice of the Global Government knife."'190 JPFO has
repeatedly used an image of Hitler with his arm raised in stiff-arm
salute next to the words "All in favor of gun control raise your right
181. Id. at 157 (emphasis omitted).
182. See id. at 158.
183. See id. at21-24.
184. Id. at 24.
185. Id. at 27-29 (emphasis omitted).
186. Id. at27.
187. Vulliamy, supra note 160, at 23 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Jay
Simkin).
188. See Strang, supra note 160, at lB.
189. See Camhi, supra note 155, at 29 (quoting JPFO literature).
190. Vulliamy, supra note 160, at 20 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Jay
Sirnkin).
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hand" on billboards, posters, bumper stickers, and advertisements.19" '
They have distributed pamphlets bearing a swastika and the slogan
"Stop Hitlerism in America" in order to oppose pro-gun-control
candidates in various states. 92 They compare Sarah Brady to Hitler:
"Hitler knew that a lie-endlessly repeated--can win acceptance. So
does Sarah Brady."193 "Brady's use of Hitler's tactics leads to a Final
Solution for law-abiding gun-owners."' 94 They also compare Waco to
Warsaw: 'We saw the government go into Waco, Texas, pretty much
as the Nazis went into Warsaw. As it was in Warsaw, so it was at
Waco."' 95  One member of JPFO summarized: "Vote only for
politicians who trust the people to own all types of firearms and who
have a strong pro-Second Amendment voting record.... I see
creeping fascism in America, just as in Germany, a drip at a time; a
law here, a law there.., soon you have total enslavement. 1
96
Arguing that the risk of another Holocaust is alive and real in
America today, JPFO viciously criticizes Jewish organizations,
leaders, and politicians that support gun control. 97 Indeed, a central
purpose of JPFO is "to expose the propaganda and myths used by all
anti-gunners, but particularly by some Jewish anti-gunners."' 98 Such
Jews have failed utterly to learn from history: "[T]he hardest lesson of
the Holocaust ... is that 'gun control' is a lethal policy. Jews have
been a major victim of this policy. Yet 'leaders' of several Jewish
communal groups-e.g., the American Jewish Congress, the B'nai
Brith among others--still support 'gun control."'1 9 9 In their blindness,
191. McPhillips, supra note 160, at 3A (providing a photograph of the advertisement);
see also Reese, supra note 160, at A8 (describing the advertisement).
192. See Kathleen Best, Senate Panel OKs Major Gun Control Bill, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, May 8, 1991, at 4A; Joanne M. Haas, Loftus Calls NRA "Bullies," UPI, Nov. 7,
1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, Upstat File.
193. Strang, supra note 160, at lB (internal quotations omitted) (quoting JPFO
advertisement).
194. Eckholm, supra note 160, at D21 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting JPFO
advertisement).
195. Vulliarny, supra note 160, at 20 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Jay
Simldn).
196. Reese, supra note 160, at A8 (internal quotations omitted) (omissions in original)
(quoting JPFO member Theodore Haas).
197. JPFO has reserved its harshest criticism for Congressman Charles Schumer
"Most Jews are not stupid or pro-criminal, but Charles Schumer is both!" Schumer Shot
Down, supra note 160 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting a JPFO advertisement). More
pointedly, Zelman told an NRA board meeting: "Charlie Schumer, who claims to be a Jew
should crawl back to the rock he came from." Smyth, supra note 160, at 30 (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Aaron Zelman).
198. Abraham H. Foxman, Jewish Pro-Gun Group, N.Y. TIMEs, May 21, 1995, § 4, at
14 (letter to the editor) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting JPFO materials).
199. SIMioN ETAL., LETHAL LAwS, supra note 157, at 159 (emphasis omitted).
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these Jews promote victimhood and subservience as a survival
strategy. Aaron Zelman maintains, "Jews who support gun control
have learned nothing from history.... Jews have always tried to
ingratiate themselves to government but let's face it. When there's too
much government it's not good for Jews. It's just not in the best
interests of Jews to be disarmed."2 °° Sympathetic columnist Charley
Reese explains: "Zelman faults many Jewish organizations that
support gun control for either having the passive attitude of the ghetto
Jew or, in some cases, for promoting victimization as a means of
promoting Jewish unity."O' According to JPFO, these pro-gun-control
Jews are stirring anti-Semitism by their pernicious behavior:
[Pro-gun-control Congressman Charles] Schumer and his collaborators
are promoting anti-Semitism and tyranny. Schumer and other Jewish
gun-grabbers--notably the B'nai Brith and its Anti-Defamation League
... cannot see that their gun control activities fuel the fires of real anti-
Semitism, as ... gun owners of all races and creeds increasingly find
their civil right to own guns reduced by these pro-criminal Jews.' °2
In short, pro-gun-control Jews, like all "those who back 'gun control'
... must be recognized as supporting genocide"--perhaps the worst
charge that one Jew can hurl against another in the late twentieth
century.20 3
From this analysis, JPFO derives two conclusions--one
prudential and one constitutional. Prudentially, JPFO contends that
Americans should arm themselves: "The best way sharply to reduce
the likelihood of genocide is for individual citizens, everywhere, to
200. Epstein, supra note 160, at D21 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Aaron
Zelman).
201. See Reese, supra note 160, at A8.
202. New York: Liberals to Endorse Abrams Today, HOTLiNE, May 2, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Cmpgn Library, Hotlne File [hereinafter Liberals] (internal quotations omitted)
(omissions in original) (quoting a JPFO advertisement). Similarly, The New York limes has
attributed to Bruce R. Chesley, JPFO's field representative in New England, the belief that
"some Jewish members of Congress who favor tighter gun control measures were feeding
anti-Semitism in the United States." Michael Janofsky, Two States, Two Gatherings and a
Lot ofAnti-Government Sentiment, N.Y. TIMEs, May 15, 1995, at A1O.
203. SIamiN E" AL., LETHAL'LAWS, supra note 157, at 4. Pro-gun-control Jewish
leaders have, in turn, accused JPFO of promoting anti-Semitism by these attacks. Rabbi
David Saperstein, director of the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, charges: "The
injection of religious bigotry into public debate is unacceptable in America. The fact that the
attack is launched by Jews does not make it any less anti-Semitic." Holmes, supra note 160,
at A2 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Rabbi David Saperstein). Similarly, Abraham
Foxman, National Director of Anti-Defamation League, wrote to The New York imes, "Anti-
Semitism has a long and painful history, and the linkage to gun control is a tactic by [JPFO]
to manipulate the fear of anti-Semitism toward their own end.... It is a campaign that has
been viewed with concern by many in the Jewish community." Foxman, supra note 198, § 4,
at 14.
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own and to be skilled in the use of firearms, especially, military-type
rifles." ' ° Such self-arming, in JPFO's view, will be effective, even
against modem arnies: "It seems sound to conclude that civilians
armed with military-type rifles by weight of numbers-if by nothing
else---can at least cripple almost any attacking military force.""0 5
Correlatively, government should allow citizens to arm themselves.
To that end, "[n]o government entity should have any dnds of records
concerning firearms ownership."2 6 More fundamentally, Americans
should not accept any kind of gun control, no matter how superficially
reasonable it may appear: '"That American 'gun control' proponents
constantly push for tighter restrictions on private ownership of
firearms by the law-abiding suggests that reasonable 'gun control' is a
contradiction in terms.... The futile effort to bring it about will be
lethal. To save millions of lives, we must destroy 'gun control."' 20 7
2. JPFO's Interpretation of the Second Amendment
Second, as a constitutional matter, JPFO argues that the
connection between gun control and genocide provides a basis for
interpreting the Second Amendment. According to JPFO,
"government can do good only slowly, but can do great harm [such as
genocide] quickly."2 8 For that reason, the Framers "designed a system
based on limiting government's power; ... created a civil right of the
law-abiding to be armed; [and] ... did not impose on the government
the duty to protect the average person." 09 In other words, according to
JPFO--and they make this claim without citing to any historical
support-the Framers of the Second Amendment shared JPFO's basic
political philosophy. Because they anticipated that gun control leads to
genocide, the Framers banned gun control.210
At another point JPFO maintains that "the way in which the
private ownership of firearms is discussed" obscures the fact that
"'gun control' is the key to genocide."' Discussants tend to focus on
unimportant short-term issues (like the abuse of firearms by criminals)
or long-term side issues (like the sporting use of firearms), but those
issues are not constitutionally significant:
204. SIMIN Er Ai, LETHAL LAWS, supra note 157, at 69.
205. Id. at71.
206. Id. at 69 (emphasis omitted).
207. Id. at 72.
208. Id. at 2.
209. Id.
210. See id. at3-4.
211. Id. at3.
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Use of firearms for self-defence against criminals, or for hunting, is
time-honored, lawful, and praiseworthy. But such uses cannot be the
main reasons that ... the private ownership of firearms was mentioned
in the U.S. Constitution....
The Framers of the Constitution did not waste words. They did not
state the obvious. They did not deal with trivial matters.
If the Second Amendment had been written only... to create a civil
right to use firearms for "sporting purposes," the Framers would have
said so, ... [and] to enable individuals to defend themselves against
criminals, that, too, that would have been stated, in plain English.
The Second Amendment plainly was written-as all other parts of
the Bill of Rights-to protect individual freedoms from encroachment
by government.212
The point of the Second Amendment, then, is not hunting or self-
defense; otherwise, the Framers would have said so "in plain English."
JPFO never actually quotes the language of the Amendment, so it
never clearly informs readers what the Amendment says "in plain
English." But in the context of its analysis, it is plain that JPFO thinks
the underlying purpose was to "protect individual freedoms from
encroachment by government"-meaning, to prevent gun control, so
as to prevent genocide.213 In short, JPFO urges us not to "miss[] the
point-that 'gun control' is the key to genocide."
214
JPFO's interpretive approach to the Second Amendment is thus
perspectival, derived from their perspective as late-twentieth-century
Jews. JPFO's stated reason for caring about the Amendment is that it
may forestall the sort of genocide that occurred in Germany.
Moreover, the political philosophy that JPFO ascribes to the
Amendment-without any quotation from the Framers or even the
text of the Amendment itself-is a view derived from reflecting on the
experience of those threatened with genocide. In short, JPFO offers us
a Second Amendment understood through the lense of the Holocaust.
Similarly, the world of JPFO's Second Amendment is populated
not by abstract individuals but by situated selves possessed of
ethnicity, group loyalty, and contending cultural agendas. In some
respects, JPFO's message appears highly assimilationist by urging
Jews to become part of the gun culture. More fundamentally,
however, JPFO's argument rests on a vision of the inevitability of
ethnic balkanization, since social hatred is perennial and endemic.
212. Id. at 3-4 (footnote omitted).
213. Id. at4.
214. Id.
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a. Assimilation to the Gun Culture
On one hand, it is easy to find assimilationist elements in JPFO's
interpretation of the Amendment. Formally, Jews with guns enjoy no
special rights; rather, they are simply exercising the rights given by the
Second Amendment to every American. The anti-genocidal Second
Amendment may have special resonance for late-twentieth-century
Jews, but it is also relevant to every person who might suffer from
government pogroms-which is to say, everyone, since hatred is a
given of the human condition. The lesson of the Holocaust, that 'gun
control' is a lethal policy," is thus a lesson "for Jews and Gentiles
alike. '215 Indeed, JPFO argues that the Second Amendment provides a
model not only for all Americans but for all nations; "every country
should speedily move to imitate America and create a civil right of the
law-abiding person to be armed." 16
Similarly, it is possible to understand JPFO as an attempt by gun-
owning Jews to gain admission into the gun culture. Some have
argued that both Zionism and assimilation were attempts to
"normalize" the Jews-assimilation, because it was "normal" to be a
fully participating citizen of some nation-state, and Zionism, because it
was "normal" to have a nation-state of one's own.217 Comparably,
JPFO's work would seem to be an attempt to normalize the Jewish
experience in America, for what can be more undoubtedly American
than loving guns and the freedom that they allegedly procure?2 8
Notably, JPFO does not discuss Israel's importance for the safety of
Jews; instead, it emphasizes the importance of Jews arming
themselves in America, to secure safety here.
JPFO finds more in common with the gun culture than with
other, more mainstream Jewish organizations. In one interview,
Zelman explained that "two factors inspired him to found JPFO:
studying the Holocaust and growing up in Tucson, Arizona."21 9 The
reporter "couldn't help wondering which was more formative"-
suggesting that the real influence on Zelman was the Arizona gun
culture.220 Indeed, in an early advertisement, JPFO proclaimed that
"Jewish gun-grabbers ... cannot see that their gun control activities
215. Id. at 159 (emphasis omitted).
216. Id. at3.
217. See BR1NES, supra note Ill, at 47-48.
218. See id. at 114-15 (explaining that in the early twentieth century, some Jews
regarded Jewish gangsters with pride, as a symbol that Jews were becoming normalized into
American culture).
219. Camhi, supra note 155, at 29.
220. Id.
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fuel the fires of real anti-Semitism." 2 21 Presumably, the members of
JPFO have seen this anti-Semitism close up, from inside countless gun
shops, as some members of the gun culture blame the Jews for their
problems. Instead of blaming the members of the gun culture for their
anti-Semitism, however, JPFO blames the "Jewish gun-grabbers" for
creating this hatred. Seeking acceptance in the gun culture, the
founders of JPFO created an organization dedicated to the proposition
that Jews can be good American gun owners.22
Structurally, the thinking of JPFO and the militia movement-the
most extreme element of the gun culture-have a great deal in
common.223 Like JPFO, the militia movement distrusts the media and
the government, believes that a conspiracy is afoot to deprive
Americans of their constitutional liberties, and argues that the prime
purpose of the Second Amendment was to prevent tyranny, not to
guarantee hunting or self-defense rights.224  Indeed, the militia
movement has adopted a good deal of JPFO's material. The Hitler
flyer appears at militia gatherings; the Free Militia (not to mention the
ubiquitous Larry Pratt) reiterates the claim that the 1968 Gun Control
Act was copied from the Nazi Weapons Law;225 and more generally,
221. Liberals, supra note 202 (internal quotations omitted) (omission in original)
(quoting a JPFO advertisement).
222. JPFO's leaders have spoken to the NRA, see Smyth, supra note 160, at 58, and to
Radio Free World, an outlet for the militia movement and other fringe right-wing crusades,
see Vulliamy, supra note 160, at 20. Some parts of the gun culture have been open to such
alliance with JPFO, often as a response to charges of anti-Semitism. The leader of the Militia
of Montana, John Trochmann, cited support from JPFO when he claimed, "We have good
credentials with people who aren't white folks." William Petroski, Soviet Threat Lives On,
Militia Leaders Believe, DES MoNEs PEG., Nov. 30, 1995, at 5M (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting John Trochmann). Similarly, Larry Pratt, President of Gun Owners of
America and Chair of the 1996 Buchanan for President Campaign, repudiated charges of
anti-Semitism thus: "I am a member of Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership,...
[which] recently issued a statement saying that JPFO and Gun Owners of America have
worked hand-in-hand to restore the Second Amendment rights of all Americans and will
continue to do so." Larry Pratt, Allegations Are "Outrageously False", POST & COURIER
(Charleston, S.C.), Feb. 26, 1996, at A9. JPFO has warmly welcomed such overtures:
according to Aaron Zelman, "JPFO considers Larry Pratt to be cut of exactly the same cloth
as the many righteous gentiles who risked their lives during the Holocaust to rescue Jews
from the hands of Nazi murderers." Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Aaron
Zelman).
223. The big discrepancy-and it is a very big one-is the anti-Semitism of the militia
movement. I discuss the significance of this discrepancy below. See discussion infra Part
II.A.2.b.
224. See Williams, supra note 11, at 892-99, 931-44.
225. See id. at 903; see also Crossfire (CNN television broadcast May 3, 1995) (airing
remarks of Larry Pratt).
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militia members rely on JPFO to buttress their claim that the federal
government is preparing a Nazi-like holocaust for gun owners."2 6
b. Ethnic Particularism
In sum, then, JPFO exhibits a distinct tendency to assimilate to
the gun culture, to build bridges and find commonality with other
Second Amendment groups and gun-owning Americans generally. At
the same time, however, JPFO imagines American culture as a whole
as riven by ethnic animosity-united only by a common dedication to
guns, suspicion of the government, and mutual distrust. Indeed, the
inevitability of that animosity is the whole reason for cherishing our
Second Amendment rights. Remember that in JPFO's vision, the
prime reason for arms ownership is not so that abstract individuals can
defend themselves against other abstract individuals. Rather, the
reason is so that ethnic and religious groups can defend themselves
against genocide perpetrated by other groups. JPFO explains:
Hatred between groups of people is the root cause of genocide. Such
hatreds are a commonplace. But such hatreds do not usually lead to
genocides. A genocide becomes possible when hatred between groups
of people reaches a point where one or more parties seek a "final
solution" to the problem, a "final solution" that involves murdering the
other party or parties.
227
Without this constant threat of ethnic balkanization, the whole reason
for the JPFO's version of the Amendment would disappear.
These two elements of JPFO's thinking-the drive to build
bridges to other groups, and the fundamental suspicion of other
groups-appear to be in some tension. That tension is especially acute
because some of the allied groups are themselves deeply anti-Semitic,
and yet JPFO blithely goes on extending the hand of peace to them.228
Several explanations are possible. First, JPFO may just be inconsistent
because it has inconsistent motives. Desiring acceptance in the gun
culture, it is prepared to overlook the anti-Semitism that should be so
offensive. Second, JPFO may simply be constructing alliances of
temporary convenience; devoted to gun rights, it is prepared to make
common cause with others who are devoted to gun rights, even if at
some future date its members may have to shoot at them.
226. See Camhi, supra note 155, at 29.
227. SImKNErA., LETHALLAws, supra note 157, at 10.
228. For discussion of the anti-Semitism of the militia movement, see Williams, supra
note 11, at 925-30.
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A third explanation, however, appears more plausible. In JPFO's
view, genocide is a possibility only when a hate-group seizes control
of the government: "Government... is the only mechanism by which
a group driven by hatred can turn emotion into large-scale actions....
Until and unless a hate-driven group gets control of the government
mechanism and disarms its intended targets, genocide simply cannot
and does not occur."229 Thus, JPFO conjures a world in which only
government can threaten armed citizens because only government can
effectively disarm them. This myopic focus on public violence has
several important consequences for JPFO. First, it allows the
organization to build bridges to other groups without particular worry.
Unless those groups seize government, they cannot perpetrate
genocide; until they do so, they are fundamentally in the same position
as JPFO-fearful of a government that wants to disarm them. Second,
it makes more plausible JPFO's claim that self-arming can prevent
genocide. After all, "[g]ovemment officials usually are a tiny minority
of the population (about 2% in America in 1991). ' 23o Moreover, in
America, "[o]rdinary civilians outnumber government armed forces-
military and police--by about 100-to-." 231  As a result, "civilians
armed with military-type rifles by weight of numbers ... can at least
cripple almost any attacking military force. As a result, genocides can
be prevented if civilians world-wide own military-type rifles and
plenty of ammunition."2
32
JPFO has thus simplified the social world into a simple duality:
average citizens against the government. In so doing, JPFO is
reiterating the elements of an age-old American myth: in
revolutionary times, the world will be divided between the people and
the government.233  That division, however, dangerously over-
simplifies, as JPFO of all groups should know. In this country, private
hate-driven violence is an enormous threat to outgroups, and it always
has been, thanks in part to the gun culture's own proclivity to take up
arms to further political goals. 34 Moreover, the line between private
and public violence is itself very fluid. By strategic inactivity, the
government can allow, even encourage, private pogroms without
getting its own hands dirty. Further, private hatred can become public
hatred as a result of elections or coups. Yesterday's militia leader
229. SmxNEr AL., LmTHAL LAWS, supra note 157, at 10, 12 (emphasis omitted).
230. Id. at 69.
231. Id.
232. Id. at71.
233. See Williams, supra note 11, at 904,916,924-25.
234. See generally discussion supra Part I.B.1, 3.
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could quickly become today's senator. Finally, private people often
cooperate with public hate violence. Many, perhaps most, ordinary
Germans, for example, were willing participants in Hitler's final
solution, not disarmed rebels, nor even innocent bystanders.235
In other words, a different vision of the social world is more
plausible but more threatening to JPFO's project: a variety of groups
existing in some tension and some amicability toward one another.
Some have influence in the government, to varying degrees at various
times, and some hold privately owned fertilizer bombs. Many of the
latter are anti-Semitic, and in troubled times, more may join them,
seeking an explanation for their woes and finding it in the Western
world's traditional scapegoats. JPFO must know how plausible this
vision is, because it often insists that the Jews in Nazi Germany stood
alone, without aid from their neighbors or even from Jews in other
countries.236 Today, it seems much more likely that the militia
movement will commit mass murder against American Jews than that
the government will do so. This vision of balkanized ethnic groups is
actually the world that JPFO itself imagines, except that it steadfastly
refuses to recognize the danger of decentralized violence. As I will
later argue, if JPFO took that danger seriously, it would be much
harder for it to sustain the claim that self-arming is the answer to
hatred.
B. Women and Guns
As with Jews, the relationship of women and guns has always
been more complicated than simple opposition. Frontier women used
guns to defend their families alongside or in lieu of their men. The
famous shooter Annie Oakley influenced the women's movement,
hoping that one day all women would be able to handle guns "as
naturally as they handle babies."237 Today, many women in the gun
culture would probably find the proposed opposition between women
and guns quite odd. Even for these women, guns may be culturally
coded as male, but they are nonetheless quite comfortable handling
and using guns. As for the men around them, guns seem an
235. See generally O~MR BARTov, HITLER'S ARMY: SOLDIERS, NAzIS, AND WAR IN
THE TmRD REICH (1991); DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING EXECUIONERS:
ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1996).
236. SmKINETAL., LETHAL LAws, supra note 157, at 158-59.
237. GLENDA RILEY, THE LiFE AND LEGACY OF ANNIE OAKLEY 143 (1994) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Annie Oakley).
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unremarkable part of life, and they own guns in significant
percentages.238
In recent years, however, a new feature has appeared in the
cultural landscape of the Second Amendment. According to some,
urban women have begun to purchase sidearms for self-defense in
record numbers, in response to specific fears rather than as a simple
cultural expression.239  In point of fact, this trend may have been
greatly exaggerated. 24" Faced with slumping membership, the
National Rifle Association (NRA) began a public relations and
training program aimed at women.24 At about the same time, faced
with slumping sales, some of the major gun manufacturers began
similar advertising campaigns.' Shortly thereafter, Smith and
Wesson commissioned a Gallup poll which concluded that the rates of
gunownership by women had skyrocketed.243 Other studies have
238. See WRIGHTrTAL., supra note 31, at 113-14.
239. See M. Elizabeth Blair & Eva M. Hyatt, The Marketing of Guns to Women:
Factors Influencing Gun-Related Attitudes and Gun Ownership by Women, 14 J. PUB. POL. &
MARKETING 117, 118 (1995).
240. See, e.g., Kelly Shermach, Gun Advocates Decry Study on Firearms Sales to
Women, MARKETING NEWS, Jan. 16, 1995, at 14.
241. This nationwide women's safety program is entitled "Refuse To Be a Victim."
Advertisements for the program (running in women's magazines like Cosmopolitan and
Family Circle) feature a frightened mother, holding a small child and walking through an
unlit garage. Those who call a toll-free number receive a safety tips brochure that includes
advice on owning a gun. Interested persons can take an NRA safety course that includes
discussion of guns as one option among others. See Ellen Neubome, Cashing In on Fear:
The NRA Targets Women, Ms., May/June 1994, at 46, 47-49.
242. For example, one Smith and Wesson advertisement features "a serious, thirtyish
woman poised at a shooting range, with the headline 'What would Mom think now?"' Blair
& Hyatt, supra note 239, at 118 (quoting a Smith & Wesson advertisement). Another Smith
& Wesson advertisement asserts, "Independence.... As more women have entered the job
market, become heads of households, purchased their own homes, they've taken on a whole
new set of responsibilities. For their own decisions. For their own lives. For their own-and
their families'-security." Letty Cottin Pogrebin, Neither Pink nor Cute: Pistols for the
Women of America, NATION, May 15, 1989, at 658, 668 (internal quotations omitted)
(omission in original) (quoting a Smith & Wesson brochure). A Colt Firearms'
advertisement "pictures a younger mother tucking her child into bed. Under this blissful
domestic scene are two models of Colt semiautomatic pistols with the headline: 'Self-
protection is more than your right ... it's your responsibility."' Carrie Goeme, Gun
Companies Target Women; Foes Call It 'Marketing to Fear', MARKETING NEWs, Aug. 3 1,
1992, at I (omission in original) (quoting a Colt Firearms advertisement). Significantly, the
Colt advertisement appeared not in a gun magazine but in Ladies'Home Journal. See id.
243. Specifically, the poll found that gun ownership among women had increased 53%
between 1983 and 1986, to an estimated 12 million women. As Smith and Wesson interprets
the poll results, it also found 15.6 million "potential female gun purchasers" in 1989, twice
the number for 1983. See Tom W. Smith & Robert J. Smith, Changes in Firearms
Ownership Among Women, 1980-1994, 86 J. Cium. L. & CPMINOLOGY 133, 136 (1995).
Unfortunately, Smith and Wesson has refused to release the poll data for study by
independent analysts. See id. at 141. Gallup itself has criticized Smith and Wesson for
misusing the data by claiming that 15.6 million women are potential buyers. See id. at 142.
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found, by contrast, that the percentage has not increased,244 and that the
typical female gun owner remains a married resident of a rural,
relatively safe, hunting household-in other words, a member of the
traditional gun culture, not a frightened urban professional.245
Whether women actually own guns in greater numbers than ever
before, however, may not be as significant as the perception that they
do so. The press has issued a blizzard of stories announcing the trend,
reporting the results of the Smith and Wesson poll without much
scrutiny.246 Correlatively, few press stories have questioned the reality
of the trend.247 Concurrently, Hollywood has released a series of new
movies featuring women with guns as both dangerous and sexy.
24
Most importantly, women gun owners have themselves become self-
conscious about the connections between their gender and their guns.
Women in the gun culture are gun owners who just happen to be
women. These new gun owners, by contrast, view their gun
ownership as a politically significant act, a defiance of ancient and
oppressive gender structures. Unlike earlier women gun owners, these
new gun proponents tend to be politically liberal and to identify
themselves as feminists.249
Unlike JPFO, this new self-consciousness is fairly broad-based.
The house journal for the movement is Women & Guns magazine,
which is published by the Second Amendment Foundation,25 has a
Instead, Gallup explained that the 15.6 million figure referred to women who said that there
"[was] at least some chance" that they would buy a gun. See id. In reality, "only 900,000
women could be considered potential purchasers." Id. (quoting Gallup response).
244. Relying on data from the National Opinion Research Center at the University of
Chicago, two researchers conclude: "According to the best available data, the ownership of
firearms among women is not increasing, the gender gap is not closing, and the level of
ownership is much lower than commonly stated, with about 11 to 12% of women owning a
gun and 4.5 to 8% owning a handgun." Smith & Smith, supra note 243, at 145. A 1994
study conducted by the Indiana University School of Law found that gun ownership
increased only 2.2% from 1980 to 1994. See Shermach, supra note 240, at 14. According to
one report, the National Science Foundation has found "no increase in female gun ownership
in the past decade." Colleen O'Connor, Women r Self-Defense: Big Business, DALLAS
MORNING NEws, Oct. 24, 1993, at IF.
245. See Smith & Smith, supra note 243, at 144.
246. See id. at 134 n.3 (citing sources).
247. See id. at 134-40.
248. See O'Connor, supra note 244, at IF.
249. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
250. The Second Amendment Foundation purchased Women & Guns in 1989. See
Peggy Tartaro, Evolution, WoMEN & GuNs, Mar. 1993, at 50, 50. The publisher, Julianne
Versnel Gottlieb, formerly worked for the foundation and is married to a member of its board
of directors. See Julianne Versnel Gottlieb, Dear Self-Reliant Reader, WOMEN & GuNs, Apr.
1993, at 50, 50.
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readership of 25,000,251 and claims to "function as the only voice for
empowerment of women through self-defense choices."252 Across the
country, a variety of firearms training seminars for women and
generally taught by women have appeared. The seminars seek to offer
a supportive environment (free of the masculine culture that usually
surrounds firearms) to help women overcome their aversion to guns 3
In a number of states, women have also formed lobbying groups to
fight gun control legislation, portraying the right to arms as a women's
safety issue.254
Probably the two most prominent figures in this movement are
Paxton Quigley and Naomi Wolf They have achieved prominence in
quite different ways. Quigley was once a gun control activist, helping
to found the National Committee for Handgun Control and to pass the
1968 Gun Control Act.255 When a fiend was raped, she experienced a
sea-change in her views about guns.256 She wrote a book, Armed &
Female, to make the case that guns are a safe, effective, and
constitutionally sanctioned form of self-defense for women.257 The
book became a best-seller, and Quigley became a prominent
spokeswoman for women and guns!" Today, she leads popular self-
defense seminars for women.25 9 In sum, she is the guru of the women
and guns movement-the very model of a modern, armed, self-reliant
woman.
By contrast, it is not at all clear that Naomi Wolf has ever touched
a gun; certainly, she is no expert on women's self-defense. Instead,
Wolf is a high profile, best-selling feminist author who has celebrated
251. See Reggie Nadelson, Magnum Force in High Heels, INDEPENDENT (London),
May 5, 1992, at 14.
252. Tartaro, supra note 250, at 50.
253. See Lisa M. Bowman, Aim at Self-Defense, Urges Author of 'Armed and
Female', L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1995, at BI; Jeanne Beach Eigner, Women & Guns: They're
Aiming at Personal Protection and a Sense of Empowerment, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRB., Nov.
8, 1992, at DI; Sonny Jones, NRA Launches New Women s Instructor Development Program,
WOMEN & GuNs, May 1993, at 39,39-42; O'Connor, supra note 244, at IF; Paxton Quigley,
An Essay on Revolvers: A Good Choice for Beginners, WOMEN & GUNs, July 1995, at 26,
26-28.
254. See Kathryn Casey, Up inArms, LADIES' HOME J., Aug. 1995, at 89,98 (Arming
Women Against Rape and Endangerment); Tony Semerad, Utah Women for Gun Control?
Not This Group, SALT LAXETRIB., Sept. 5, 1994, at Al (Women Against Gun Control); Dave
Shiflett, Lock and Load, Ladies: Shooting for Some Common Sense to Gun Ownership
Laws, RocKY MTN. NEws (Denver), Feb. 19, 1995, at 58A (Safety for Women and
Responsible Motherhood).
255. See PAXTON QUIGLEY, ARMED AND FEMALE at xvii (1989).
256. See PAXTON QUIGLEY, NoTANEASY TARGET 14 (1995).
257. See QUIGLEY, supra note 255, at 52-53, 131-38.
258. See Bowman, supra note 253, at B1.
259. SeeA Call to Arms, PEOPLE, Jan. 10, 1994, at 60, 63.
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women's self-arming as part of a new trend in feminism. 260 In Fire
with Fire, she urges women to abandon what she calls "victim
feminism" and instead to embrace "power feminism":
What is power feminism? It means taking practical giant steps
instead of ideologically pure baby steps; practicing tolerance rather than
self-righteousness. Power feminism encourages us to identify with one
another primarily through the shared pleasures and strengths of
femaleness, rather than primarily through our shared vulnerability and
pain. It calls for alliances based on economic self-interest and
economic giving back rather than on a sentimental ... fantasy of
cosmic sisterhood.261
Rather than remaining ideologically pure in their powerlessness,
therefore, power feminists should fight "fire with fire.' 262 They should
take up "the master's tools"--such as "the electoral process, the press,
and money"-because "it is only the master's tools that can dismantle
the master's house.,
263
Guns are among those tools. Wolf offers the women and guns
movement as evidence to refute "[t]he premise that women are
helpless victims."2 4 She reports the alleged trend of women buying
guns, and she describes the history and content of Women & Guns
magazine.2" Her tone is celebratory: "As violence against women
reached epidemic proportions, women were not just sitting around.
Quietly, carefully, with thorough training and in unprecedented
numbers, while they looked after their families and tended their
marriages, they were also teaching themselves to blow away potential
assailants. 266  Women & Guns "addresses the unlabeled power
feminism of women in the American mainstream;" in letters to the
magazine, "one can hear the pioneer feminism of women who know
that no one will take care of them but themselves." 267 For these
women, "victim feminism's worldview is far from accurate, and less
then useless. The fact is that women are psychologically burning the
clothing of victimization." 68
260. See, e.g., NAOMI WOLF, FnE WrrH FatE: THE NEw FEMALE PowER AND How IT
WEL CHANGE THE 21sr CENTRY at xv-xix (1993); "Ms."--Understanding Women
Gunowners, WOMEN& GuNs, Aug. 1994, at 8, 8.
261. WOLF, supra note 260, at 53.
262. See id. at 53-54.
263. Id. at 54.
264. Id. at216.
265. Seeid. at216-20.
266. Id. at216.
267. Id. at217.
268. Id. at219-20.
TULANE LA WREVIEW
1. Power Feminism and Guns
Following Wolf's analysis, the women and guns movement is
made up of women who generally consider themselves to be "power"
feminists, who reject "victim" feminism's association of women with
nonviolence.269 This argument draws heavily on three traditional
feminist themes--empowering women, gendering the subject, and
maintaining that the personal is political.
a. Empowering Women
The movement's central argument is that gun ownership can
empower women to lead full, active lives, with less fear for their safety
and fewer restrictions on their movements.27° For these women, self-
arming is only a logical extension of feminism's drive to empower
women.27" ' Women who fear guns will remain victims; they should
instead transcend their fear, take responsibility for their own
protection, and stop relying on men.272 One woman summarized: "In
many ways, it's an extension of the women's movement. The same
way we've decided we're perfectly capable of taking care of our
economic well-being -.. we're also capable of taking care of... our
personal and physical well-being." 73
Women & Guns advances this theme insistently, relying heavily
on the language of choice and empowerment. Julianne Versnel
Gottlieb, the publisher of Women & Guns, writes a monthly column
entitled Dear Self-Reliant Reader.274 In it, she takes a consistent
position:
We must realize that we, and only we can-and will--be responsible
for our personal safety.
I do not choose to be a victim. I choose to be a woman with power
and I will use whatever means I need to attain this goal.
I choose to carry a firearm in certain situations.... It is my
choice.275
269. See, e.g., id. at 216-20.
270. See infra text accompanying notes 300-303.
271. On feminism's desire to empower women, see CATHERiNE A. MAcKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 242 (1989).
272. See Mitchell Landsberg, More Women Turning to Firearms Out of Fear, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 1993, at Al8.
273. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting a female gun owner).
274. See, e.g., Gottlieb, supra note 250, at 50.
275. Julianne Versnel Gottlieb, Dear Self-Reliant Reader, WOMEN & GuNs, Sept
1994, at 58, 58. I offer the quoted language as just one example of Gottlieb's position;
virtually every column of Dear Self-Reliant Reader includes similar language of choice and
empowerment.
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Similarly, Paxton Quigley's self-defense course is called "Women's
Empowerment in the 90s,"276 and the idea is never far from her lips: "I
teach empowerment"; 277 "When they learn how to use a gun, and that
they can control it and often shoot well, they become empowered";27
'Women have finally decided they have to protect themselves. It's the
last avenue to independence and liberation."279
Thus, for the women and guns movement, the central reason for
arms ownership is self-defense, rather than hunting, target shooting, or
revolution.2"' The movement maintains that armed self-defense is
important to women in a variety of contexts. For example, the
movement argues-against conventional wisdom-that motherhood
provides an important reason to be armed: to protect one's children.2"'
Armed self-reliance is also necessary to women's ability to travel and
pursue employment.282 Perhaps most centrally, guns empower women
to resist rape, domestic abuse, and sexual harassment. Paxton Quigley
concludes her chapter 'Tutile Defense" with an admonition:
If, for whatever reason, you think it is time for you to do your share
to end the victim status of women, and if you can bear to undertake the
attendant responsibilities, you should know that finding a gun in the
hand of a potential victim is one of the most feared and avoided
276. Neubome, supra note 241, at 46.
277. Eigner, supra note 253, at DI (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Paxton
Quigley).
278. Bowman, supra note 253, at B1.
279. Eigner, supra note 253, at DI (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Paxton
Quigley).
280. A voluntary survey of the readership of Women & Guns tends to confirm this
point: 68% of those responding listed self-defense as their reason for owning a gun. See
Peggy Tartaro, A Picture of Women Gunowners, WoMEN & GuNs, Mar. 1994, at 30,31.
281. Julianne Versnel Gottlieb explains:
Ironically, perhaps to some, it is the fact that I have small children that has made
me more vehement in my stand to be able to defend them and myself. I do not
choose to be a willing victim or allow them to become ones [sic]. Nor do I want to
see that choice denied to any other woman or mother.
Gottlieb, supra note 250, at 50. Another woman echoes: "More and more women today are
separated or divorced, and the responsibility for their children's safety lies with Mommy
alone." Ruth Bohan, The Firing Line: Women Are Stepping Up, Ci. TRm., Aug. 15, 1993,
at 3 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting a female gun owner).
282. One woman explains: "Women have the right to work, but only in safe areas....
They have the right to go on business trips, but not at night. They are denied equal
promotion opportunities because these trips require them to travel alone. This robs women of
their rights." Paul Brinkley-Rogers, Guns Can Free Women, NRA Forum Told, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, May 22, 1995, at BI (internal quotations omitted) (quoting NRA member and
feminist Terryl Morgan). Similarly, Women & Guns declaims: "If [women] are to compete
successfully in the business world, they must be free to travel without fear... For too long
women have accepted the roll [sic] of natural victim. This must stop.", Karen MacNutt,
Perpetuating the Victim Status of Women, WoMEN & GUNS, Dec. 1991, at 7.
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incidents a felon can imagine-feared and avoided even more than the
police.283
Naomi Wolf argues: "Women's relationship to violence is changing.
Ordinary women are at a turning point. The fury generated by sexual
abuse, which has traditionally been turned inward, is beginning to be
directed outward."284  Julianne Versnel Gottlieb writes: "[W]omen
who are assaulted are victimized twice. Once by the perpetrator of the
crime and the second time by the criminal justice system.... You
cannot count on anyone to protect you or defend you except
yourself."2
85
Importantly, self-arming allows women to rely on themselves,
rather than the men in their lives. One woman colorfully explained:
"When there aren't any warm shoulders of a man to lean on for
protection, there's nothing that feels better then the cold barrel of a
gun.'216 Another insisted: "I don't have, or necessarily need, a man to
protect me."287  Similarly, self-arming allows women to rely on
themselves rather than on the state, which cannot or will not
adequately protect women. One woman took a forgiving tone: "A big
part of learning how to use a gun is self-reliance .... The police
aren't psychic. They come when they're called. We're socialized to
think some man on a white horse is going to come and rescue us.
That's a fairy tale." 8" Most; however, are more critical. Safety for
Women and Responsible Motherhood (SWARM), a lobbying group
opposed to gun control, sarcastically instructs: "Call for a cop, an
ambulance and a pizza and see who gets there first. The pizza rarely
comes in second."289 Karen MacNutt, legal consultant for the Second
Amendment Foundation and the National Rifle Association, writes a
monthly column for Women & Guns called Legally Speaking.2 19 It
stresses the inadequacy of legal mechanisms such as restraining orders
283. QUIGLEY, supra note 255, at 39.
284. WoLF, supra note 260, at 220.
285. Julianne Versnel Gottlieb, Dear Self-Reliant Reader, WOMEN & GUNS, Aug.
1994, at 58, 58.
286. Rebecca Walsh, A Rally for Right to Bear Arms, SALT LAKE TRM., Jan. 28, 1996,
at B3 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting a female gun owner).
287. Joe Holleman, More Women Are Fired Up About Guns, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Mar. 22, 1993, at IA (internal quotations omitted) (quoting a woman who bought
and learned to use a gun because a man had been threatening her).
288. Katherine Seligman, Women Taking Up Firearms, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 16, 1994,
at Al (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Nancy Bittle, founder of the group Arming
Women Against Rape and Endangerment).
289. Shiflett, supra note 254, at 58A (quoting a popular phrase used in SWARM
materials).
290. See, e.g., Karen MacNutt, Legally Speaking: Restraining Orders, WOMEN &
GUNS, Mar. 1993, at 44.
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to protect women; instead, MacNutt urges women to become self-
reliant by arming themselves.
2 91
Women in the movement have harsh words for those "victim"
feminists who equate femaleness and nonviolence, especially feminist
proponents of gun control-similar to JPFO's denouncement of
"Jewish gun-grabbers." Karen MacNutt declaims: "What is truly
amazing is the large number of otherwise intelligent, so-called
'liberated' women who blandly accept and even promote the idea that
women are incapable of defending themselves with these devices."292
Peggy Tartaro accuses feminist gun control advocates of elitism and
paternalism: "This particular self-described liberalish feminist still
thinks women can make up their own minds, thank you very much.
And she thinks that while not every woman may want to include a
firearm in her own self-defense options, that those who do shouldn't
be subject to ridicule."293 When Ms. magazine criticized the idea that
guns empower women, Women & Guns magazine responded:
[Naomi] Wolf's brand of feminism is unacceptable to the Ms. editorial
board which apparently believes "feminism" and its attendant
vocabulary can only be defined and used by themselves.
In fact, none of the material presented talks directly with women
gunowners, preferring to fall back on the victim mythology created by
the general media.
294
Finally, Julianne Versnel Gottlieb virtually chants her personal code:
I am not a victim feminist. I am a power feminist
I refuse to be a victim. I refuse to be a victim of crime. I refuse to be
a victim of discrimination. I refuse to be a victim of someone else.
I have power. I have power against crime. I have power against
discrimination. I have power against someone else.
I am self-reliant.
291. See, e.g., id. ('"Nightmare Ends In Death,' read the headline. Estranged husband
violates restraining order to murder wife then kills self. We did all we could, says judge
.. "..") (omission in original); Karen L. MacNutt Legally Speaking: Occupational Safety 11,
WOMEN & GuNs, July 1994, at 40, 42 ("I believe a handgun is the best defense from random
violence.'); Karen L. MacNutt, Legally Speaking: Better Late Than Never, WoMEN & GUNs,
Sept. 1993, at 38, 38 (describing a hypothetical police officer who tells an abused woman,
'We've better things to do than to get involved in a lover's quarrel").
292. MacNutt, supra note 282, at 7.
293. Peggy Tartaro, From the Editor, WOMEN & GuNs, Aug. 1995, at 6, 7.
294. "Ms." -Understanding Women Gunowners, supra note 260, at 8 (emphasis
added). Similarly, according to Sonny Jones, "feminism is dying," because victim "feminists
don't dance.... [B]efore you teach a person the art of war, you must teach her the art of
dance. In other words, a woman must learn to love life and herself before she can deal with
the concept of fighting to preserve that life." Nadelson, supra note 251, at 14 (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Sonny Jones, founding editor of Women & Guns).
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And I wantyou to have that choice also.295
b. Gendering the Subject
Like "establishment" feminists, the women and guns movement
insists that too often, public policy analysis does not take gender into
account, using either a masculine or a "gender-neutrar' actor as the
subject. 96 Instead, analysis of the right to arms should take both a
woman's and a man's perspective-it should "gender the subject"--
because the right may have different significance for women than for
men.2 97 Indeed, reversing the traditional wisdom, the movement
argues that the right to arms is more important to women than to
men.
298
One of the earliest essays to discuss women and guns, by Ruth
Silver and Don Kates, protests the failure of both sides in the gun
control debate to consider directly "the viability of women's self-
295. Julianne Versnel Gottlieb, Dear Self-Reliant Reader, WOMEN & GUNS, Oct. 1994,
at 58, 58. "Establishment" feminists have also had harsh words for the women and guns
movement Betty Friedan, Susan Estrich, Patricia Ireland, Representative Nita Lowey, Ms.
and other women's magazines, have all attacked the NRA, the firearms industry, and the
movement generally for coopting the language of feminism to serve a nonfeminist end,
cynically preying on women's fears to promote sales and membership, and misleading
women. See Robert Draper, Why 15 Million Women Own Guns, GLAMOUR, May 1993, at
260, 302-03; Susan Estrich, Women, Beware of NRA, USA TODAY, May 25, 1995, at 13A;
Steve Fishman, Up Front: What You Know About Guns Can Kill You, VoGuE, Oct. 1993, at
146, 148; Melinda Henneberger, NRA Campaign Under Attack, N.Y TIMS, Oct. 24, 1993,
§ 4, at 4; Ann Japenga, Would IBe Safer with a Gun?, HEALTH, Mar./Apr. 1994, at 52, 54;
Ann Jones, Living with Guns, Playing with Fear, Ms., May/June 1994, at 38, 40-43;
Neuborne, supra note 241, at 46; Pierre Thomas, Fear Impels More Women to Buy Guns,
WASH. POsT, Jan. 29, 1994, at Al. One law review article even argued that recent
advertising aimed at women violates FTC regulations. See Debra Dobray & Arthur J.
Waldrop, Regulating Handgun Advertising Directed at Women, 12 WHITER L. Rnv. 113
(1991). Charles Schumer petitioned the commission for an investigation. See William
Langley, Arms and the Woman, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 15, 1995, at 1, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File. The response of Women & Guns is that these charges
are paternalistic; women can decide for themselves whether they need a gun, without
guidance from the feminist "establishment" or a government agency. See Julianne Versnel
Gottlieb, Parting Shots.... WOMEN & GUNS, Feb. 1995, at 58, 58; "Ms. "--Understanding
Women Gunowners, supra note 260, at 8; New NRA "Refuse To Be a Victim'" Launched into
Nationwide Orbit, WOMEN & GuNs, Jan. 1994, at 8, 8-10; Peggy Tartaro, From the Editor,
WOMEN & GuNs, Feb. 1995, at 6, 6; Vogue Takes One-Sided Look at Women Gunowners,
WOMEN & GuNs, Dec. 1993, at 8, 8-9.
296. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 837-
49 (1990).
297. See WOLF, supra note 260, at 216-20.
298. See, e.g., Chris Martell, Women Take Shots at Soglin Proposal, Wis. ST. J., Feb.
14, 1993, at IA.
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defense."299  By contrast, the authors conclude that "a specific
discussion of women's armed self-defense is appropriate, because the
crimes women fear are particularly deterrable and defendable with
handguns."3' They also argue that women have greater need of guns
than do men, because of their relative physical weakness: "[Women's]
freedom is made possible by the opportunity to possess a handgun. To
paraphrase a saying from the Old West: God didn't make men and
women equal, Colonel Colt did."3 1 The notion that guns are a gender-
equalizer has become a slogan in the women and guns movement.3 2
One gun owner put the idea colorfully: "That's my equalizer with a
man that's going to do me bodily harm. That makes us the same, then.
We're on equal ground, and that's a good safe feeling. I'd just aim for
the crotch and hit the heart."30 3
Similarly, in the movement's view, gun control falls especially
heavily on women. This criticism applies to all gun control, because
"women are more vulnerable to attack, and have more at stake in
battling new controls on guns than men do."3' Particular forms of gun
control also have particular problems. Peggy Tartaro condemns
waiting periods as "gender biased" because women are "more likely
[than men] to be first time purchasers of guns," and she concludes that
"waiting periods ... kill women."3 5  One group condemns
discretionary licensing statutes because police chiefs tend to grant
them primarily to men: "This discrimination against [Colorado's]
women is deeply violent."30 6  As noted above, women's lobbying
groups have sprung up all over the country to fight gun control at the
state level. 3
07
299. Carol Ruth Silver & Don B. Kates, Jr., Self-Defense, Handgun Ownership, and
the Independence of Women in a Violent, Sexist Society, in RESrRICrnNG HANDGUNS: THE
LmERAL SKm'Tics SPEAK Our 139, 139 (Don B. Kates, Jr. ed., 1979).
300. Id. at 140.
301. Id. at 169.
302. See, e.g., Miguel A. Faria, Women, Guns, and the Medical Literature-A Raging
Debate, WOMEN & GUNs, Oct. 1994, at 14, 16.
303. Blair & Hyatt, supra note 239, at 123; see also Casey, supra note 254, at 98
(noting that Camille Paglia calls a gun "the ultimate equalizer"); Miguel A. Faria, supra note
302, at 16 ("The gun is the great equalizer for women."); Laura Ingraham, Armed and
Empowered, PrrTsuRGH POST-GAzETE, May 19, 1996, at E-1 ("[F]eminist leaders
[wrongly] pooh-pooh the notion that guns are 'equalizing forces' for women who are
otherwise no match for a would-be attacker.'); Walsh, supra note 286, at B3 (quoting the
head of Women Against Gun Control, who calls guns "the great equalizer").
304. Semerad, supra note 254, at Al (paraphrasing the head of Women Against Gun
Control).
305. Peggy Tartaro, From the E8ditor, WOMEN & GUNS, May 1993, at 6,6.
306. New Colorado Group Will SWARM Concealed Carry Reform, WoMEN & GUNS,
Feb. 1995, at 8, 8.
307. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
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c. The Personal Is Political
The women and guns movement also echoes the feminist
conviction that the world is not and should not be sharply divided into
personal and political spheres.08 On one hand, the movement seeks to
defend an individual right to keep and bear arms; it urges women as
individuals to purchase and train with guns for their own personal
protection 09 On the other hand, the movement also hopes that this
self-arming will have large and long-term effects in the public
realm.310
Those political dimensions are several and linked. First, as I have
argued above, for the women and guns movement, self-arming rests
on a belief that the state cannot or will not protect women, so they
must protect themselves.31' One study concluded of recent women
gunowners, "[o]wning a gun for these women is a necessary evil, as
well as a political statement. They all expressed doubt that gun control
legislation would work and, therefore, defended their right to own a
gun." 312 Second, as I have detailed earlier, for the movement, the
choice to buy a gun entails a decision not to rely on men for
protection.3 13 Indeed, many of these women see the purchase of a gun
as a way to upset conventional gender roles, by invading the masculine
culture of guns and defying the expectation that women will be weak
and passive.314 Paxton Quigley explains:
[S]ocialization processes that connect femininity to various styles of
weakness and helplessness may paralyze many women, teaching them
the fear that restricts their ability to defend themselves....
* Sometimes it takes weeks or even months before these women
begin to realize that they are physically and mentally capable of
successfully defending themselves against an aggressor.
308. See, e.g., SusANMOLLEROKjN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND TmE FAMILY 124 (1989).
309. See supra Part II.B.l.a.
310. See, e.g., New Colorado Group Will SWARM Concealed Carry Reform, supra
note 306, at 8.
311. See supra notes 288-291 and accompanying text.
312. Blair& Hyatt, supranote 239, at 123.
313. See supra notes 286-287 and accompanying text.
314. While the movement hopes to invade and disrupt the masculine culture of guns, it
also plainly hopes to retain a good deal of conventional feminine culture as well. This
blending of the two cultures leads to some of the odder elements of the movement For
example, Women & Guns published an article on whether shooting and pregnancy mix (they
do), see Carolee Boyles-Sprenkel, Shooting and Pregnancy: Do They Mir?, WOMEN &
GUNs, Aug. 1995, at 22, and apparel designers have produced "[g]arter-belt holsters,
gabardine business suits, slinky sequined evening gowns, even the trusty headband ... to
comfortably hide a pistol," O'Connor, supra note 244, at IF.
[Vol. 74:387
1999] CONSTITUTIONAL TALES OF VIOLENCE
Moreover, a great many women also dislike and fear guns and
consider it normal female behavior to react in that manner. These
emotions may be a consequence of a myth that perpetuates the idea that
guns belong to men as if they were some sort of cultural prerogative.
Some women... perceive guns as an extension of a man's masculinity,
giving him perhaps an undeserved power.3 15
Karen MacNutt proudly proclaims that society would consider
her a "very bad girl" because, as she explains, "I carry a gun. I have
no faith in the protective shield of some Victorian sense of
innocence.... [I]f my .38 is too small, I'm sure my .45 will do the
job."316
Third and cumulatively, although the movement views the right
to arms as an individual right, it hopes that general self-arming by
women can radically change current gender dynamics. Proponents
and opponents of the movement agree that it grows out of a deep well
of anger about the oppression of women. Ms. magazine explains that
women possess "a certain off-the-record vein of vengefulness, a
mother lode of anger, a vast buildup of unrequited insults and
injuries.... Sweet revenge. Women's interest in guns-such as it
is-isn't just about fear. It's about fighting back."317 One gun dealer
made the point in almost identical terms: "Women have suffered from
purse snatchings, rapes and all kinds of humiliation. They're
absolutely disgusted with government's feeble attempts to do anything
for them. And they're getting p ---- off.3 8  Supporters of the
movement believe that this anger can be successfully channeled into a
large-scale resistance movement. Paxton Quigley explains: "If a
number of women say 'Enough is enough,' we're going to see a real
Take Back the Night movement."31 9 Even critics of the movement see
the appeal in this hope. Letty Cottin Pogrebin, founding editor of Ms.,
acknowledges:
[M]y reaction surprised me. I'm for gun control and nonviolent
conflict resolution, yet suddenly I imagined every woman armed,
powerful and instantly equalized-not as an aggressor but as a
confident defender of her safety and physical integrity. Wait until some
guy attacks us on an empty street: POW-one less pervert; BANG-
315. QuiGLEY, supra note 255, at 37-38.
316. Karen L. MacNutt, Legally Speaking: Comus, WoMN & GuNs, Feb. 1996, at
48,48 (internal quotations omitted).
317. Jones, supra note 295, at 42-43.
318. Kathleen Kemicky, Women and Guns: Shooting Away the Stereotypes, Btwr.
NEWs, Aug. 15, 1995, at Cl, available in 1995 WL 5495060 (quoting a gun dealer).
319. Japenga, supra note 295, at 57 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Paxton
Quigley).
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another rapist blown away.... [P]istol-packin' mamas will fight back:
ZAP-victims no more.20
In this sense, the movement seamlessly blends individual and
collective aspects of the right to arms. On one hand, each woman
possesses an individual right to arms-she alone has the choice to
decide to buy a gun, and she alone must pull the trigger. The
movement imagines that the right to arms will generally be exercised
in a one-to-one confrontation with an aggressor. On the other hand,
these individual exercises of the right to arms are part of a more
general movement, and the movement hopes that the meaning and
effect of this general self-arming will have immense political
significance. In this view, when an individual woman fights off an
attacker, she is fighting not only a particular man but the forces of
misogyny. When she overcomes her own fear of violence, she is
contributing to a large-scale shift in cultural attitudes that consign
women to victimhood. And when she joins with other women in gun
training classes or in reading Women & Guns magazine, she is
affirming that there is strength in armed sisterhood.
The apotheosis of this line of thinking is the common claim that
the solution to political violence against women is women's personal
self-arming--echoing JPFO's claim that the solution to the Holocaust
was Jewish self-arming. After recounting the atrocities in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Julianne Versnel Gottlieb protests:
I have never read or heard one reporter-female or male-who has
decried the fact that these women have no way to defend themselves.
They never comment on, refer to, allude to, or allow that any woman-
every women-should have the right to choose not to be a victim.
... It is time for [women's organizations'] help to expand its
outreach to teach women around the world how to choose not to be a
viCtin.321
In a later column, Gottlieb offers the same prescription for other
countries:
[Tjhe same horrendous practices are taking place in Haiti and Rwanda.
With each new revelation, the United Nations continues to pass
320. Pogrebin, supra note 242, at 668. Similarly, a liberal talk-radio host, who finds
the "passion about guns in this country... disgusting," still finds herself conflicted: "If more
women purchased guns and learned how to use them, it would be a step toward the end of
victimization of women.... I am reacting to centuries of violence against women.... My
fears are part of the collective conscious of all the assaults and abuse against women."
Martell, supra note 298, at IA (intemal quotations omitted) (quoting Diana Summers).
321. Julianne Versnel Gottlieb, Dear Self-Reliant Reader, WOMEN & GuNs, June
1993, at 50, 50.
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economic sanctions and demand the restoration of the "rightful"
governments.
It's not working. It's time to do something so that the victims can
protect themselves.
I am not a victim feminist. I am a power feminist.
322
Even Naomi Wolf has warm words for women's self-arming in the
Balkans:
In the Balkans, women have begun to take part in the violence that has
engulfed the region, and to reject their submissive roles in the
traditionally patriarchal culture. "Women have changed since the
beginning of the war," Sarajevan Jasna Delalic said. 'Women have
banded together... I will never slave for anybody anymore."
Balkan women are reacting to their victimization with a matter-of-
fact military vengefulness.... [A Sarajevan doctor explained,] "I've
treated eighteen raped women .... About a third waited to have their
gynecological problem resolved and then went out and picked up a
g1un 32 3
2. The Second Amendment as an Equal Rights Amendment
The interpretation of the Second Amendment offered by the
women and guns movement grows directly out of its analysis of the
importance of self-arming to women. In this sense, the interpretation
is perspectival-it is the Second Amendment as understood through
the lense of power feminism. And it rests on a vision of the social
world as deeply divided by gender animus. The reason for the right to
anns is that women need to defend themselves against misogynist
men, not so that abstract individuals can defend themselves against
other abstract individuals. In that sense, for the movement, the Second
Amendment is a kind of Equal Rights Amendment. Like Colonel
Colt, it equalizes the marginal difference in physical strength between
men and women and so gives the latter a real-world freedom of
movement and physical integrity.
Paxton Quigley's interpretation of the Amendment exemplifies
these characteristics in a somewhat indirect way. Her formal analysis
of the Amendment itself is actually quite gender-neutral, sounding
very like the standard account offered by the individual rights school
and indeed relying heavily on the work of Don Kates.324 She begins
with a number of standard passages by early American thinkers like
322. Gottlieb, supra note 295, at 58.
323. WOLF, supra note 260, at 220.
324. See QUIGLEY, supra note 255, at 54-65.
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Samuel Adams, James Madison, and Richard Henry Lee, on the
importance of the right to arms.325 She then argues, following Don
Kates, that the "militia" to which the Amendment refers is the
unorganized militia, composed of every private householder.326 And
she concludes by arguing that the threat of tyranny is still very real,
and so we should continue to embrace the Second Amendment.327 On
the face of things, none of these arguments is overtly connected to
perspectivalism or a divided social world. Quigley's interpretation of
the Amendment, however, occurs in a book devoted to the idea that
women need guns to be free.32 Her analysis of the Amendment
contains no discussion of the importance of hewing to the Framer's
intent or the value of a written constitution. Instead, she values the
Amendment, as she interprets it, because it promises to help women in
a divided social world-and she thinks that we should value the
Amendment for the same reason: "[T]he real issue is not the polemics
of guns versus no guns; rather, for some women it is the choice of
being victor or victim. 3 29
The editors of Women & Guns more directly connect their
interpretation of the Amendment to perspectivalism and the vision of a
divided social world. The magazine describes itself as "[a] publication
primarily for women, primarily by women and presenting a strong
proactive stand on the right to keep and bear arms for women."30 For
better or worse, the state has no constitutional obligation to protect
women: "[M]any courts have held that police have no obligation to
protect individual citizens." 331 Fortunately, the Second Amendment
guarantees women the right to protect themselves. In the prose of
Julianne Versnel Gottlieb, the meaning of the Second Amendment and
the concerns of power feminism are so neatly blended that it becomes
impossible to divine where one begins and the other ends.332 In one
column, she denounces Hillary Rodham Clinton for believing that
325. See id.
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See id. at 1-27.
329. Id. at91.
330. Julianne Versnel Gottlieb, Dear Self-Reliant Reader, WOMEN & GuNs, Mar.
1994, at 58, 58.
331. Glamour Asks Why?, WOMEN & GuNs, July 1993, at 8, 9 (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting a letter from a reader); see also Faria, supra note 302, at 15 ("[The police
do not have a legal duty to protect the public against criminals .... '[There is no
constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or
madmen."' (quoting Bowers v. Devito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)).
332. See Julianne Versnel Gottlieb, Dear Self-Reliant Reader, WOMEN & GuNs, Sept.
1993, at 50, 50.
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"government is the only entity able to make choices for you and
me.' 333 By contrast, "I, Julianne Versnel Gottlieb, believe that the
individual can make the best choices for the individual.' 334  In so
doing, she follows in the footsteps of Dolley Madison, wife of "James
Madison, the author of the Second Amendment," and "a woman who
time and again in her long life made the choice not to be a victim.
33
Similarly, Gottlieb feels a close connection to Eleanor Roosevelt, who
"carried a small handgun in her purse. She made a choice not to be a
victim. '336 After claiming these women, along with Molly Pitcher,
Martha Washington, and Abigail Adams, as spiritual ancestors,
Gottlieb then offers her view of the Second Amendment:
If the U.S. Constitution gives me the right of privacy-the right to
control the destiny of what occurs to my body-it gives me same right
of privacy to choose to protect myself from assault, rape or worse.
I believe that the Second Amendment of the Bill of Rights gives me
the individual right to make a choice if, and/or how, I am going to do
SO.
I believe that as a mother, I have these same rights when it comes to
the protection of my children. I believe that as a wife, I have the same
rights for the protection of my husband.337
In another column, she writes that the Second Amendment
was included in the Bill of Rights over 200 years ago to protect us from
tyranny from within, as well as from without. It is what I fight for so
that you and I do not become victims like those tortured women in
Bosnia-Hercegovina today and who knows where tomorrow.338
In these passages, Gottlieb offers a power-feminist Second
Amendment, predicated on the reality of a misogynist world. In place
of Founding Fathers, she offers us a roster of Founding Mothers, each
of whom "chose not to be a victim. 3 9  If the Constitution today
protects women's substantive due process rights to reproductive
autonomy, then it stands to reason that the Second Amendment also
gives women the right to defend themselves-to choose not to be
victims. Women may exercise that right as individuals, as mothers, or
as wives-and the Second Amendment recognizes and celebrates all
of those uses. In other words, this rendering of the Amendment is
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Gottlieb, supra note 321, at 50.
339. Gottlieb, supra note 332, at 50.
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perspectival. It offers us a Second Amendment interpreted with the
concerns of power feminism in mind.
Gottlieb's version of the Amendment also rests on a vision of a
socially divided world. The reason that women need the Amendment
is to defend themselves against "rape, assault, or worse.""34 Indeed,
the Amendment offers the only guarantee that Bosnia-like
misogynistic violence will not occur here. For that reason, Gottlieb
has devoted herself to defending the Amendment-as it defends her
and all women. The staff of Women & Guns draw the obvious
conclusion: "If we allow the gun-control lobby to chip away at our
constitutional rights in the name of crime control we will be taking the
first step in guaranteeing that we are victims.""34 And Gottlieb warns,
"It is not possible to be selective about the Constitution.... This is
crucial to realize when responding to the violence that pervades our
lives.
3 42
Recently, this rendition of the Amendment has made its way
from the popular press to the law reviews. Like Don Kates and Ruth
Silver, Inge Anna Larish condemns "[tihe exclusion of women's
concerns in the gun control debate [because] women are most in need
of guns for self-defense. All else being held equal, women are
physically weaker than men and will continue to be victimized by men
whether or not men have guns."3 ' 3 Moreover, the police have been
especially deficient in "preventing the crimes which greatly and
disproportionately affect women, such as sexual assault and domestic
violence."3' As a result, gun control falls especially heavily on
women. In practice, statutory schemes for carry pen-nits discriminate
against women, who generally do not carry large sums of cash and
cannot demonstrate need.345 In addition, a complete gun ban would
help "men who perpetrate violent crime against women" because
"[flor most women, men's fists are lethal force.'34 6
In Larish's view, the current discussion of the meaning of the
Second Amendment wrongly ignores these women's concerns. The
Framers wrote the Amendment "in gender-neutral language," but "[a]
problem with gender-neutral law is its assumption that such laws
340. See id.
341. Glamour Asks Why?, supra note 331, at 9.
342. Julianne Versnel Gottlieb, Parting Shots... , WoMEN & GuNs, Apr. 1995, at 58,
58.
343. Inge Anna Larish, Why Annie Can't Get Her Gun: A Feminist Perspective on the
SecondAmendment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 467,473.
344. Id. at 504.
345. See id.
346. Id. at 505.
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concern themselves with women's interests, when, a closer
examination reveals that the interpretation, discussions and application
of the law often ignores women."347 Thus, collective rights theorists
completely ignore women's need for self-defense, reading the
Amendment instead to protect only the "states' right to maintain
militias. 3 48 Even historians of the individual rights school "speak in
terms of a male right, generally agreeing that one of the primary
purposes of the [Second Amendment] was to guarantee an individual's
right to defend 'himself.' 3 49 Larish never describes how she would
interpret the Amendment in detail, but it is not difficult to infer from
her analysis. If we read the Amendment with women's needs in mind,
we would presumably endorse a very strong personal right to own
arms for self-defense, and we would find most gun control statutes
unconstitutional. Like Quigley and Gottlieb, then, Larish offers a
perspectival Second Amendment (indeed, Larish subtitles her article A
Feminist Perspective on the Second Amendment), understood through
the lense of women's particular concerns and resting on a vision of a
social world saturated with misogynistic crimes against women.
C. An Afro-Americanist Reconsideration
As explained above, most African-Americans may have not
found guns alien to the extent that most women and Jews have. ° In
addition, blacks have resisted oppression by force of arms since before
the creation of the repubic. 35 Before the Civil War, Southern states
sought to keep blacks disarmed, but slaves repeatedly rose in revolt,
even though, unlike slaves in other parts of the Americas, they may
never have developed a clear revolutionary tradition?52 After the Civil
War, blacks formed private militias to resist, usually unsuccessfully,
attacks from white supremacist groups.3Y 3  Later, W.E.B. DuBois
called for black self-arming as a response to lynching: "[L]ynching of
Negroes is going to stop in the South when the cowardly mob is faced
by effective guns in the hands of the people determined to sell their
souls dearly."35 4  Similarly, throughout the nineteenth century,
347. Id. at 472, 503.
348. Id. at 503.
349. Id.
350. See supra notes 122-126 and accompanying text.
351. See Bogus, supra note 129, at 1370.
352. See EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVEs
MADE 587-98 (1976).
353. See KOPEL, supra note 35, at 332-35.
354. W.E. Burghardt DuBois, Editorial, 12 CRIsIs 267, 271 (1916), quoted in KOPEL,
supra note 35, at 337 (alteration in original).
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Northern blacks organized armed militias to repel the assault of white
urban mobs, again usually, but not always, without success. 55
During the early years of the civil rights movement, Robert
Williams pioneered disciplined, aggressive, and collective self-defense
strategies in resisting the Klan;356 he later authored the classic tract on
the subject, Negroes with Guns.3" Across the South, blacks organized
local chapters of the Deacons for Defense and Justice to similar
ends.35 ' As the sixties proceeded, black violence became more
widespread and less organized.359 In the face of massive racial
injustice and the assassination of Martin Luther King, rioting erupted
in many of the nation's large cities.360 Capping a decade of growing
militancy, the perennially controversial Black Panther militia put the
Second Amendment at the center of its political platform:
We want an immediate end to POLICE BR UTALITY and MURDER
of blackpeople.
We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by
organizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending
our black community from racist police oppression and brutality. The
Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a
right to bear arms. We therefore believe that all black people should
arm themselves for self-defense. 61
1. Before Cottrol and Diamond
In short, then, although blacks have never been part of the
mainstream gun culture, African-American culture has often produced
and celebrated courageous acts of armed resistance. In recent years,
legal academics have begun to write a new and important chapter in
this tradition. They have begun to craft an interpretation of the Second
Amendment that puts black resistance at the center of focus and argues
that the right to arms may be especially important to despised groups,
like blacks, who have good reason to distrust the state.362 For some
355. See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Towani
an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 339-42 (1991).
356. See PEARSON, supra note 127, at 25-28, 35-39.
357. ROBERT F. WmLIAMS, NEGROEs wrrH GuNs (Marc Schliefer ed., 1962).
358. See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 355, at 357-58.
359. See KOPEL, supra note 35, at 338-40.
360. See id. at 339-40.
361. PEARsoN, supra note 127, at 110-11.
362. See generally John R. Salter, Jr. & Don B. Kates, Jr., The Necessity ofAccess to
Firearms by Dissenters and Minorities Whom Government Is Unwilling or Unable to
Protect, in REsmcTING HANDGUNs: THE LmERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT, supra note 299, at
185.
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decades, individual rights theorists have been laying the foundation for
this new interpretation. First, many civil rights workers in the 1960s
found that a gun was an important tool to resist racist violence, and
some of these workers later became central figures in the individual
rights school of Second Amendment theory. Don Kates, for example,
explains, "As a civil rights worker in a Southern state during the early
1960s, I found that the possession of firearms for self-defense was
almost universally endorsed by the black community, for it could not
depend on police protection from the KKK."'
Second, theorists of the individual rights school have argued that
the purpose of much gun control has been to disarm blacks." In the
post-Reconstruction South, some states passed laws banning
ownership of cheap handguns, so that only those (overwhelmingly
white) people of ample means could own a handgun2 61 In other
Southern states, sheriffs simply confiscated the weapons of African-
Americans, even in the absence of formal laws banning black
ownership. 66 Often, these sheriffs were helped in their confiscation
efforts by early registration laws. 67 Still other states imposed very
heavy taxes on handgun sales, comparable in effect to poll taxes. 68
And yet others hit upon the most successful scheme of all-a
discretionary licensing law, under which the police could grant permits
to those whom they favored and deny permits to everyone else,
including "undesirables" like blacks2 69
Some individual rights theorists further maintain that much
recent gun control is really motivated by a desire to keep guns out of
the hands of blacks and the poor.37 In this view, for example, the 1968
Gun Control Act does not significantly restrict gun ownership; rather,
it primarily makes guns more expensive by restricting the import of
cheap foreign guns.37" ' For that reason, the 1968 Gun Control Act
363. Id. at 186. Similarly, John Salter reflects on his own experience: "There is no
question but that the known existence of pervasive firearms ownership in Southern Black
communities prevented much (though not all) massively violent racist retaliation." John R.
Salter, Jr., Social Justice Community Organizing and the Necessity for Protecting Firearms,
in fTm GUN CULTURE, supra note 30, at 19,20.
364. See Don B. Kates, Jr., Toward a History of Handgun Prohibition in the United
States, in RESRICTING HAN'DGUNS: THE LnBERAL SKETcs SPEAK OUT, supra note 299, at 7,
12-15.
365. KOPEL, supra note 35, at 336; Kates, supra note 364, at 14.
366. See Kates, supra note 364, at 14.
367. See id. at 14-15.
368. Seeid. at 15.
369. KoPEL, supra note 35, at 337-38; Kates, supra note 364, at 15-20.
370. See Kates, supra note 364, at 25.
371. See id.
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functions as a "poll tax" on Second Amendment rights.37  Similarly,
many believe that the agitation for a ban on "Saturday Night' specials
proceeds from a fear of blacks with guns: "It is difficult to escape the
conclusion that the 'Saturday Night Special' is emphasized because it
is cheap and is being sold to a particular class of people. The name is
sufficient evidence-the reference is to 'nigger-town Saturday
night."'373  Inferentially, this claim that gun control is often racist
contains the heart of the Afro-Americanist reconsideration of the
Second Amendment. The sorry history of racist gun control might
lead one to conclude that it is unwise to entrust the state with a
monopoly of force. Hence, the experience of blacks with gun control
argues in favor of an individual rights interpretation of the
Amendment.
2. Cottrol and Diamond
While this interpretation has been some years in the making, it
has recently found its master expositors in Robert Cottrol and
Raymond Diamond. While the women and guns movement may be
the product of a large change in popular social consciousness, and
JPFO is a small organization on the political fringe, the Afro-
Americanist reconsideration of the Second Amendment is largely the
work of these two gifted scholars. 374  The impact of their work has
already been significant. Their writings have been frequently
reprinted,375 and they have recently been cited by one Supreme Court
Justice-perhaps evidence that their views may influence the Court if
and when it ever decides the meaning of the Second Amendment.376
372. See id.
373. Bruce-Briggs, supra note 27, at 74.
374. The primary work is Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an
Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, supra note 355. More recently, Professors Cottrol and
Diamond completed a second chapter in what they describe as "our ongoing effort to explore
the connections between racial conflict in American history and the evolution of the notion of
the right to bear arms in American constitutionalism." Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T.
Diamond, "'Never Intended to Be Applied to the White Population ": Firearms Regulation
and Racial Disparity-The Redeemed South ' Legacy to a National Jurisprudence?, 70 Cm.-
KENT L. REv. 1307, 1307-08 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
375. Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration has been reprinted in several
publications. See, e.g., GuNs: WHo SHOULD HAVE THEM? 127 (David B. Kopel ed., 1995);
SAFEGUARDING LrEMR: THE CONSTITUTION AND CrrIzEN MmrnAs 135 (Larry Pratt ed.,
1995).
376. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938 n.2 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). In Printz, the majority held that the provision of the Brady Bill requiring local
law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on potential gun purchasers violated
the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 848-935. Justice Thomas joined that opinion, but he also
wrote separately to emphasize that the Brady Bill might also violate the Second Amendment:
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The work of Professors Cottrol and Diamond contain two central
themes, one historical and the other theoretical, closely blended but
analytically severable. First, they develop a careful historical
exposition of the relationship of American race relations, on one hand,
and the constitutional right to arms and gun control, on the other.3" In
this exposition, they emphasize that gun control has often hurt
African-Americans and self-arming has helped them.37 From this
historical evidence, they develop the second of their themes--a
theoretical argument that the Second Amendment should be given an
individual rights reading, because a personal right to arms is an
important safeguard for African-Americans and other despised groups
in a country still consumed by bigotry.379 In language that could stand
as a statement of philosophy for every outgroup theorist, Professors
Cottrol and Diamond write:
This article explores Second Amendment issues in light of the Afro-
American experience, concluding that the individual rights theory
comports better with the history of the right to bear arms in England
and Colonial and post-Revolutionary America. The article also
suggests that Second Amendment issues need to be explored, not only
This Court has not had recent occasion to consider the nature of the substantive
right safeguarded by the Second Amendment. If, however, the Second
Amendment is read to confer apersonal right to "keep and bear arms," a colorable
argument exists that the Federal Government's regulatory scheme... runs afoul of
that Amendment's protections.
Id. at 938 (Thomas, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Justice Thomas declined to venture a
firm view on the meaning of the Amendment because the parties did not raise it, but he left
little doubt that on a different occasion, he would join the individual rights theory of the
Amendment. He commented in dicta: "Marshaling an impressive array of historical
evidence, a growing body of scholarly commentary indicates that the 'right to keep and bear
arms' is, as the Amendment's text suggests, a personal right." Id. at 938 n.2 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Moreover, he plainly hopes that the Court will give the Second Amendment an
individual rights interpretation: "Perhaps, at some future date, this Court will have the
opportunity to determine whether Justice Story was correct when he wrote that the right to
bear arms 'has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic."' Id. at
939 (Thomas J., concurring).
In light of this opinion, it is tempting to speculate that Justice Thomas might himself
become an important architect of the Afro-Americanist reconsideration of the Amendment.
The opinion offers no direct evidence to support such a speculation. While Justice Thomas is
African-American and plainly favors an individual rights theory of the Amendment, he might
not endorse an Afro-Americanist reading of the Amendment. The only bit of evidence that
might lend some support to the speculation is Justice Thomas's choice of citation. In his
string cite of titles from the individual rights camp, all of the sources except Toward an Afro-
Americanist Reconsideration are articles about the general meaning of the Amendment.
Only Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration is more specifically focused, so it would
seem that this article caught Justice Thomas's particular attention.
377. See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 355, at 320-27.
378. See id.
379. Seeid. at 318-19.
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with respect to how the right to keep and bear arms has affected
American society as a whole, but also with an eye toward subcultures
in American society who have been less able to rely on state
protection.
380
Cottrol and Diamond begin their historical sketch with the
colonial background of the right to arms. They demonstrate that by
the eighteenth century, English law had come to recognize a right to
keep and bear arms, but that right was highly qualified along class and
religious lines.381 By contrast, the American legal tradition quickly
eliminated those distinctions and substituted racial ones.382 White
citizens, whatever their class or religious status, had a right and usually
a duty to be armed, but African-Americans enjoyed only a limited
right to keep guns.33 The reasons for this change are clear. As
America was becoming a society deeply divided by race, white
Americans felt threatened by Native Americans on their borders and
black slaves in their midst.384 As a result, they needed both to arm the
white population and to control the access of blacks to arms.38
Next, Cottrol and Diamond summarize the revolutionary
ideology of the Second Amendment as they understand it:
If necessity forced the early colonists to arm, the Revolution and the
friction with Britain's standing army that preceded it-and in many
ways precipitated it--served to revitalize Whiggish notions that
standing armies were dangerous to liberty, and that militias, composed
of the whole of the people, best protected both liberty and security.
386
When the new Federal Constitution gave Congress the power to
organize, arm, and discipline the militia 387 many feared that Congress
would use its new powers "to both destroy state power over the militia
and to disarm the people."388 As a result, state legislatures proposed a
constitutional amendment to protect the right of the population to keep
and bear arms:
It is against this background that the meaning of the Second
Amendment must be considered. For the revolutionary generation, the
idea of the militia and an armed population were related. The principal
reason for preferring a militia of the whole over either a standing army
380. Id. at319.
381. See id. at 321-23.
382. See id. at 323-27.
383. See id.
384. See id.
385. Seeid.
386 Id. at 327.
387. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
388. Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 355, at 328.
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or a select militia was rooted in the idea that, whatever the inefficiency
of the militia of the whole, the institution would better protect the newly
won freedoms than a reliance on security provided by some more select
body.389
At this juncture, however, the Afro-Americanist reconsideration
hits its first serious snag. The presence of violent racism among white
Americans before and after the founding generation may lend support
to the Afro-Americanist/individual rights theory. Because African-
Americans need arms to resist such violence, we should read the
Amendment to protect a personal right.39 The presence of racism in
the founding generation, however, tends to undercut the Afro-
Americanist/individual rights theory. Following Carl Bogus's view,
the Second Amendment would protect the right of white people to
own arms so as to subjugate red and black people.39 1 As Bogus
powerfully argues, an Afro-Americanist reconsideration of the Second
Amendment would therefore have to reject the Amendment as a
vestige of an oppressive and archaic worldview 9z The provisions of
the Uniform Militia Act make this problem especially pressing for
Professors Cottrol and Diamond. Shortly after Congress proposed the
Second Amendment, which called for a militia of the whole and hence
an armed population, Congress then ostensibly defined the militia of
the whole in a racially restrictive way: "The Uniform Militia Act
called for the enrollment of every free, able-bodied white male citizen
between the ages of eighteen and forty-five into the militia."393
Cottrol and Diamond avoid this problem by arguing that "while
[the Uniform Militia Act] specifically included only this limited
portion of the population, the statute excluded no one from militia
service."' 4  In other words, the statute only seems to be racially
exclusive. It requires that white men enroll, but implicitly allows the
states to adopt a broader definition.395 Cottrol and Diamond offer three
sources of evidence to support this reading. First, in the antebellum
period, states in both the North and the South sometimes enrolled
blacks into their armed forces, especially during times of invasion.396
Second, Northern-but not Southern-states generally allowed blacks
389. Id. at 330.
390. See id.
391. See Bogus, supra note 129, at 1367-74.
392. See id.
393. Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 355, at 331 (footnote omitted).
394. Id. at 332.
395. See id.
396. Seeid. at331-32.
TULANE LA WREVIEW
to own firearms. 7 Third, "[tihe authors of the statute had experience,
in the Revolution, with a militia and Continental Army considerably
broad in membership" in that older and younger men, black men, and
even some women had served, though the last two categories caused
considerable controversy.398 As a result, "it is likely that the framers of
the 1792 statute envisioned a militia even broader than the one they
specified." '39 9 Cottrol and Diamond then use this analysis of the
Uniform Militia Act to give the Second Amendment a nonracist
reading. If the drafters imagined an inclusive militia in the statute, it
stands to reason that they intended the same sort of militia in the
Second Amendment:
[T]he widespread use of blacks as soldiers in time of crisis and the
absence of restrictions concerning the arming of blacks in the northem
states may provide another clue concerning how to read the Second
Amendment....
[The broad militias envisioned by the 1792 statute suggest] to us
how broad the term "people" in the Second Amendment was meant to
be.400
In short, because of the demands of their theory, Cottrol and
Diamond must and do portray American culture as violently racist
before and after but not during the founding generation.4 1 This
portion of their historical account seems the least plausible. First, they
offer no reason for this break in the historical pattern. Further, they
offer no written evidence that the Framers intended a multiracial
militia; the best contemporaneous evidence-the Uniform Militia
Act-appears on its face to prescribe a uniracial militia. Cottrol and
Diamond argued that the Act allowed but did not require a multiracial
militia, but they offer no explanation of why the drafters of the statute
would concoct such a scheme. The most obvious reason for requiring
all whites but not blacks to be members of the militia is that they
distrusted blacks, but that reason would lead to excluding blacks
altogether. Cottrol and Diamond argue that we can infer that the Act
would allow a multiracial militia from the fact that militias sometimes
included blacks.402 As Cottrol and Diamond admit, however, that
inclusion was always controversial and occurred only in times of dire
397. See id.
398. Id. at 332.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. See id. at 324-26, 340-42.
402. See id. at 331-32.
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need, as a concession to necessity.4 3 Moreover, the militia sometimes
included women, but even Cottrol and Diamond do not argue that the
Uniform Militia Act pennitted a multigender militia. There is a
different, and more intuitively plausible, explanation of the language
of the Act. In times of need, the militia had included blacks, but that
experience had been so controversial that Congress decided to exclude
them in peacetime. Should the need arise again, Congress could adopt
a more expansive definition.
After this implausible rendering of the founding period, however,
Professors Cottrol and Diamond resume their historical account with
their customary care and scrupulousness. In the years immediately
after the Revolution, American law removed many racial restrictions,
but as the nineteenth century slid toward civil war, racism in both the
North and South became more virulent and violent.4°4 In the South,
the white population feared not only slaves but also free blacks,
because the latter might give the slaves a desire for freedom or might
foment a slave rebellion.4 5 As a result, the Southern states actually
restricted the access to arms of free blacks more than they did that of
slaves, who were presumed to be under the control of their masters.40 6
Lest the reader miss the implicit point that gun control has often been a
means to racial oppression, Professors Cottrol and Diamond title this
section 'The Southern Antebellum Experience: Control of Arms as a
Means of Racial Oppression."40 7
Professors Cottrol and Diamond use the Northern antebellum
experience to illustrate the other side of this coin, that blacks with guns
can defend themselves against racist violence.4 8 Accordingly, they
title this section 'The Northern Antebellum Experience: Use of
Firearms to Combat Racially Motivated Deprivations of Liberty.'" 9
Throughout the North in the years before the Civil War, blacks formed
private militia units in the face of widespread mob violence and race
riots because they were aware of the "potentially counterproductive
nature of individual action."' 0 The central example is the Cincinnati
riot of September 1841.4 1 On the first night, a black militia beat off a
white mob; on the second night, the white militia disarmed the
403. See id. at 332.
404. See id. at 332-35.
405. See 1d. at 335-36.
406. Seeid. at 336-38.
407. Id. at 335.
408. See id. at 339-42.
409. Id. at 339.
410. Id. at341.
411. See id. at 342.
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African-Americans, and whites returned to inflict personal injury and
property damage on the black community.412 Again, Cottrol and
Diamond drive the point home:
The 1841 Cincinnati riot represents the tragic, misguided irony of the
city's authorities who, concerned with the safety of the black
population, chose to disarm and imprison them--chose, in effect, to
leave the black population of Cincinnati as southern authorities left the
black population in slave states, naked to whatever indignities private
parties might heap upon them, and dependent on a government either
unable or unwilling to protect their rights. As a symbol for the
experience of northern blacks protecting themselves against
deprivations of liberty, the 1841 riot holds a vital lesson for those who
would shape the content and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
[as it relates to the Second Amendment].
4 13
After the Civil War, the Southern experience provides yet more
evidence of the danger of disarming blacks. The Southern legislatures
passed black codes that, inter alia, restricted the access of blacks to
arms, so as to keep them helpless before the intimidation of private
violence.414 Concerned, Congress wrote the Fourteenth Amendment
in part to ensure that the freedmen would have the right to keep and
bear arms to resist such terrorism.415 The rest of the story is
depressingly familiar. The Supreme Court sharply limited the reach of
the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that it did not limit the actions of
states or private individuals and that it gave Congress no authority to
pass civil rights statutes controlling the actions of private parties.4 16 As
a result,
[w]ith the protective arm of the federal government withdrawn,
protection of black lives and property was left to largely hostile state
governments. In the Jim Crow era that would follow, the right to
posses [sic] arms would take on critical importance for many blacks.
This right, seen in the eighteenth century as a mechanism that enabled a
majority to check the excesses of a potentially tyrannical national
government, would for many blacks in the twentieth century become a
means of survival in the face of private violence and state
indifference.417
In the twentieth century, white violence and the black need for
arms continued. In the North, race riots still threatened the safety of
412. Seeid.
413. Id.
414. Seeid. at342-45.
415. Seeid. at345-46.
416. Seeid. at346-48.
417. Id. at 348-49.
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black communities.41 In the South, state legislatures enacted Jim
Crow laws and tolerated widespread lynching and other sorts of
private violence.419 Blacks often used firearms to defend themselves,
but Professors Cottrol and Diamond frankly concede that such efforts
"were often partially successful but were ultimately doomed. 420
Indeed, the only real hope was collective action: "Although individual
efforts of blacks to halt violence to their persons or property were
largely unsuccessful, there were times that blacks succeeded through
concerted or group activity in halting lynchings."4"- Accordingly, we
should conclude that gun control has not generally helped blacks:
The willingness of blacks to use firearms to protect their rights, their
lives, and their property, alongside their ability to do so successfully
when acting collectively, renders many gun control statutes, particularly
of Southern origin, all the more worthy of condemnation. This is
especially so in view of the purpose of these statutes, which, like that of
the gun control statutes of the black codes, was to disarm blacks.422
Finally, Professors Cottrol and Diamond close this historical
review with a summary of the way that self-defense helped those in
the civil rights movement. They recognize that nonviolence "had its
adherents among the mainstream civil rights organizations," but they
reject the view that nonviolence was a universal credo: "[M]any
ordinary black people in the South believed in resistance and believed
in the necessity of maintaining firearms for personal protection."423
Although some black resistance to white violence was ad hoc, much of
it was organized, following in the tradition of black militias of the
past.424 In particular, as already noted, the Deacons for Defense and
Justice spread throughout the South after its founder realized that not
only white reactionaries but also the police opposed the civil rights
movement.4 25 The Deacons sought to "protect black people from
violence, and they did so by extending violence to anyone who
attacked. This capability and willingness to use force to protect blacks
provided a deterrent to white terroristic activity."426  Cottrol and
Diamond draw the moral lesson sharply:
418. Seeid. at350-51.
419. See id. at 349-52.
420. Id. at 353.
421. Id. at 354.
422. Id. at 354-55.
423. Id. at356.
424. See id. at 357.
425. See id.
426. Id. at 358 (footnote omitted).
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Blacks in the South-found the Deacons helpful because they were
unable to rely upon police or other legal entities for racial justice. This
provided a practical reason for a right to bear arms: In a world in which
the legal system was not to be trusted, perhaps the ability of the
system's victims to resist might convince the system to restrain itself.
42 7
In conclusion, Professors Cottrol and Diamond analogize the fate
of the Second Amendment and African-Americans. Both have
traditionally been consigned to the periphery of the attention of courts,
policy makers, and scholars. That parallel treatment may not be a
coincidence:
Throughout American history, black and white Americans have had
radically different experiences with respect to violence and state
protection. Perhaps another reason the Second Amendment has not
been taken very seriously by the courts and the academy is that for
many of those who shape or critique constitutional policy, the state's
power and inclination to protect them is a given. But for all too many
black Americans, that protection historically has not been available.428
Moreover, even today, the state still does a very poor job of protecting
black Americans. The threat of white violence is still real. Although it
might seem to be waning, "many fear a decline in the quality of that
atmosphere."" 9 In light of the nation's past failure to live up to its
promises of equality, "it is not unreasonable to fear that law, politics,
and societal mores will swing the pendulum of social progress in a
different direction, to the potential detriment of blacks and their rights,
property, and safety. ' 30
Perhaps the primary threat to blacks today, however, is no longer
"the horrors of white lynch mobs ... [but] the tragic black-on-black
violence that plagues the mean streets of our inner cities." 31 To this
point, Cottrol and Diamond have built their case for an individual
rights reading of the Second Amendment on the specter of white
violence, so this shift from collective white attacks to individual black
crime seems an important break. Indeed, Cottrol and Diamond
acknowledge that "a case can be made that greater firearms restrictions
might alleviate this tragedy."432 Nonetheless, they ultimately believe
that the recent past gives no real discontinuity and no reason for
abandoning the individual rights interpretation of the Second
427. Id.
428. Id. at 359.
429. Id. at 360.
430. Id. at361.
431. Id. at 359.
432. Id. at361.
456 [Vol. 74:387
1999] CONSTITUTIONAL TALES OF VIOLENCE 457
Amendment. Whether the threat comes from black or white violence,
American governments have never protected their black citizens:
[A] society with a dismal record of protecting a people has a dubious
claim on the right to disarm them. Perhaps a re-examination of this
history can lead us to a modem realization of what the framers of the
Second Amendment understood: that it is unwise to place the means of
protection totally in the hands of the state, and that self-defense is also a
civil light.433
The interpretation of the Second Amendment offered by
Professors Cottrol and Diamond is vastly more sophisticated, careful,
and nuanced than those offered by JPFO and the women and guns
movement-as I hope the above detailed summary conveys.
Nonetheless, this interpretation shares two features with those. First, it
is perspective-based, an interpretation from the perspective of African-
American history. Professor Cottrol and Diamond are self-conscious
about their perspectival approach. Their subtitle is Toward an Afro-
Americanist Reconsideration."' Over and over, they stress their
central argument-from an African-American perspective, we should
be inclined to favor the individual rights theory of the Second
Amendment, because blacks have not been able to rely on the state for
protection.
Second, like those versions of the Amendment proffered by
JPFO and the women and guns movement, this theory of the
Amendment rests on a vision of the social world as fractured along
lines maintained by bigotry Traditionally, in Cottrol and Diamond's
view, the reason that blacks have needed personal firearms is the
constant threat of racist white violence, and that threat has not
disappeared even today. Recently, the primary threat may have shifted
to black-on-black violence, a product of intraracial, not interracial,
division. But the reason that blacks need personal guns to defend
against this intraracial threat is still interracial animus; the state,
indifferent to the fate of its African-American citizens, has always
failed and still fails to protect them. The vision of the social world in
this interpretation of the Second Amendment is thus depressing in its
clarity. At worst, all of white America-both government and private
groups-has turned a violent hand against its black citizens; at best,
the white citizenry will be quiescent and the state indifferent while
blacks kill one another. The implicit message to black America is also
clear: in matters of violence, you may rely on no one but yourselves.
433. Id.
434. See id. at 309.
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M. OUTGROUPS, POPULISTS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLENCE
The outgroup theories of the Second Amendment all prescribe a
scheme of decentralized violence. The state is so incompetent or so
perfidious that it cannot claim a monopoly of force. As subpart A
explains, however, decentralized violence is usually very dangerous to
outgroups. Private ordering of the means of force usually favors self-
styled populists who exile traditionally disfavored groups. As subpart
B suggests, outgroup theorists might acknowledge the dangers
inherent in decentralized violence, but they would insist that
centralized violence is even worse. When the state has exercised a
monopoly of force, it has generally failed to protect or has actively
oppressed outgroups. Subpart C acknowledges the force of this
argument. As a matter of policy, perhaps the state should allow
outgroups to arm themselves, and as a matter of prudence, perhaps
outgroups should do so.
In the world as described by these theorists, however, outgroups
must choose between hopeless alternatives. In a scheme of
decentralized violence, they will be oppressed by private groups; in a
scheme of centralized violence, they will be oppressed or abandoned
by the state. The only hope for the better treatment of outgroups
would be a consensus culture more protective of outgroups; only in
such a culture would the threat from private or public violence abate.
In other words, if the problem is hate violence, the only answer is less
hatred. These outgroup theories of the Second Amendment, however,
actively frustrate the creation of such a culture. The theories do not
merely counsel outgroups to take up arms against the present reality of
hate violence. They also tell constitutional tales with a profoundly
pessimistic story line-Americans will always be divided by hatred
and must always prepare for war against one another. Telling and
listening to such stories can only ensure that they will come true, and
outgroups will be left to choose between hopeless options.
A. Decentralized Violence
The analysis of Part II highlights several themes common to the
new outgroup interpretations of the Second Amendment. First, the
social world of the Second Amendment is fractured into identity
groups based on religion, gender, and race. Second, hatred and
violence or the constant threat of violence characterize much of the
relationship between these groups. Third, because of this hatred and
violence, the Second Amendment should be interpreted to guarantee a
general right to keep and bear arms, so that outgroup members may
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defend themselves. Fourth, control over the means of violence should
therefore be decentralized, belonging to all individuals. The state must
have no monopoly of violence, either because it threatens hate
violence itself or because it tolerates such violence by private parties.
For these outgroup theorists, the Second Amendment thus
guarantees a right that is both individual and political/collective. It is
individual in the sense that each individual has a right to keep and bear
arms. It is political/collective in the sense that these individuals use
anms in their status as members of collectivities. People attack them as
Jews, women, or African-Americans, and they resist as such. Often,
they will organize into groups to resist such violence, and often they
will hope to make political change in the world by defeating the forces
of anti-Semitism, misogyny, or racism. Even when each individual
acts alone in self-defense, however, she acts as part of a collectivity-a
Jew or woman or African-American victimized because of her
membership in a despised group.
In stressing these commonalities among the various outgroup
theories, I do not wish to overlook their differences in emphasis.
JPFO's analysis is the most political/collective and the least individual.
Simkin, Zelman, and Rice paradigmatically imagine the populace as a
whole, and Jews as a group, resisting a tyrannical government rather
than individual Jews defending themselves against individual anti-
Semites.435 Because the enemy for JPFO is the government itself, the
need for united action is very keen; action by random individuals
would do little good. Still, even for JPFO, the right to arms ultimately
belongs to individuals as individuals, not as part of some formal
organization such as a state militia. The women and guns movement's
analysis is the least political/collective and the most individual. The
movement's paradigmatic case is an individual woman resisting an
individual misogynist.436 Still, even for this movement, the right to
arms is deeply political and collective. Misogynists attack women
because they are women, and women must resist for the same reason.
Further, the movement itself attempts to make large scale political
change, by offering women a tool of empowerment, by helping them
to overcome their fear of guns, by breaking cultural stereotypes about
women and power, by eliminating their dependence on men, and by
generally reducing the power of misogynistic violence to oppress
women as a class.437
435. See SmwauN ar AL., LEHAL LAWS, supra note 157, at vi-vii, 159.
436. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
437. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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The Afro-Americanist perspective on the Amendment is
somewhere between these two. The paradigmatic exercise of Second
Amendment right is less collective than that of JPFO but more
collective than the women and guns movement. Cottrol and
Diamond's central historical examples are African-Americans
organized into private associations to resist other private
associations.4  Thus, unlike JPFO but like the women and guns
movement, the paradigmatic enemy is private, but like JPFO and
unlike the women and guns movement, that enemy is organized into
an association, rather than being composed of disconnected
individuals. For that reason, the collective aspect of the Afro-
Americanist perspective on the Amendment is less intense than for
JPFO but more intense than for women and guns: when you are
fighting private groups rather than government, the need for broad-
based action is less significant; when you are fighting an organized
enemy, you need some organization yourself. Furthermore, unlike
JPFO and the women and guns movement, Cottrol and Diamond
imagine a range of appropriate uses of the right to arms, rather than
just one paradigm-beyond combating private associations, they also
imagine collective resistance to racist governments and individual
resistance to racist individuals.439 In that sense, they more fully cover
the continuum between the individual and collective poles.
Despite these differences, however, the commonalities are very
important. For all these theories, the social world of the Second
Amendment is composed of individuals possessed of the right to arms,
divided into hostile identity groups, and relating through violence,
with government either contributing to the violence, indifferent to it, or
incompetent to suppress it. Presumably, these various groups may also
relate through peaceful politics, but these theories do not mention that
possibility and do not seek to stress it. In other words, these theories
reflect a profound frustration with government and the possibility of
deliberative democracy; as a result, they celebrate armed action to
achieve political ends when normal politics fail. In that sense, these
theories are very much a part of the current social zeitgeist-distrust of
government and anger among groups."
In interpreting the Second Amendment in a way that recognizes
both individual and collective elements, these theories are perhaps
438. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
439. See discussion supra Part lI.C.2.
440. See, e.g., STANLEY B. GREENBERG, MIDDLE CLASS DREAMS: THE PoLmcs AND
POWER OF THE NEW AMERICAN MAJORnY 3-19 (1995); SUSAN J. TOLCHN, THE ANGRY
AMERICAN: How VOTER RAGE IS CHANGING THE NAnON 1-20 (1996).
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closest to those individual rights theorists who stress the right of
resistance to government. Both groups of theories locate the right to
arms in each individual, but they also imagine that those individuals
will band together to use their rights for political ends. Yet, if the
outgroup theories are similar to some individual rights theorists in this
regard, they are also different from all previous theories. In imagining
the social world as composed of violent identity groups, these theories
offer something new under the Second Amendment sun.
Earlier formal theories effectively ignored or suppressed such a
vision of group discord. As argued above, the individual right of self-
defense is a Lockean natural right located in abstract individuals,
divorced from their social context." It ignores the significance of
anti-Semitism, sexism, or racism in analyzing the wisdom of an
individual right to arms. Similarly, the right of revolution and
resistance-for both the individual rights theory and the collective
rights theory-is naively populist. It imagines the people, unified and
homogeneous, or the state militias, composed of generic citizens,
rising up against a tyrannical government. Effectively, the traditional
right of revolution divides the world into only two social blocs-the
people and the government-and it imagines only one evil-abstract
tyranny through oppression of individual rights."2
By comparison, these outgroup theories seem much more
realistic about the social world. They acknowledge the existence of
multiple, hostile groups among the population, and they fear not just
abstract tyranny but traditional bigotry. One might think of these
theories as offering a Second Amendment for the real world of the late
twentieth century, in which taxation without representation seems less
of a threat than violent anti-Semitism, misogyny, or racism.
Unhappily, in offering a realistic vision of the social world, these
theories also create new problems, problems that they do not
adequately recognize or confront. Centralized control of the means of
violence risks state tyranny, but decentralized control of the means of
violence risks civil war if the population is not deeply united. As I
have argued elsewhere, the Framers of the historical Second
Amendment took that threat seriously."3 They sought to recognize a
right of revolution in the Second Amendment, but only because they
believed that Americans were a united, homogeneous, virtuous
republican citizenry.4" As a result, under conditions of profound
441. See supra text accompanying note 20.
442. See supra text accompanying note 21.
443. See Williams, supra note 2, at 588.
444. See id.
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social division, the historical Second Amendment-by its own
terms--has limited relevance." 5 My present point, however, is not
historical but pragmatic. The Framers were wise to worry about the
threat of civil war. Under modem conditions, the use of nonstate
violence for political ends most likely portends chaotic private
terrorism, not a unified revolutionary movement.
In their responses to the threat of civil war, the militia movement
and the outgroup theories are, in a sense, obverses of one another. As I
have argued elsewhere, the militia movement implicitly recognizes the
threat of civil war, but responds to it by denying the demographic
reality of a fragmented citizenry. Instead, it conjures with the
people-assuming, against all the evidence, that the American
citizenry is highly homogeneous, or restrictively defining the "people"
in such a way as to make it highly homogeneous." 6 By contrast, the
outgroup theorists acknowledge that the citizenry is deeply fractured
but then fail sufficiently to address the threat inherent in decentralized
violence. Under conditions of civil war, outgroups are at great risk.
Since the state cannot protect them, they must protect themselves-but
for reasons that I will discuss below, they cannot do so.
It is important to remember that these outgroup theories all
interpret the Second Amendment to guarantee a general right to arms,
not just a right for Jews or blacks or women. The result is that
everyone-including anti-Semites, misogynists, and racists-will
possess the right to arms. Doubtless, these outgroup theorists would
emphasize that they do not endorse anti-Semitic, misogynist, or racist
violence. Further, they would argue that they celebrate a right to arms
for purposes of self-defense, not aggression against other groups. The
"genie" of a personal right to arms, however, is impossible to stuff
back in the bottle once it is released. In these theories, everyone-
regardless of his politics or motivations-has a right to arms, free of
all but incidental state regulation.
Moreover, these theories effectively mandate a state that is not or
should not be strong enough to block hate violence. All the theories
agree that the government may not disarm militant groups in advance.
In addition, for slightly different reasons, all the theories maintain that
the state is not or should not be strong enough to deter crime
successfully by threat of punishment. For JPFO, the state should not
be powerful enough to control violent political activists because the
445. See id.
446. See Williams, supra note 11, at 915-17, 924-46.
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state is even more untrustworthy than those activists.4 7  For the
women and guns movement, the state has no obligation to protect the
individual and is incompetent to deter crime.448 The Afro-Americanist
theorists maintain that the state is both incompetent to block crime and
too perfidious to be entrusted with a monopoly of violence." 9 In short,
the point in these theories is that the state is either so corrupt or
incompetent that citizens must have arms to take up the burdens of
personal and collective self-defense. The result is a profound
privatization of control over the means of violence--we are on our
own. That, however, is a state of affairs that outgroups should fear, not
welcome, for three reasons.
1. Outgroups' Relative Lack of Power
First, outgroups should fear a regime of decentralized violence
because they are relatively weak and powerless; they do not have as
many guns as their enemies. Saul Alinsky provocatively described the
Black Panther militia: "They haven't got the numbers and they know
nothing about revolutionary tactics. What kind of revolutionary is it
who shouts that all power comes out of the muzzle of a gun when he
knows damn well the other side's got all the guns?"45  Alinsky's
comment is equally applicable to these outgroup theories of the
Second Amendment. Blacks and Jews are a small fraction of the
population. Women actually constitute a majority, but as a group-
and the same could be said for Jews--they own fewer guns, are less
comfortable with them, and are more reluctant to use them than
others.45 The women and guns movement is seeking to change that
state of affairs, but despite publicity of an alleged trend, the numbers
have probably not changed much.452
In short, as a general matter, decentralization of violence will
today inevitably favor those groups with roots in the gun culture-not
members of these outgroups. It is not a coincidence that the gun
culture has traditionally embraced the Second Amendment; it sees in
the provision a constitutional symbol of its right to primacy. Today,
the element of the gun culture most likely to exploit vigorously the
decentralized regime of violence is the militia movement, a
447. See discussion supra Part II.A.
448. See discussion supra Part lI.B.
449. See discussion supra Part ll.C.
450. PEARSON, supra note 127, at 210 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Saul
Adinsky).
451. See generally discussion supra Part lI.B.
452. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
463
TULANE LA WREVIEW
development unlikely to promote the health and safety of blacks and
Jews. Although JPFO has made common cause with the militia
movement, and there are even Jewish and black militia members, this
alliance is based largely on a shared fear of the government.453 Such
alliance is, however, extremely naive in turning a blind eye to the
dangers of private racist and anti-Semitic violence. It is not true that
the enemy of my enemy is necessarily my friend.
2. The Link Between Hate Violence and Revolutionary Conditions
Second, beyond just being outnumbered, outgroups should fear
decentralized violence, especially when accompanied by attacks on the
legitimacy of the state, because it seems to increase feelings of bigotry
among the general population. Essentially, these outgroup theories
prescribe a state of permanent, incipiently revolutionary conditions.
The state can claim no monopoly of force. The state's legitimacy is
constantly suspect; indeed, the outgroup theories presuppose the state's
illegitimacy vis-A-vis outgroups, as they presume that the state will not
provide even the most basic security for its outgroup citizens. Finally,
outgroup theorists contend that the Constitution positively empowers
private groups to use violence in order to secure political change.
Under these conditions, in the absence of a presumptively legitimate
state, identity affiliation has typically stepped in to fill the need for
order.
Recent events in Europe provide perhaps the most graphic
examples of this tendency. To the surprise of many, the breakup of the
old autocratic states often gave rise to a revival of ethnic hatred, both
public and private, that had in some cases been held in check by a
strong central government. Michael Walzer summarizes:
[E]thnic and religious differences survived, and wherever they were
territorially based, local agencies, which were more or less
representative, retained some minimal functions and some symbolic
authority. These they were able to convert very quickly, once the
empires fell, into a kind of state machine driven by nationalist ideology
and aimed at sovereign power-and opposed, often enough, by
established local minorities, the great beneficiaries of the imperial
regime and its last and most stalwart defenders.454
In Russia, hard-right nationalist sentiment existed even under the
Soviet regime, but in the chaotic conditions after the fall of that
453. See Epstein, supra note 160, at IA.
454. MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw 18-19
(1997).
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regime, such sentiment became a vigorous and significant force.455
Pamyat was only the most notorious of many new, anti-Semitic groups
dedicated to the preservation of traditional Russian culture.
456
Eventually, despite his buffoonery, Vladimir Zhirinovsky became a
serious presidential candidate by tapping this well-spring of
nationalist, anti-Semitic anger.457 Similarly, Josip Tito's oppressively
strong central regime managed to hold the various nationalisms of
Yugoslavia together; with its demise, the Balkans have again become
balkanized, and the phrase "ethnic cleansing" has entered the popular
vocabulary.48  Other contemporary examples could be listed in great
number.
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Even the history of genocide, on which JPFO relies so heavily,
illustrates the tendency of revolutionary change to increase hate
violence.46 Lethal Laws opens with a revealing discussion of
"Revolution and Genocide," a comparative study of twentieth-century
genocide by the late Robert Melson of Purdue University.461' The
authors quote Professor Melson to the effect that domestic genocide
has killed more people in the twentieth century than has international
war.4 62 LethalLaws then faults Melson, however, for failing to explain
that gun control causes genocide.463 In so arguing, JPFO ignores
455. See WALTER LAQUEUR, BLACK HUNDRED: THE RISE OF THE EXTREME RIGHT IN
RussiA 119-296 (1993); DAVID REMNICK, RESURRECTION: THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEw
RussiA 49 (1997).
456. See REmNicK, supra note 455, at49-50, 100.
457. See id. at 88-102.
458. See, e.g., MIsHA GLaENN, THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA: Te THIRD BALKAN WAR
12-14 (1992); ROBERr D. KAPLAN, BALKAN GHOSTs: A JOURNEY THROUGH HISTORY 39-45
(1993). I suspect that JPFO would criticize my use of these examples and argue that while
totalitarian regimes may be capable of controlling ethnic hatred (or guns), they could do so
only by completely suppressing civil liberties. Therefore, under this argument if the
alternative to decentralized violence is totalitarian oppression, we should choose
decentralized violence, despite the risk to outgroups. My response is that I am not arguing in
favor of the political regimes of Stalin or Tito. Instead, I am simply arguing that when the
legitimacy of the state (whether that state is totalitarian or liberal and democratic) comes
under severe attack, the resulting conditions of decentralized violence are conducive to hate
violence. If the only alternative to those conditions were totalitarianism, then we would be in
a very bad way. As discussed in the next subpart, however, our options are not limited to
those two.
459. For examples of ethnic hatred displacing or arising in the stead of strong state
authority from outside of Europe, see ROBERT D. KAPLAN, THE ENDS OF THE EARTH: A
JOURNEY AT THE DAWN OF THE 21 ST CENTURY (1996).
460. See SIMKINETAL., LETHAL LAWS, supra note 157, at 9-14.
461. See id. at vi (discussing ROBERT MELSON, REVOLUTION AND GENOCIDE: ON THE
ORIGINS OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND THE HOLOCAUST (1992)).
462. See id.
463. See id.
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Melson's primary thesis about what causes genocide.4&4 This failure is
not surprising, because Melson's thesis directly undermines JPFO's
key contention that decentralized violence is good for Jews.
Melson's thesis is that the genocides that he examined-
including the Holocaust, the Armenian genocide, the destruction of the
Russian Kulaks, and the Cambodian autogenocide-were all the
products of political revolution.465  Melson offers a powerful
explanation for this link between revolution and genocide. By his
definition, "[e]very revolution results in not only the collapse of a
state's political institutions but also the loss of its legitimacy and the
destruction of the political myth that links rulers to the ruled.' '466 Upon
the demise of those old myths, the revolutionary movement must
create new ones: "[P]olitical myths are basic to revolutions because,
in a compelling manner, they tell the tale of the revolutionary state's
origins; they identify and define the new state's true citizens, 'the
people,'; they target its enemies; and they formulate its goals. 467
This process of revolutionary myth making is very dangerous for
outgroups, because in defining the true "people," these myths need
also to define a contrasting class of people-the enemies of the state.
Melson explains:
Revolutionary myths and ideologies have implications for genocide
in that every revolutionary vanguard that has achieved state power
seeks to restructure the state and give it a new basis of support....
... Having come to power in a revolutionary situation, a new regime
is presented with the opportunity to shape society in its own image and
to construct and redefine who is this "people" from whom this
revolutionary state will seek its legitimacy....
The impulse to reconstruct and redefine the political community and
to exclude from it whole categories derives in part from the exigencies
of the postrevolutionary situation. This is always characterized by
domestic disorder, a lack of legitimate authority, and often war....
... [R]ecasting the political community according to a revolutionary
vision implies that groups and classes, whole categories of human
beings, will not fit into the postrevolutionary society. These will have
to be reshaped, reeducated, reformed, or permanently excluded from
the new order.4 68
464. See MELsoN, supra note 461, at 17-18.
465. See id. at 18,278.
466. Id. at 267.
467. Id.
468. Id. at268-69.
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In short, then, Melson may or may not believe that gun control is good
for Jews-he never clearly indicates one way or the other-but he
argues quite powerfully that decentralized violence and the failure of
state legitimacy is generally bad for Jews.
In this country as well, political violence has usually taken a
racial and ethnic form in the absence of effective government; indeed,
it would appear a distinctive aspect of American culture that political
violence takes these guises, rather than class-based forms. Ted Robert
Gurr, perhaps the most distinguished student of American political
violence, explains:
One distinctive feature of the American experience is the relative
unimportance of conflict defined in class terms compared with conflict
along lines of ethnic, religious, and national cleavage.... [T]he
participants in episodes of ethnic and racial rioting saw themselves and
their opponents through the lenses of communal identification, not class
ones. Communal loyalties and antagonisms were a consequence of
ethnic and national diversity in a society established and dominated by
English settlers. The dominant Anglo-Americans defined Indians,
blacks, Irish, Jews, and Italians as separate and to varying degrees
inferior people. Little wonder, then, that if and when the latter groups
mobilized in conflict, they did so as communal or identity groups rather
than making class alliances across ethnic lines.4 69
Another student of the field offers a similar summary: "Unlike
Europe, so little of the violence in the United States [has] been
insurrectionary. Most [has] involved one group of citizens against
another, rather than citizens against the state. Class conflict [has] been
overshadowed to an extraordinary degree by ethnic, religious, and
racial conflict.'1470
469. Ted Robert Gurr, The History of Protest, Rebellion, and Reform in America: An
Overview, in 2 VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: PROTEsr, REBELLION, REFORM 11, 14-15 (Ted Robert
Gurr ed., 1989).
470. Hugh Davis Graham, Violence, Social Theory, and the Historians: The Debate
over Consensus and Culture in America, in 2 VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: PROTEST, REBELLION,
REFORM, supra note 469, at 329, 342. Graham is paraphrasing the analysis of Richard
Hofstadter, one of America's great historians albeit a partisan in the gun culture debate, in his
introduction to American Violence: A Documentary History. See Richard Hofstadter,
Reflections on Violence in the United States, in AMERiCAN VIOLENCE: A DOCUMENTARY
I-sToRY 3, 10-12 (Richard Hofstadter & Michael Wallace eds., 1970).
A generation of historians has rediscovered the prevalence of ethnic and racial violence
in this country's story. A full account would obviously be outside the scope of this Article,
but a partial bibliography would include BENNErr, supra note 77; THOMAS J. DAvIs, A
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3. The Failureof Decentralized Violence to Secure Progressive
Ends
The third reason that outgroups should fear decentralized
violence grows out of the first two. Because outgroups are small and
because decentralized violence promotes bigotry, reactionary
movements can sometimes successfully use violence for political ends,
but progressive elements almost always fail. Ted Gurr summarizes:
The use and threat of violence on behalf of social reform usually has
stimulated a backlash of defensive violence. Campaigns of violence to
reverse threatening social and political change, however, succeeded in
those times and places where their purposes were widely supported.
The use of intimidation and violence by the Ku Klux Klan, by lynch
mobs, and by vigilantes are cases in point.471
The evolution of the conflict dynamic in the civil rights
movement offers perhaps the most familiar and important example of
this theme. In broad-and necessarily oversimplified-outline, that
evolution occurred thus: in the early years of the movement, demon-
strators sought in nonviolent but provocative ways to cause Southern
white racists to attack them; appalled at such images of racist violence,
whites elsewhere in the nation came to endorse the cause of civil
rights. As a result, the movement secured impressive advances,
including landmark civil rights legislation.4 72 As the decade of the
sixties wore on, however, the conflict dynamic of the movement
gradually shifted from nonviolent provocation to violent assault,
especially in the form of urban rioting." This shift stirred a white
backlash that led to waning white support for measures to improve the
condition of African-Americans." 7 The lesson in this progression is
clear. Outgroups cannot achieve their ends by violence alone. They
need the support of others, and the use of widespread violence usually
causes them to lose that support.
VIOLENCE IN THE ANTEBELLUM NORTH (1991); and CATHEIuNE McNICOL STOCK, RURAL
RADICALs: RIGHTEOUS RAGE IN THE AMERICAN GRAIN (1996).
471. Gurr, supra note 469, at 18.
472. See James Button, The Outcomes of Contemporary Black Protest and iolence,
in 2 VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: PROTEST, REBELLION, REFORM, supra note 469, at 286, 288-91;
Doug McAdam & Kelly Moore, The Politics of Black Insurgency, 1930-1975, in 2 VIOLENCE
IN AMERICA: PROTEST, REBELLION, REFORM, supra note 469, at 255, 271-74.
473. See Button, supra note 472, at 293-94.
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468 [Vol. 74:387
1999] CONSTITUTIONAL TALES OF VIOLENCE
4. The Link Between Populism and the Revolutionary Second
Amendment
For all these reasons, it seems no coincidence that as a cultural
icon, the Second Amendment has always had a populist cast. As I
have argued elsewhere, the Framers' Amendment rested on the idea
that the right to revolution inhered in the "body of the people"--a
homogeneous, united citizenry that would rise up against a small set of
tyrannical usurpers.475  As detailed above, today, the primary
constituency for the Second Amendment is the gun culture, which
claims to be the fundamental culture of the true American people-as
opposed to arriviste interlopers with European ideas about the role ofgoverment.476 At its most extreme end, the gun culture shades into
the militia movement, which claims to represent the American people
against blacks, Jews, international bankers, secular humanists, and
others who do not belong.477
Indeed, at the most macroscopic level, it is possible to understand
the Second Amendment as an icon of the imperial expansion of
northern European culture. In arguing that the Second Amendment is
fundamental to the American soul, individual rights theorists stress
that early in our history, Americans came to cherish the right to arms
while Europeans came to disregard it.47 The reason for this American
affection was that Americans lived in a frontier society; needing
constantly to be armed against attack by hostile Indians, they
organized universal militias-the body of the people.479 Americans, in
other words, came to love guns through hating Indians. Later, these
same militias became instruments of slave control,410 and still later
populist Americans embraced gun ownership as a way to keep deviant
elements, such as new immigrants and the labor movement, in line.481
Individual rights theorists stress this tradition to emphasize the
prominence of guns in the American tradition, but it equally well
highlights the close association between gun ownership and populist
social control.
As a populist text, the revolutionary Second Amendment shares
the advantages and disadvantages of populism generally. On one
475. See Williams, supra note 2, at 577-81.
476. See discussion supra Part I.B. 1.
477. See Williams, supra note 11, at 924-46.
478. See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMs: THE ORIGINS OF AN
ANGLO-AM ECAN RIGHT 138-41 (1994).
479. See id.; Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 355, at 323-24.
480. See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 355, at 324.
481. See MICHAEL KAziN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 34-42,
52-77 (1995).
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hand, populism has a democratic and egalitarian face. Members of the
people should all enjoy the same fundamental rights and status. In this
aspect, populism has arrayed itself in opposition to self-styled elites,
and it has often served as a force for the liberation of the common man
and even sometimes the common woman.482 On the other hand,
populism has also often had a more sinister, racist, nativist, sexist, and
anti-Semitic side. Although some populists sought to extend rights to
women, Jews, and blacks, many others sought to keep all those groups
in thrall.413 Thus, American history has witnessed the ironic spectacle
of Jacksonian democrats seeking universal enfranchisement for white
males and simultaneously insisting on the subjugation of women,
blacks, and Indians4 84 Similarly, at the end of the nineteenth century,
populists attacked the power of urban wealth while simultaneously
defending white supremacy in the South.48  More recently, George
Wallace and Pat Buchanan have built populist movements by tapping
a vein of anger among "average" Americans (meaning white,
Christian, and working class-in other words, the gun culture) at
immigrants, blacks, and others.486
This apparent contradiction between egalitarianism and
hierarchical elements in American populism is only apparent.
Populists believe in democracy and equal rights, but only for members
of "the people," as they define "the people." Others cannot enjoy
equal rights, either because they are inherently inferior or culturally
too different-too "tnassimilable.'4  This affection for the people as
a political concept is thus the great promise and the great threat of
populism.488 The promise, for those who are unambiguously full
482. See, e.g., id. at 1-2; STOCK, supra note 470, at 3-5,8.
483. See, e.g., KAZIN, supra note 481, at 2,7, 14-15,34-36,40-41; STOCK, supra note
470, at 5-7, 10-13, 128-31,139-42, 148-49.
484. See, e.g., KAZIN, supra note 481, at 21-22.
485. See, e.g., id.; STOCK, supra note 470, at 6, 128-30.
486. See, e.g., KAzIN, supra note 481, at 4-5, 222-86; STOCK, supra note 470, at 152-
53.
487. See KAzIN, supra note 481, at 34-36; STOCK, supra note 470, at 110-11, 131-35,
142.
488. Catherine McNicol Stock powerfully describes this fusion of promise and threat
in rural populism:
[Tlhe roots of violence, racism, and hatred can be and have been nourished in the
same soil and from the same experiences that generated rural movements for
democracy and equality. In many places and at many times in the American past,
the best and worst, the most forgiving and most vengeful, the most egalitarian and
most authoritarian, the brightest and darkest visions of American life were alive in
the same men's souls, nurtured at the same dinner tables, learned in the same
schools, and preached from the same pulpits. Not two sets of beliefs, then, but two
expressions of the same beliefs and circumstances bound left and right together in
an unwavering, desperate, synthetic embrace.
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members of the people, has been real self-rule through egalitarian
democracy. Even the insistence on exiling "unassinilable" elements
grows out of this commitment to democracy, because populists
understand that democracies depend on a shared civic culture and
politically educated citizens.4 9 If egalitarian democracy is populism's
great promise, however, oppression of outgroups is its great threat.
Some populists have defined the people expansively,49 but others have
deemed outgroups unworthy or less worthy of self-rule--at best,
second-class citizens and at worst disenfranchised helots.491  For
outgroups, then, populism is a dangerous game to play, one that can
always turn ugly because it contains the lurking potential of exclusion.
If some are inside the people, then some must be outside. For that
reason, it again seems no coincidence that outgroups traditionally have
shied away from populism,492 preferring instead discourses that stress
the rights of individuals, regardless of race, religion, or gender, against
the legislative majority.493
Populism has generally shown its ugly and exclusive side when it
turns violent-in other words, when it embraces the Second
Amendment as its master text. Again, the examples are innumerable
and the reasons are not difficult to surmise.4 94 In a regime of
decentralized violence, citizens need some source of order and some
basis for legitimacy, and they often find it in primordial affiliation with
STOCK, supra note 470, at 148.
489. See KAZIN, supra note 481, at 34-36. Populism's promise of democracy through
a shared civic culture and politically educated citizens is by no means an antiquated idea even
today. See TODD GITLIN, THE TWILIGHT OF COMMON DREAMS: WHY AMERICA Is WRACK.D
BY CULTURE WARS (1995); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DImOCRACY WORK: CivIc
TRADTIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT:
AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996). Indeed, the yoking together of
radically disparate cultures into a single majoritarian democracy can be threatening for the
minority cultures as well. As the polity breaks down into endless culture wars, cultural
majorities simply impose their will. For that reason, American Indians have always
maintained that they should have the right to self-government within racially and culturally
separate tribes. See David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians
as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REv. 759, 841-50 (1991).
490. See, e.g., STOCK, supra note 470, at 6.
491. See supra note 469 and accompanying text.
492. Most recently, this discomfort with populist ideologies has appeared in the very
lukewarm reception that civic republicanism has received among outgroup thinkers. See,
e.g., Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J.
1609 (1988); Brown, supra note 97; Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97
YALEL.J. 1663 (1988).
493. See, e.g., ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEmnIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 28-34
(1983); PATRICIA J. WLiAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 146-56 (1991); Richard
A. Epstein, The Interior Diaspora, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1997, § 7, at 26 (book review).
494. See, e.g., STOCK, supra note 470, at 89, 109-42, 167-76.
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their identity groups.495 Private violence succeeds primarily when
used to defend the conservative order against threatening social
cultural changes-such as the movement of Jews, women, and blacks
into positions of respect, autonomy, and power.496 Finally, populists
generally turn to the gun after becoming angry and frustrated with
politics, when they believe that the political process has been captured
by enemies of the people.497 And the best evidence of that capture for
populists is that the system no longer seems to value them the way that
it once did; instead, it showers traditional outgroups with "special"
favors.
498
In short, then, the traditional cultural landscape of the Second
Amendment actually makes a good deal of sense. The absence of state
legitimacy and decentralized violence are conditions prone to produce
an angry, exclusive, and belligerent populism. The gun culture might
welcome that situation, but for outgroups it should represent great
danger. Populism has many attractive aspects, but its great downside
is precisely its ambiguous attitude toward outgroups. In other words,
it makes best sense for outgroup theorists of the Amendment to issue
warnings about the dangers of political violence, rather than to
embrace it with enthusiasm.
B. State Monopoly of Violence
Despite the threat that decentralized violence poses to outgroups,
outgroup theorists of the Second Amendment devote virtually no
attention to how America might eliminate decentralized violence.
JPFO myopically confines its concern to genocide and argues that only
the state can produce genocide; as a result, JPFO has no cause to pay
attention to private violence.4 99 The women and guns movement and
the Afro-Americanist theorists, by contrast, dwell at length on the
danger of private violence; indeed, it is precisely because of that
violence that they promote a right to arms. 00 Professors Cottrol and
Diamond even concede that armed outgroups will usually lose,
because their opponents enjoy the benefit of numbers.5°' Yet despite
their acknowledgement of the danger, they propose no way to reduce
495. See generally discussion supra Part II.
496. See STocK, supra note 470, at 163-76.
497. See id.
498. Seeid. at 124, 128, 131,140-42, 163, 171.
499. See supra notes 161-207 and accompanying text.
500. See supra notes 270-291,362-369 and accompanying text.
501. See supra notes 420-421 and accompanying text.
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conditions of decentralized violence; instead, they propose to
exacerbate those conditions, by celebrating the private use of arms.
This failure to address the danger of private violence is a charge
often leveled at right-to-arms theorists. 2 In the modem dialogue
about gun control and the meaning of the Second Amendment,
proponents of control argue that we would all be safer if we were all
disarmed 3 Thus, Robert Spitzer compares citizen self-arming to the
international arms race: "[A] national policy that encourages and
implements weapons ownership as a recognized means of self-defense
invites a domestic arms race."5°4 He proposes that government should
seek to achieve "nonproliferation of new weapons and technologies,
combined with arms control for existing weapons."5 5  Similarly,
outgroup proponents of gun control argue that outgroup members in
particular would be safer under conditions of general disarmament.
Carl Bogus, for example, maintains: "The lesson to be drawn from
both history and contemporary experience is not that blacks should be
armed, but that all citizens should be subject to stricter gun control
regulations. 50
6
In fact, outgroup theorists of the Amendment do have a response
to this charge. We must consider the alternative to decentralized
violence, and in the modem debate, the only serious alternative is a
state monopoly of violence. According to the outgroup theorists, we
should all fear a state that insists on retaining complete control of
violence, but outgroups have special reason to fear. On this point, the
thinking of JPFO, the women and guns movement, and Professors
Cottrol and Diamond all come together: outgroups cannot trust the
state to protect them. At worst, the state may itself launch a campaign
of genocide against its outgroup citizens; at best, the state may stand
aside-out of indifference, hostility, or incompetence-to allow
private violence against outgroups. The state may sometimes be able
and willing to protect outgroup members, but it is never wise to count
on that protection. Even if a general ban on guns were effective, it
would hurt outgroups. Outnumbered, their only chance is to use guns
to equalize the discrepancy. The tactic may not always work, but it is
better to succeed sometimes than never.
This response is powerful and important, and it should not be
ignored. Unfortunately, many gun control proponents do ignore this
502. See, e.g., ROBERT I SPrrZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 187-97 (1995).
503. See id. at 192.
504. Id.
505. Id. at 195.
506. Bogus, supra note 129, at 1367.
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response--an important example of the way that both sides in this
dialogue tend to talk past one another. For example, after powerfully
documenting the threat of private violence to outgroups, Carl Bogus
closes his article with a surprisingly trusting vision of the relative
reliability of the state:
This is not to deny that there will be times or circumstances when we
mistrust public authorities. We live in an imperfect world-as cynics
are fond of saying-and problems are inevitable. However, we will
live in a far more imperfect world if private groups are armed and ready
to defend "the security of a free state" as they themselves see fit 07
Bogus' claim here is really only an assertion, not an argument; he has
proved that private violence is dangerous, but he has done nothing to
show that it is more dangerous than a state monopoly.
To resolve this disagreement between the proponents and
opponents of gun control, one would have to weigh carefully the
relative risks of state violence and private violence to outgroups. As a
practical matter, that determination would probably be very difficult to
make. The hypothetical nature of this determination makes it even
harder. Control proponents would probably concede that the state has
not adequately protected outgroups but then argue that we should
focus all of our efforts on making the state sufficiently responsive.
Control opponents would respond that the state cannot be made
sufficiently responsive; control proponents would respond that it can;
and the debate then would swirl off into the increasingly speculative.
Perhaps because weighing such imponderables seems impossible,
analysts seem to fall back on their basic presumptions about the world.
Control proponents insist that the state is generally good and
competent; control opponents insist that it is inherently untrustworthy.
As a result, it is perhaps not surprising that the debate on the
relative dangers of private and public violence has not really occurred.
Nonetheless, it should occur, because it is at the heart of the
disagreement on gun control. Moreover, although these outgroup
theorists do not themselves compare the relative dangers of state and
private violence, they have collected a great deal of evidence
suggesting that the failure of the state to protect outgroups might be
endemic and inevitable. Franldy, I doubt that anyone could read these
accounts and remain untouched. Many of the stories are highly
personal and therefore powerful, if only anecdotal. The sheer
accumulation of stories by each outgroup theorist only compounds
their power, and the further accumulation across outgroups adds still
507. Id. at 1388.
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more. After a careful perusal of all these stories, it becomes difficult to
believe that (1) the American state can ever be trusted to want to
protect outgroups or (2) the American state will ever do what is
necessary to protect them.
C. Constitutional Tales of Violence
1. Prudence and Policy Versus Constitutional Storytelling
I am unable to address the prudential wisdom of outgroup self-
arming, because I do not know how to weigh the relative dangers of
public and private violence. I am inclined to believe that the judgment
would be different in different times and places. In some places,
general disarming may be a good policy; it seems to work quite well
for Japan and Great Britain." 8 Further, unlike proponents of the gun
culture, I am not convinced that the gun culture comprises the
permanent fundament of the American soul. As a result, general
disarming may be successful in some places in America today; in the
future, as the culture changes, it may be successful in more places. On
the other hand, it may also be wise for some outgroup members in
some places and times to arm themselves. The statistical effectiveness
of self-arming is a subject of heated disagreement among social
scientists, criminologists, and medical professionals, but these stories
are evidence that self-arming may sometimes be useful. 9 Moreover,
limited outgroup violence may even provoke widespread political
change when carefully used to attract the attention of a sympathetic
majority510
In short, then, I plead agnosticism to the wisdom of outgroup
self-arming as a matter of prudence and policy. Perhaps outgroups
should arm themselves, perhaps not; perhaps the state should allow
them to arm themselves, perhaps not. I would like, however, to draw a
distinction between outgroup self-arming as a subject of prudence and
policy and as a subject of constitutional storytelling. On the former
subject, I express no opinion; on the latter, I wish to argue that these
outgroup tales of violence actively frustrate the very end that they are
508. See KoPE, supra note 35, at 20-46,59-107.
509. See, e.g., Karl P. Adler et al., Firearm iolence and Public Health: Limiting the
Availability of Guns, 271 JAMA 1281 (1994); Don B. Kates et al., Guns and Public Health:
Epidemic of Nolence or Pandemic ofPropaganda, 62 TENN. L. REv. 513 (1995).
510. See Button, supra note 472, at 302. This view is of course premised on the idea
that violence may sometimes be an appropriate response to violence. As Sara Ruddick
explains, "[a]lthough she will never celebrate violence, a peacemaker may herself act
violently in careful, conscientious knowledge of the hurt she inflicts and of its cost to her as
well as her victim" RuDDICK, supra note 92, at 138.
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designed to produce-the physical safety of outgroups in the
American constitutional republic.
These outgroup interpretations of the Second Amendment leave
outgroups with only two options, and each is hopeless. First,
outgroups could commit themselves to a state monopoly of violence,
only to face the state indifference or hostility documented in these
stories. Alternatively, they could commit themselves to decentralized
violence, only to face the private hate violence that I have described.
Neither path is acceptable. The only viable future is one that these
theories never mention-the creation of a consensus culture that
welcomes outgroups, prizes their physical safety, and pervades the
way that both the state and the private sector use violence. In other
words, it does not seem especially useful to consider whether a hate-
filled state with a monopoly of violence is worse than a hate-filled
society composed of multiple, angry, and armed private groups.
Instead, we should ask how to reduce the general level of hatred likely
to erupt into violence. Reducing that level of hatred would make both
the state and the private sector more trustworthy, and the debate over
their relative trustworthiness would become less burning.
In arguing the necessity of such a consensus culture, I do not
mean to propose that the culture need be placid, monolithic, or
immutable. In fact, such a culture need serve only one end. It must
provide a common account of the way that violence should be used to
resolve social difference, especially differences between identity
groups. As a result, the consensus in this culture may be quite limited
in several ways. First, its content may be quite limited. It may address
only the use of violence among identity groups, while allowing
disagreement on other issues, including religion, gender, and race
issues.51" ' Second, the consensus need not be universal; it need only
include enough of the population effectively to control hate violence.
Third, hope for such a consensus need not be predicated on the belief
that America can ever eliminate hatred or hate violence, or that the
struggle against bigotry can ever cease.512 By contrast, it is predicated
on two more modest beliefs: (1) only general cultural change (as
511. For further amplification of this point, see discussion infra Part lII.C.2. Of
course, some general attitudes about religion, gender, and race might inevitably lead to
violence against outgroups; such attitudes would therefore be inconsistent with the necessary
consensus culture.
512. For that reason, I do not believe that my position is necessarily inconsistent with
the view of many critical race theorists that racism will never cease and the struggle against it
must therefore be perpetual. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REv. 363,
377-78 (1992). It may, however, require a belief that racial conditions can be meaningfully
improved-a belief that some critical race theorists may not share. See id. at 373-74.
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opposed to private arming) can significantly control hate violence and
(2) cultural change in the direction of greater intolerance for hate
violence is possible. Those assumptions are borne out by history. The
level of hate violence in this country has significantly diminished over
time, apparently as a result of the general delegitimation of anti-
Semitism, misogyny, and racism. In short, the constitutional
organization of violence (and, by implication, the interpretation of the
Second Amendment) provides a necessary limit to multiculturalism.
Americans need a consensus culture to control violence, so as to
provide a safe field within which America's many cultures can
contend in peaceful ways. Indeed, without agreement on the use of
violence, peaceful disagreement and multiculturalism itself would
become impossible.
Outgroup theorists, I suspect, might not directly take issue with
that position. Instead, they might respond in the following way. Yes,
we are in favor of a welcoming consensus culture, but we don't have
such a culture now. Moreover, it is unclear whether we ever will have
such a culture. In the meantime, in recognition of our current hate-
filled state, outgroups should keep their guns. As noted above, I do
not know how to gauge that claim as a matter of prudence and policy.
Certainly, it has enough force that it cannot be rejected out of hand;
maybe outgroup members should hold fast to their guns. As
constitutional stories, however, these tales of violence do not simply
protect outgroup gun ownership until we arrive at a less hate-filled
culture; rather, they actively frustrate the creation of such a culture.
They may help in the short-term, but only with unacceptable long-term
damage.
2. Hopeless Tales of Constitutional Violence
In the absence of a common language, race, ethnicity, religion, or
history, Americans have been in large measure united by their great
public professions of faith,513 and the Constitution has been central
among them.514 We have looked to the constitutional tradition for
stories that unite us as a people, delimit the legitimate use of violence,
and provide a common culture of inclusion, tolerance, and decency."' i
513. See, e.g., SEYMOUR MARTIN LipsEr, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-
EDGED SWORD 31, 50-51 (1996).
514. The Constitution has thus functioned as a kind of civil religion. See SANroRD
LEViNsON, CONSTrrTUONAL FArrH 9-17 (1988); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as
Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984).
515. The late Robert Cover strenuously insisted on the importance of paideic
subcommunities in the United States; through the creation of nomic traditions, these
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These outgroup tales of violence, by contrast, lead in the opposite
direction-to fragmentation and violent anger, not merely as a short-
term situation but as a constitutionally mandated state of affairs. To
create the necessary culture, we need stories of unification based on
justice, but these are stories of violent division rooted in mistrust.
These stories share six constituent elements. Taken together and
embraced as constitutional storytelling, these elements would sharply
circumscribe the possibilities of our common political life.
a. Perspective-Based Interpretations of the Second
Amendment
First, these stories all adopt a perspective-based interpretation of
the Second Amendment, rooted in the particularities of their group
experiences. In doing so, these theories all seem to embrace a central
element of postmodemism-truth is inevitably perspective-based,
produced and determined by the background of the truth-seeker 1 6
Moreover, again like postmodem multiculturalism 1 7 these theories
maintain that society is fractured into contending identity groups. As a
result, consensus is virtually impossible. The best that we can hope for
is the coexistence of these various cultures, living next to one another
but each perceiving the world in its own way. Concomitantly, we
cannot hope for a constitutional culture that would hold across society
in delimiting the use of violence.
The struggle to give meaning to the Second Amendment suggests
why so many feel the need for something more than perspectival truth-
telling. If multiculturalism is to be more than an apology for the
dominance of the strong over the weak, it must aim for the peaceful
coexistence of different groups. But to have peace, we must also have
widely shared norms governing the interaction of groups and
specifying when violence might be justified.518 In other words, to
some degree, we must all be uniculturalists on the subject of the
communities generated law equal in significance and gravity to the state's law. See RoBERTr
CovER, Nomos and Narrative, in COVER ESSAYS, supra note 112, at 95, 95-108, 121-28.
Indeed, Cover maintained, these communities must generate sacred texts of resistance-tales
about the way that the community relates to violence, by the state, other communities, or
themselves. See id. at 148-55. Nonetheless, despite this profound respect for nonstate law,
Cover also insisted that the state must be jurispathic. See id. at 138-40. In this welter of
conflicting legal stories, it must kill some and keep others alive, simply in order to create
conditions of peace under which paideic communities can flourish. See id. at 155.
516. See, e.g., Susan H. Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 63, 68-72, 72 n.28 (1993).
517. See, e.g., WAI.ZER, supra note 454, at 87-90.
518. See COvER, supra note 515, at 105, 109, 153-55.
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constitutional organization of violence. 19 Similarly, at some level we
must all be proceduralists. Precisely because we may celebrate
difference, we need general agreement on peaceful procedures that
will allow us to cope with the fact of difference, instead of violently
eliminating it.520 This insight is at the heart of classical liberalism, and
it retains its force in the face of modem social fragmentation. 21 When
disagreement surfaces, as it inevitably must, societies need shared
notions about how to avoid bloodshed. In short, then, a purely
perspectival approach to some constitutional provisions may be
appropriate, but not to the Second Amendment.
The outgroup theorists might argue that I have overcharacterized
their position. They might contend that they approach the Second
Amendment from a particular perspective, but they do not deny the
possibility of a society-wide "perspective." Such an argument might
take either of two forms, but neither would be persuasive. First, they
might argue that they are offering their perspective, but they do not
intend that their perspective should automatically control. Instead,
constitutional interpreters should assemble a range of perspectives to
produce a "generic" perspective. The problem with this argument is
twofold. First, it is almost certainly not what these outgroup theorists
519. I should distinguish this claim--that a shared culture on the organization of
violence is necessary for the safety of outgroups--from two other claims that I do not wish to
endorse. First, although it is important that we share a single culture on this subject, it is not
necessary, indeed perhaps it is undesirable, that that culture be controlled, produced, and
limited by the state. In that sense, following Robert Cover, see id., I do not wish to privilege
state tales of violence over others. Second, although a shared culture is necessary for the
safety of outgroups, outgroups might nonetheless reject even a protective shared culture for
reasons other than safety-such as fidelity to a distinct religious tradition. See id. at 121-31,
144-55. In that case, they might reasonably prefer cultural integrity to physical safety, but in
such a scenario, the values of safety and integrity are in tension. These outgroup theories of
the Second Amendment, by contrast, promise safety as well as integrity through self-arming,
and my point is that those promises are misleading.
520. Again, to use Cover's terminology, the courts must kill some (violent and
aggressive) legal stories, so as to create conditions that will allow legal stories in general to
flourish; jurispathos is necessary forjurisgenesis. See id. at 155.
521. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBas, LEvATHAN 228 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin
Classics 1985) (1651) ("[A] Common-wealth ... is One Person, of whose Acts a great
Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the
Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient,
for their Peace and Common Defence." (emphasis omitted)); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATiES OF
GovERumENT § 90, at 344 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690) ("[Tjhe
end of Civil Society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the State of Nature,
which necessarily follow from every Man's being Judge in his own Case, by setting up a
known Authority, to which every one of that Society may Appeal .... (emphasis omitted));
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 5 (1971) ("If men's inclination to self-interest makes
their vigilance against one another necessary, their public sense of justice makes their secure
association together possible.").
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really mean. They argue quite forcefully that we should interpret the
Second Amendment to guarantee a personal right to arms because
their perspective demands it. They never mention the possibility-
'and presumably would quite vigorously dispute the idea-that if other
perspectives (i.e., those of government bureaucrats, would-be tyrants,
or just people who are afraid of guns) counsel a contrary interpretation
of the Amendment then perhaps we should read the Amendment not
to protect a personal right to arms. Indeed, as I will argue below, these
outgroup theories almost require the rejection of other perspectives
than one's own, because it is never safe to trust the viewpoint of other
identity groups in a world beset by hatred. Second, the creation of a
single "generic" perspective would be impossible. Because the
perspectives of different groups differ on the ultimate question of
whether the Amendment should be read to protect a right to arms, it
would not be possible simply to agglomerate them. 522
Second, these outgroup theorists might argue that insights
derived from their perspectives might appeal to groups from all
perspectives. In particular, they might argue that we all might
someday be outgroups at the mercy of a tyrannical or indifferent
government, and so we all should support a universal right to arms.
As a result they would maintain, their perspectival approach is
actually not limited to their perspective at all. The problem with this
contention is that the very history of racism, misogyny, and anti-
Semitism compiled by these outgroup theorists belies the hope that
such an appeal will reach potential oppressors. As Professors Cottrol
and Diamond so effectively document Southern white supremacists
enacted legislation to disarm blacks without worrying that someday
the government might try to disarm them. 523 Similarly, as JPFO
details, the Nazis sought to disarm Jews and other "enemies of the
state" without any flicker of concern that they might someday be
522. Alternatively, the outgroup theorists might argue that there is a single privileged
perspective-the Framers'--that should form the basis for constitutional interpretation, and
luckily, both the Framers' and the outgroups' perspectives would lead to the same
conclusion, a personal right to arms. Again, this rendition of the outgroups' argument seems
untrue to their intent. If the Framers' perspective really does control, then the perspective of
outgroups is simply irrelevant in interpreting the Second Amendment-at best an interesting
digression, rather than a reason to read the provision in a certain way. Both JPFO and the
women and guns movement, moreover, seem entirely uninterested in directly examining the
Framers' intent See discussion supra Part II.A-B. Professors Cottrol and Diamond, who
read the Amendment as a protection for hated minorities rather than the right of a
revolutionary majority, even acknowledge that the Afro-Americanist perspective would differ
from the Framers' perspective. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
523. See supra notes 364-369 and accompanying text.
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branded enemies of the state themselves.524  Blinded by hate,
oppressors do not usually realize that they might someday be on the
bottom.
In other words, we will not have a unified constitutional culture
on the organization of violence as long as we consult only the
perspectives of identity groups as they are presently constituted. A
consensus culture can be the product only of careful and prolonged
political interaction, in which groups may come to enlarge their
perspectives, to accept the necessity of a shared vision, to understand
themselves as members not just of identity groups but also of a
constitutional republic, and so to redefine their own identity as
including the perspectives of other citizens.5 25 These stories-with
their unrelieved focus on a single perspective--give us no hope for
such an enlarged sense of perspective. Nor, as the next several
subparts explain, do they offer us a vision of the political process
through which such a vision might be achieved.
b. The Necessity of Hatred and Suspicion
The social world of the Second Amendment in these theories is
composed of multiple, hostile, and violent groups. That vision of the
social world is not incidental to these theories of the Amendment;
rather, it is at their heart. The whole reason outgroups need guns is
hate violence that the state cannot or will not control. If the state could
and would control private violence, or if the general culture were safe
for them, then outgroups would have no need of the right to arms, and
their interpretation of the Amendment would be entirely different. In
other words, these theories require the existence of hatred and division
to remain viable.
Moreover, these theories require that hatred and division be
permanent elements of the social world, not historically contingent.
JPFO overtly asserts that such hatred is inevitable, and for that reason,
the Constitution guarantees a right to aims.5 26 The Afro-Americanist
theorists admit that racism waxes and wanes, but argue that blacks will
always need a right to arms because violent racism will always be an
important force in America.2 7  I have been unable to find any
discussion by the women and guns movement on whether misogyny is
524. See supra notes 172-182 and accompanying text.
525. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539,
1542-45, 1549-50 (1988).
526. See discussion supra Part II.A.
527. See discussion supra Part III.C.
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ineradicable, but an answer seems implicit in its view that the right to
arms must be constitutional-and so permanent. 28
Even if these theorists might acknowledge that a unified social
world might someday be possible, they would argue that we should
nonetheless always act as if that world did not exist and were not
possible. The whole point in constitutionalizing these stories is that
the storm of hatred can always appear, suddenly and violently, even
during the calm seas and sunny skies of harmony. Only fools will
release their guns and their suspicion just because conditions seem
good right now. The Second Amendment constitutionalizes that
wisdom. The people-meaning, for these theories, all the discordant
groups in society-have a right to arms because they must always
keep on their guard, against the state or other private groups. In short,
suspicion is the fundamental relationship between each identity group,
other identity groups, and the state.
The result of this suspicion is a profound circumscription of our
political life together. Collective constitutional vision and action
become supremely difficult, perhaps impossible. An effective civic
culture depends on the existence of civic trust among citizens. 9 For
these theories, however, it is only good sense to distrust the motives
and perspectives of those from other groups. As a result, these
theories implicitly preclude the nurturance of the reciprocal
dependence, mutual respect, and dialogic interaction necessary for a
welcoming and safe consensus culture. Moreover, even if we could
somehow develop a shared constitutional vision, these theories
explicitly preclude us from acting on it by collectively organizing
violence. For these theories, the Second Amendment gives the right to
arms to each individual, to use as he or she sees fit, without the
supervision, consultation, or consideration of any other individual or
super-individual entity. As a result, to be effective, a consensual
culture on the proper use of political violence would have to be
virtually unanimous to be effective. Because such unanimity is all but
impossible under the best of conditions, some groups will inevitably
attack other groups, setting up a round of reprisal and counter-reprisal
that will foster hatred and preclude the possibility of ever reaching
consensus.
In the stories of these outgroup theories, the right to arms has
entirely benign consequences. Women fight off rapists, blacks fight
528. See discussion supra Part II.B.
529. See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAmA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION
OF PROSPERITY 3-57 (1995); PuTNAm, supra note 489, at 167-80; ADAM B. SEU.GMAN, THE
IDEA OF CvIL SOCETY 169-96 (1992).
[Vol. 74:387
CONSTIMUTIONAL TALES OF VIOLENCE
off the Klan, Jews stop the Holocaust. But in a fractured world, other
real-life stories feature the right to arms in a less savory light. In
Northern Ireland"' ° and the former Yugoslavia,53" ' conditions of
decentralized violence have resulted in wounds so deep that a
consensus constitutional culture may never be possible. Closer to
home, violence between blacks and Jews has further poisoned already
strained relations between these once allied groups, so that
rapprochement appears increasingly unlikely.532 Indeed, this last
example is especially ironic in that the outgroup theorists include both
blacks and Jews. The former tell stories of resisting the Klan, and the
latter tell stories of resisting the Nazis, but it is equally likely that some
members of each group will use their personal arms to kill members of
the other group.533
c. The Functional Equivalence of All Constitutional Visions
In these outgroup theories, all groups retain the right to keep and
bear arms alike, regardless of the malignancy of their constitutional
vision. Before the fact, the state may not choose to disarm some,
based on the danger that they pose to the commonweal; after the fact,
the state cannot or will not punish malefactors. For all practical
purposes, then, on the issue of self-arming, the state will treat all
constitutional visions as if they were morally equivalent. In this sense,
the Second Amendment functions rather like the First Amendment, in
that the state may not regulate groups based on disagreement with their
ideas.534 Indeed, in a bizarre sense, all identity groups must treat one
another as if they were morally equivalent on the issue of self-arming.
To be sure, outgroups may believe that hate groups have an inferior
constitutional vision, and they may even take up arms to prove the
point. Nonetheless, all share the right to keep and bear arms. No
group has the right to insist that the state disarm another group, no
matter how threatening that group may be. As a result, all effectively
have a right to maintain their point of view by force of arms, and each
group has no choice but to meet opposing groups on the field of battle.
530. See generally KEM Toous, REBEL HEArzs: JouRN~ysWrmENTHIRA'sSouL
(St. Martin's Press 1996).
531. See generally GLENNY, supra note 458.
532. See, e.g., RowAN, supra note 128, at 29-35.
533. See, e.g., id.
534. For a discussion of the centrality of content neutrality to the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the First Amendment, see Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and
the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. Rnv. 615 (1991).
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In short, before the Second Amendment, all share a functional
moral equivalence. This equivalence would appear to grow out of
suspicion. No one is in a position to decide who should be armed and
who disarmed, because no one is trustworthy enough. We must keep
the means of violence decentralized because no one, including the
state, holds a privileged position in determining when violence should
be deployed for political ends. The result is that the decision to use
violence has an irreducibly subjective and fluid quality. As we cannot
trust the state or some other putatively authoritative body to make such
determinations for us, we must each decide-and those decisions,
inevitably, will differ.
In analyzing the actions of the Black Panthers, Professors Cottrol
and Diamond seek to repudiate this subjectivity: "The Deacons for
Defense and Justice are to be contrasted with the Black Panther Party
for Self-Defense. The Black Panther Program included [an assertion
of Second Amendment rights]. Yet, the Black Panthers deteriorated
into an ineffective group of revolutionaries, at times using arguably
criminal means of effectuating their agenda." s35 In other words, the
main difference between the Panthers and the Deacons is that the
former may have violated the criminal law; they are objectively in the
wrong, whatever their subjective views. Yet this repudiation of
subjectivity is inconsistent with the basic premises of Cottrol and
Diamond's approach. They cannot mean that groups should never
exercise their Second Amendment rights in such a way as to violate
the law of the state; their whole historical exploration is sufficient
proof that the state cannot always be trusted to pass just or even
constitutional laws. If the state of North Carolina had criminalized the
ownership of guns or the use of guns for self-defense, the Deacons for
Defense and Justice would have been criminals as surely as the
Panthers, yet their cause would have no less good. But if the state
cannot be trusted to judge the appropriateness of violent action, then
who can? Only individuals, with their personal right to arms, can
make such a judgment-and in assassinating police officers, the
Panthers were doing exactly that, because from their perspective,
assassinations were simple acts of self-defense against the white power
structure.536  Such extreme fragmentation-the result of the moral
equivalence of all groups in the eyes of the Second Amendment-
would make the creation of a unified, protective culture supremely
difficult.
535. Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 355, at 357 n.273 (citations omitted).
536. See PEARSON, supra note 127, at 110-11.
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d. The Erasure of Political Structures
All of these theories assert that the solution to the political
problem of hate violence is personal self-arming by all the individual
members of the affected groups. Of necessity, these individuals may
sometimes organize to mount collective resistance, as when women
develop self-defense classes or blacks enlist in private militias. These
associative efforts, however, are only-and, by the premises of these
theories, can only be-the product of countless individual wills
spontaneously deciding to enlist. Like eddies in the ocean, they form
when individuals swirl toward one another, and then they disappear
when the perceived need for collective self-defense is past. Only the
individual holds Second Amendment rights, and so only the individual
can decide when and how to use them.
Collective organizations thus have no rights to arms as such; their
legitimacy derives entirely from the will of their members. As a result,
these theories express only suspicion about more formal, more
permanent, or more powerful collective organizations, such as the
state, the army, or the United Nations."3 7 At best, these organizations
will be ineffectual, and at worst tyrannical. In an old American
tradition, Second Amendment associations must follow the model of
private voluntarist groups; they must resemble mutual aid societies,
religious denominations, or reform movements." 8
These theories go to great lengths to assert the effectiveness of
private anned associations, and the ineffectiveness of political
structures, to solve political problems. Thus, JPFO criticizes the
United States and international societies for dithering or intentionally
ignoring the Holocaust; instead, the answer was to arm the Jews."3 9
Women & Guns magazine asserts that international peacekeeping will
not solve misogynist violence in Bosnia; instead, the answer is to arm
Bosnian women.540 Even Professors Cottrol and Diamond ignore the
fact that only the Union army was effective in suppressing white
supremacist violence during Reconstruction; 41 instead, they praise
black self-arming after withdrawal of the troops. 42
537. See discussion supra Part m.C.2.b.
538. See, e.g., ROBERT H. WinE, SELF-RuLE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 15,72-75 (1995).
539. See supra text accompanying note 163.
540. See supra text accompanying note 321.
541. See Enic FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-
1877, at 454-59, 569-75,582-83,587-88,593-95 (1988).
542. See supra text accompanying note 417.
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In making these assertions, these theories essentially erase
political structures as a mechanism for distributing the means of
violence. Indeed, in prescribing the use of guns for political ends,
these theories are nonetheless resoundingly silent about the political
organization of arms-bearing citizens themselves. First, the theories
maintain that the state should not have a monopoly of violence, and
second, they maintain that individuals should possess arms for political
purposes. At that point, however, their analysis stops; they seem to
lose interest in exactly how individuals will collectively organize their
armed might-if at all. Apparently, merely rolling back the power of
the state and vesting individuals with the right to arms will best blunt
the dangers of political violence.
These accounts, then, offer no theory of the collective
organization of violence beyond the simple assertion that individuals
should act as seems best to them. Indeed, these theories are virtually
driven to this conclusion by their starting premises. Because it is
unsafe to trust the state-and presumably any other super-individual
entity-with authority, only the mass of individuals can assume
ultimate control of the means of violence. Thus, these theories
explicitly condemn state attempts to control the means of violence, but
they also implicitly condemn any association-private or public-that
attempts to organize violence except through the spontaneous
agreement of individuals. To put the matter another way, these
theories reject the use of authoritative political structures as a means of
organizing the means of violence. If individuals sua sponte cohere
into a political movement, it is well and good; if not, then it is not.543
Earlier, I argued that the women and guns movement echoes the
feminist claim that the personal is political; giving women a personal
right to arms can have great political significance.5" In fact, however,
the echo is terribly distorted. The movement-like all of these
theories-actually reduces the political to the personal, by insisting
that the only effective solution to hate violence is individual self-
defense. Mainstream feminism takes exactly the opposite approach.
For most feminists, the point in claiming that the personal is political is
to seek political solutions to problems traditionally dubbed "private"
543. In this sense, there is an odd echo of Marxist theory in these outgroup
interpretations. Only when state power withers away will humankind find its liberation, free
at last of the oppression inevitable in any political system. To be sure, unlike Marxism, these
theories are not naive. They imagine that a world of decentralized violence will be bloody
and hate-filled. But they assert that it is better than what they believe to be the alternative-
trusting the state (or other super individual organizations) for protection and thus giving up
hope of personal self-defense.
544. See discussion supra Part II.B.l.c.
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and thus ignored in the public sphere. 45 Indeed, those feminists may
believe that the women and guns movement actually denies that the
personal is political, because the movement for all intents and
purposes denies that there is a political.5 46 In the view of the
movement, if police cannot protect women, then women should stop
whining and protect themselves. But at that point, misogynist violence
once more ceases to be a public concern and disappears again into the
hidden world of private relationships.
In short, these theories are so distrustful of the state that they
reject any project that would subject the realm of violence to collective
ordering. Instead, they cast their lot with the mass of individuals
organized only into such structures as they spontaneously generate.
They are so sensitive to the concern that state power corrupts that they
will instead tolerate a regime of private ordering in the realm of armed
power. Such decentralized violence may, in some situations, produce a
welcoming and just culture for outgroups. As I have argued above,
however, decentralized violence usually leads to hatred and bigotry.47
If it does so, there is very little that we can collectively do to correct
the situation, because these theories have erased political structures as
a way of organizing cultural ideas about the just distribution of the
means of violence.
e. The Fundamentality of Relating Through Arms
These theories also maintain that violence is more basic than
peaceful politics to the life of the state, and, concomitantly, citizens
relate to one another more fundamentally through arms than through
political participation. In part, this argument is simply a matter of
tone. All of these theories repeatedly celebrate the use of guns to
combat hate violence; by contrast, they never mention the possibility
of changing the culture through politics. As a result, these theories
offer no vision of redeeming the culture by making it protective
toward outgroups. Instead, they assume the perennial existence of
hatred and then urge outgroup members to arm themselves in
response. Sometimes, these theories make this tonal argument more
explicit. For example, all of these theories condemn the state-and,
implicitly, the political process that purportedly controls the state-as
unreliable and/or perfidious. By contrast, the theories describe self-
arming as the most reliable self-defense tool for outgroups. For that
545. See, e.g., OKIN, supra note 308, at 124.
546. See id. at 111, 124-33.
547. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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reason, the theories insist that outgroup members would be foolish to
depend on the state for protection; instead, they should depend only on
themselves and their identity group. Similarly, the theories sometimes
repeat an argument central to the individual rights theory of the
Second Amendment. The right to arms is our most important right,
because it is the practical guarantor of all other rights. If we give up
our guns, we lose control over government, which may then run
roughshod over the Constitution."'
The image of the social world implicit in this constitutional
vision flows from the basic premises of these theories. Underneath the
veneer of peaceful politics lurks a more essential world of primordial
hatred, waiting to boil over. We may participate in politics, but we
should also hold to our guns, ready for assault. Concomitantly, we
may relate to fellow citizens through politics, but we should also
remember that in an instant, they could become our oppressors.
Politics is no more than a precarious holding action against the forces
of hatred; our ultimate bulwark of safety is our personal capacity for
violence.
f The Constitutional Mandate of These Conditions
This element of the stories is implicit in the foregoing five
themes, but it is so important that it bears separate mention. The social
world described in these stories-one of mistrust, division, and
violence-may be an accurate portrait of the world in which we
presently live. For that reason, as a matter of prudence and policy, it
may be best for outgroup members to arm themselves now. These
stories, however, argue that the Second Amendment requires us to act
as if the social world will always be divided and violent. Indeed, these
theories maintain that this mandate of eternal vigilance is the great
insight of the Second Amendment. The world may look safe now, but
it could change in a moment. Mistrust, division, and violence are thus
not historically contingent elements of our present social order;
instead, they are permanent elements of the human condition in all
times and places. Whatever cultural gains might have been made are
fragile and untrustworthy; only a good gun is real protection.
548. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right,
104 YALE L.J. 995, 1011 (1995) (book review) ("Far from being inferior rights, in the
practical constitutional sense, Blackstone understood these auxiliary rights [such as the right
to arms] as the mechanisms that protected the subjects' natural or inherent rights."); Faria,
supra note 302, at 15 (asserting that the "Second Amendment is the right that secures all
others").
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The Constitution, in this view, is a profoundly "realist"
document. It requires us to take people at their worst, to guard against
their proclivity to do evil. Thus, this vision emphatically rejects a
different model of the Constitution as a redemptive force, a bridge to a
better future.5 49 These constitutional tales of violence tell us how to
deal with a permanently fallen world; they offer no vision of a better
one. Outgroups, however, cannot abjure redemptive constitutionalism,
because the present and the past are too hopeless. Outgroups will not
be safe under conditions of hate-filled decentralized violence, and they
cannot trust a hate-filled state monopoly of violence. Their only hope
is to reduce the level of hate. That path may seem hopelessly
idealistic, but some idealism may be inevitable in hoping that
outgroups will ever enjoy safety in a nation presently poisoned with
hatred. In that sense, redemptive constitutionalism may actually be
much more "realistic" than a constitutional vision that urges outgroup
members to celebrate the private ordering of violence.
3. The Futility of Constitutionalizing Outgroup Rights of Violence
Thus, these constitutional stories of violence frustrate the creation
of a consensus culture protective of outgroups because they essentially
mandate conditions of hatred and violence. This tendency to frustrate
the creation of such a culture is not a coincidental feature of these
particular tales; we would find a similar tendency in any outgroup
interpretation of the Second Amendment as a guarantee of a personal
right to arms. The reason is that any such interpretation must imagine
the social world as perennially poisoned by hatred; the existence of
such hatred is, after all, the reason that outgroups need a personal right
to arms. As a result, the Constitution cannot be a redemptive road to a
world without hatred; it can only be a compromise with present reality.
In short, then, telling these constitutional tales of violence creates
real costs for outgroups. Moreover, these stories will likely create very
few gains, for similar reasons. If the culture is protective of outgroups,
then presumably the state will either protect them or guarantee them a
right to arms as a matter of policy-even without a constitutional right
to arms. Thus, constitutionalizing these stories could help outgroups
only when the culture is deeply hostile. But in such a culture, it seems
wildly implausible that the state will ever actually create, recognize,
and protect a constitutional right to arms for outgroups. It defies
common sense to believe that the state will allow the killing of
outgroups but will carefiflly protect their Second Amendment rights.
549. For an example of such a vision, see CovE, supra note 515, at 101-03.
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As soon as these stories require us to posit a world filled with hatred
and violence, they virtually preclude a world scrupulous about fidelity
to the Constitution. In short, these tales make sense as stories of
guerrilla resistance; they make little sense as constitutional stories."'0
The work of Professors Cottrol and Diamond illustrate this
problem."' In scrupulous .detail, they document the way that gun
control statutes have been used to disarm African-Americans, in
violation of the Second Amendment as they understand it. They
conclude from this survey that gun control statutes generally do not
help blacks. Their work, however, might lead to another conclusion.
In the face of widespread racism, the Second Amendment has not
helped blacks either. Similarly, Professors Cottrol and Diamond argue
that both before and after the founding period, white Americans
generally feared blacks and, for that reason, sought to disarm them.
According to Cottrol and Diamond, however, the founding period was
utterly anomalous. In that one brief, shining moment, white
Americans sought to guarantee black Americans a permanent right to
arms. As I have argued, this argument is the most implausible part of
Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration.5 5 2 Apparently, Cottrol
and Diamond felt required to make such an implausible claim because
their theory makes inconsistent demands on them. On one hand, they
must assert that the culture is dangerous to blacks, so blacks need arms
to resist; on the other hand, they must also assert that the culture is so
benign that it recognizes the right of blacks to keep and bear arms.
In short, on balance, this style of constitutional storytelling offers
little long-run hope for outgroups. Such stories undercut the only
550. In a few situations, a constitutional right to arms might marginally help
outgroups, even in a hate-filled world. First, the state might be internally divided. The courts
might seek to protect outgroup rights against a bigoted legislature and executive. That
scenario would hold only under the following factual conditions: (1) despite general societal
bigotry, the courts are both enlightened and courageous; and (2) despite their bigotry, the
political branches will obey the courts' orders. Each of those factual conditions seem
implausible, and their combination even more so. Recall the Court's failure to protect
Japanese-American internees in World War II, see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), and Andrew Jackson's failure to protect the Cherokee Nation even after the Court had
ordered him to do so, see, e.g., 2 JOHN SPENcER BASSETr, THE LnFE OF ANDREw JACKSON
688-92 (1916).
Second, the state might be chronologically divided. At one point, under an enlightened
regime, outgroups stockpile private arms; at a later point, they use them to resist oppression.
Again, such a scenario seems implausible. For example, as Professors Cottrol and Diamond
themselves explain, Reconstruction governments generally did protect the right of blacks to
arms; those arms helped very little when southern governments and white supremacist groups
later sought to disarm blacks. See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 355, at 1326-29.
551. See discussion supra Part ll.C.2.
552. See supra text accompanying notes 401-403.
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long-term hope of outgroups-the creation of a protective, consensual
culture on the organization of violence. Correlatively, the stories offer
very little short-term hope for outgroups because a constitutional right
to arms will be relatively meaningless to outgroups in the absence of
precisely such a protective, consensual culture. For outgroups,
fighting hatred with guns may be a necessary stopgap in a dangerous
world; it cannot be an ultimate constitutional solution." 3
IV. CONCLUSION: POPULISM AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Culturally, Second Amendment dreams have been populist
dreams. They yearn for the people, organic, democratic, militant, and
united, rising up against its enemies. Those dreams, like much of
populism, can be noble. They have inspired campaigns for social
553. This analysis does not directly apply to one type of outgroup armed organization:
secessionist movements. I have argued that for their own safety, outgroups must seek to
transform the culture of violence; they must seek to convert the bigots, not merely shoot
them. Secessionist movements, however, pursue a different strategy altogether. Rather than
trying to defend themselves against the culture, they seek to exit it entirely. As a result, they
might not need to transform the culture, because they will have left it behind. In their new
nation, these outgroup secessionists will no longer be outgroups at all but rather the people
around whom the nation is constructed. In this sense, secessionist movements demand a
right to arms not so much for old outgroups as for new populisms. In addition, the
recognition of a right to arms for secessionist movements would be more historically
resonant with the original meaning of the Second Amendment-precisely because outgroup
secession would involve the separation of one people from another, as happened in the
American War for Independence. Again, in this sense, the demand for secessionist rights is
really a populist argument and so consistent with the general cultural tradition of the Second
Amendment.
In other words, recognition of a right to the exit option would not undermine the
importance of ajust consensus culture but strengthen it. Groups pursue the option when they
have concluded that the only way to create such a culture is separation. It is hoped that they
will then produce a new constitution with more unifying tales. As a result, although I have
argued for the general futility of a constitutional right to arms as a protection for outgroups,
that argument does not directly apply to the special case of outgroup secessionist movements.
Such movements are, however, very rare. Some Native Americans and some African-
Americans have demanded separate nationhood. See GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, BLACK
LIBERATON: A COMwARATIwE HISrORY OF BLACK IDEOLOGIES IN THE UNrrED STATES AND
SourH AmRICA 286-90 (1995); PAuL CHAAT SMrH & ROBERT ALLEN WARRIOR, LIKE A
HuRmicAN: THE INDIAN MOvEMENT FROM ALCATRAZ TO WOUNDED KNEE 217-20, 227-28
(1996). Usually, however, when outgroups arm themselves, they are seeking to secure justice
within the United States-as are all of the outgroup theorists that I have discussed above.
Even separatists, moreover, cannot safely stake their future on the power of the gun. Even if
they somehow managed to achieve independence, they would still be perennially unsafe in
the face of a hostile American culture around them. Even these secessionist movements,
then, must seek to tell constitutional stories that would create a common culture of justice
with the United States citizenry. In other words, they would need the kind of relationship
that the United States has with Canada, rather than the kind that the United States has with
Central America. I will elaborate this analysis in a future article. See David C. Williams, The
Second Amendment and the Sovereign State (unpublished, unfinished manuscript, on file
with author).
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justice, resistance to unjust authority, and at least one revolution-our
founding myth, the War for Independence. They hold before us a
particular constitutional ideal: "The people" in its most democratic,
egalitarian, unmediated, and unstructured guise, taking power into its
own hands when the government fails to honor its obligations.
Such dreams, however, can become nightmares. Direct
democracy always runs the risk of becoming majoritarian tyranny.
The people may be wise, just, and tolerant, but they may also be angry,
bitter, and intolerant. Generally, when the people feel betrayed by
government and compelled to take up air'ns, they look for the cause of
their felt disempowerment. In an old American tradition, rather than
looking for the cause of their distress in an increasingly complex
world, they seek out the enemies of the people that have betrayed
them. Too often, they find these enemies in outgroups who, in fact,
have even less power than they.
Under such conditions, outgroups may have no choice but to arm
themselves, and if the state cannot or will not protect them, it may
have an obligation to let them protect themselves. Such self-defense
efforts, like populist dreams, can be noble. They offer us an ideal of
courageous, resolute self-reliance in the face of hatred. But however
noble it might be, this ideal is still only an adaptation to an
unacceptable reality-a world poisoned with bigotry. While it may be
important to retain armed self-reliance as one cultural ideal, it is vitally
important that we not transform it into an ultimate constitutional
vision. The temptation to do so is great, as the ideal rests on values
that we deeply cherish. A people that finds its origin in resistance to
tyranny may, perhaps must, find these tales of violence enormously
resonant. After centuries of oppression, a group declares that it will
suffer no more, resolved to die free men-and women-rather than to
live slaves. But like all values, these are only partial, and they must be
balanced by a dream even more dear-the search for a society that is
peaceful, just, harmonious, cohesive, and protective of all its citizens.
Constitutional structure is one traditional route to that society.
Rather than trusting to direct democracy, the Framers sought to create
a frame of government that would balance power against power,
branch against branch, federal against state governments. These
Framers hoped that such a system of checks and balances might better
protect minority rights.554 At least some of the Framers would
therefore presumably believe that the government of a constitutional
554. See, e.g., THE FEDERALISTNO. 10 (James Madison).
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republic would better protect outgroups than the populo annato"
Subsequent constitutional amendments further sought to extend
protection to outgroups 5 6 The Supreme Court has used those
provisions to improve the well-being of outgroups, although it has
never secured-and may never secure-the dream of perfect equality
and safety. In short, many may believe that outgroups are best
protected by the state, at least if that state is a constitutional republic.
These outgroup tales of violence, by contrast, highlight just how
neglectful and oppressive the state has been to outgroups. In focusing
on this treatment, these outgroup theories find in the Second
Amendment an insight into their own history. No matter how well
designed and carefully balanced a constitutional government might be,
it can still become corrupt and oppressive. While the Amendment
may accurately diagnose the condition of outgroups, however, its
prescription will not serve them well. That prescription is an armed
people with the power to intimidate and resist the state. For those who
are unambiguous members of the people, that answer may be
empowering and inspiring; for others, it may be only terrifying. At
times in American history, populists have included all Americans in
their definition of the people, but all too often, they have insisted that
the only true Americans are people like themselves. Regrettably, the
gun culture today continues this tradition, arguing that it alone
represents the real American soul.
If outgroups can rely neither on the state nor on an armed
citizenry for their ultimate protection, then they must rely on
something even more diffuse-a general culture that cherishes the
well-being of all Americans. Such a culture would curtail the threat
posed to outgroups by either the state or an armed citizenry. Hope for
such a culture, however, may seem wildly idealistic, ephemeral, even
naive. America's mainstream culture has generally been racist,
misogynist, and anti-Semitic. To depend on that culture for protection
from violence may seem like a counsel of suicide. Outgroups,
however, have no other hope. With hate violence loose in the world,
outgroups are always at peril, and their survival may seem a miracle.
In the short-term, self-arming may work as a temporary strategy. But
in the long-term, as a subject of constitutional storytelling, it will not
bring about a better world-except, perhaps, by allowing outgroups to
555. These same Framers stressed the importance of the armed citizenry but as a
populist hedge against tyranny, not as a protection for outgroups. See THE FEDERALIST No.
46 (James Madison); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J.
1131,1162-75 (1991).
556. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, XIX.
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go to their graves with dignity. In this country, the long-term gains
made by outgroups have generally been the product of changes in the
dominant culture, not violence. To hope for such changes may seem
wildly idealistic, but to hope for the well-being of outgroups in a world
choked with violent hatred may require such idealism. If we do not
dream better dreams, we will have to live in a landscape of nightmare.
